

of Illinois, and probably of the Taft administration at Washington. Merriam was at the Republican primaries what Dunne was at the Democratic—a Progressive, fighting reactionaries. His principal supporters include such distinguished progressive Republicans as Charles R. Crane (vol. xii, p. 1095; vol. xiv, p. 80), Congressman William Kent (vol. xiii, p. 1214), and Harold Ickes. We trust that his principal supporters in the election campaign may include also the best among the Democrats who supported Dunne at the primaries.



Make no mistake. Merriam will need all the democratic support he can get, from whatever party it may come. Plutocracy does not curl up and lie down when it is knocked out. It "comes to the scratch" again every time, with all its retainers. Every vote that Roger Sullivan, "Hinky Dink," the La Salle Street crowd, the Hearst papers, the Lorimer esoterics—every vote that these can influence will be rallied against Merriam, for he is none of their kind; and the Taft spoilsmen and the Deneen organization, while externally enthusiastic, will be interiorly cold, for he is none of their kind either. Congressman Kent has been through it all and has won. He was elected by progressive Democrats and progressive Republicans. So it must be with Merriam, or Chicago will fall into the hands of Hearst and his new friend Harrison, with "Hinky Dink" and his friend Lorimer "on the side."



Presidential Nominations.

Mr. Bryan's intimation that Governor Harmon of Ohio is unavailable as a Democratic candidate for President appears to be wise and well founded—so well founded that there is little to fear. With such men as Governor Wilson and Governor Foss forging ahead on the Democratic side (and, moreover, Champ Clark may "make good" as Speaker), Governor Harmon is quite unlikely to play the part he has laid out for himself as a candidate at the Democratic convention. If he were to secure the nomination, there are La Follettes and such who might be nominated at the Republican convention, whereupon Governor Harmon would be no better off with the Democratic nomination than without it. And if a reactionary were nominated by each convention, would it be unreasonable to anticipate something suggestive of chemical action in American politics?

President Taft's Freer Trade.

President Taft's play at politics through his reciprocity venture is not likely to work out as well as he has been advised. Its apparent purpose was to put progressive Republicans of farming regions into a political hole, and incidentally to bother the Democrats. It didn't bother the Democrats at all. There was enough free trade in it to make it acceptable to the progressive wing, and not enough to give the reactionary wing a toehold. So the Democrats have embarrassed Mr. Taft by adopting his reciprocity measure as their own. Progressive Republicans, however, were embarrassed by it as was intended. The farmers on whom they must depend for support have lived so long on protection delusions that they were scared by reciprocity. But they are thinking the thing over now, and thinking is deadly for protection. By the time Mr. Taft's reciprocity comes to a vote, he is likely to realize that the trap he made has caught other political game than progressive Republicans. In calling a special session of a Democratic Congress for the sole purpose of passing a reciprocity measure, this Republican President is challenging Fate. Few things could better contribute to the disintegration of parties.



THE BRITISH REFERENDUM.

It must puzzle British democrats to find their friends in Canada and the United States so keenly for the referendum (p. 204), while they themselves are as keenly opposed to it. This apparent incongruity may be somewhat puzzling, too, to referendum advocates over here.

But the explanation is easy.

Over here the referendum is a people's referendum, part of the fast spreading movement for extension of People's Power in government.

But in Great Britain the referendum is a House of Lords' referendum, part of the fast dying institution of Hereditary Power in government.



Considering the introduction of the referendum into British politics, it is first to be observed that the "responsible ministry" system in British government has an extraordinary tendency to make representative government truly representative of the people. It is so much more representative in actual operation than our system of "checks and balances," that Americans appreciate only with great difficulty the keen sensitiveness and re-

sponsiveness of British government to British opinion.

This responsiveness alone has much to do with the different attitudes of British and American democrats toward the referendum. