

working farmers would be much more than \$8 a year.



Trusts and Land Monopoly.

In a discussion of Regulated Competition versus Regulated Monopoly, before the Boston Economic Club on the 8th,* Professor Johnson tripped a little, for him, in saying that the question of who should do the regulating (and in whose interest) whether of Competition or of Monopoly, is vastly more important than the question of regulation of competition versus regulation of monopoly. The important question (whether or not more important than the main question) isn't *who*? It is *how*?



But if Professor Johnson slipped unexpectedly in this way, Mr. Brandeis and some of the others slipped in a worse way—and not so unexpectedly—in ignoring the importance of land monopoly in connection with the trust question. Agricultural connotations of the term “land” have lodged so firmly in some men’s minds that much of their reasoning in economics is vitiated by it. To talk to them of land monopoly is to make them see only little farmsteads or wide stretches of public domain. Their perception of the importance to trusts of urban land monopoly, of monopoly of transportation rights of way and terminals, and of the economic emphasis that railroad tariffs and customs tariffs give to landed privileges, is a blur.



Yet it is demonstrably true that no trusts have long survived without some landed privilege, directly owned or indirectly enjoyed. The oil trust depends upon its pipe lines and terminals, which belong in the category of land monopoly. Railroad monopoly depends upon the monopoly of rights of way and terminals. The tobacco trust depends upon monopoly of tobacco lands, accentuated by tariff leverages and transportation privileges. The express monopoly depends upon its parasitical relations to railroad monopoly. The beef trust would lose its power in an instant if it lost its monopoly of the transportation terminals called “stockyards.” There is not today a single trust, with any commercial power as such, which does not possess some great government privilege; and the basic privilege of all is land monopoly. In this would concentrate *all* the profit and all the power if every other government privilege were abolished.

*See current volume, page 975.

The Ananiasing of Brandeis.

Louis D. Brandeis has been Rooseveltized into the Ananias club. Mr. Brandeis—whose progressive record, by the way, may be at least favorably compared with Mr. Roosevelt’s—ventured the statement about the Roosevelt platform which we quoted at page 938 of this volume of *The Public*. “Nowhere in that long and comprehensive platform,” said Mr. Brandeis, “neither in its nobly phrased statement of principles, nor in its general recommendations, nor in its enumeration of specific measures, can there be found *any pledge* to secure the right of Labor to organize, without which all other grants and concessions for improvement of the condition of the workingmen are futile.” He then proceeded with this explanation: “*It contains merely a friendly approval of the practice; the platform promises social and industrial justice, but it does not promise industrial democracy.*”



A fairer characterization of the Roosevelt platform it would be hard to make. Yet for having made it, Mr. Brandeis comes under some of the sweeping denunciations which Mr. Roosevelt has for several years been trying to popularize in rowdy forms. But is it Mr. Brandeis who is in the wrong? On the contrary, the truth is as he has said. In Roosevelt’s platform we find no pledge to secure organization rights to Labor. Yet organization rights, not sympathy handed down, is what Labor demands and needs. The Roosevelt platform *pledges* his party “to work unceasingly in State and nation” for several good things; but when it comes to Labor organization, in the next succeeding paragraph to the last in the list of pledges, it quits pledging and begins to “favor.” It only *favors* the organization of the workers; it offers no pledge. Why that jump from the potent “pledge” to the frivolous “favor”? If not intended to define a difference, why the milder term at that important point? Was it an accident of composition? Mr. Roosevelt wouldn’t say “accident” if he found as bad a break in any other platform.



The reason was suggested by Mr. Brandeis. And it was not far-fetched. In view of the Labor policy of the Steel Trust which Mr. Roosevelt’s economic mentor, Mr. Perkins, has only recently applauded, the substitution of “favor” for “pledge” is significant; for Mr. Perkins boasts that there are no labor strikes any more among Steel Trust employees. He does not boast that this trust has utterly destroyed Labor organization among them.

That boast would be bad politics. But it is the fact. Mr. Brandeis has shown a verbal peephole through the Roosevelt platform, and it isn't quite appropriate to Ananias him for it. What he says is true. The Roosevelt platform "does not promise industrial democracy." What it represents is *plutocratic benevolence*.



Roosevelt versus Deneen.

The essence of the violent quarrel between Governor Deneen and Mr. Roosevelt is this: Governor Deneen supported Mr. Roosevelt in his efforts to secure the regular Republican nomination for President. Mr. Roosevelt then welcomed his support. When Mr. Roosevelt's proprietary rights in that nomination were stolen, and he "bolted" the regular Republican convention to form his new party, Governor Deneen "stood pat," hoping to get for re-election as Governor the support of both factions. In this he had the co-operation of Mr. Roosevelt's Illinois organ, the Chicago Tribune, but not of Mr. Roosevelt. Having to choose between the factions, Governor Deneen took a month or so to think about it, meanwhile campaigning the State in his own behalf and maintaining a masterly neutrality on the Presidential problem. His neutrality was steadied by the Tribune, which continued to support Roosevelt for President and Deneen for Governor. In the course of his campaigning, Governor Deneen learned, or thought he did, that Roosevelt's strength in Illinois is declining. He saw, or thought he saw, that Roosevelt votes are rippling over to Wilson or slipping back to Taft. So he decided to come out for Taft. Some strong language has, in consequence, been interchanged. On the point of veritability, Deneen appears to have the best of it; at any rate he offers facts in evidence, whereas Roosevelt confines himself as usual to shirt-sleeve eloquence and epithets. But there is really nothing very substantial in the controversy. Deneen would have "looked good" to Roosevelt if he had come over to Roosevelt; in Deneen's eyes, Roosevelt would have "looked good" if the Illinois vote had had a stronger Roosevelt coloring. The one important thing about it all is that *Governor Deneen has come to the conclusion that Roosevelt will be third in the race in Illinois*. It should be added that whatever else Deneen may or may not be, he is an acute political observer.



Mayor Dunne as a "Big Joke."

As Mayor of Chicago, "Dunne was a big joke." So states an autogenetic "committee of 100" in

Chicago. And he was—to the idle and indifferent swallows of grafters' gossip. But Mayor Dunne was no joke, little or big, to the crooks of Chicago, respectable or disreputable. He made war on their graft; and he could not be bought off, coaxed off nor scared off. Until Mayor Dunne spoiled it, one of the juiciest centers for respectable graft was the school board. This graft has run up into millions annually, and lots of it keeps on going to the very newspapers that have conspired to make the groundlings think that Dunne was a "big joke" as Mayor. It was their only way. Failing to make him a grafter like themselves, they labeled him a "joke." Let whoever doubts, read the official reports of the Supreme Court of Illinois since the election of Dunne in 1905. That the Court had to decide for technical reasons in favor of the grafters sometimes, will not mislead any intelligent person; their graft was uncovered just the same. Were all the truth known, it is not improbable that some of this graft might be traced to the inner councils of that autogenetic "committee of 100" which denounces Mayor Dunne's school board record. By no means was Dunne's administration a "big joke" to big grafters (or little ones, either); the joke was too big on them to be big to them.



FREE SHIPS AND FREE SEAMEN.

A consideration of the problem of the American merchant marine discloses four palpable facts: (a) The American flag has all but disappeared from the high seas; (b) the disappearance of our shipping is a distinct loss to the country, both in peace and in war; (c) the American sailor has been driven from the sea by antiquated laws, which have as their central feature a high protective tariff; and (d) our place can be regained only by repealing the restrictive laws, and adopting such a liberal code as will give liberty to the shipmaster, and freedom and self-respect to the men.



It is not the purpose of an editorial to provide a Congressional program, but it may discuss the general principles upon which such a program must rest.

There has been a vast deal of discussion as to how our flag is to be restored to the high seas.

During the fifty years that the protective tariff has been slowly but surely strangling this one-time great industry, Congressional committees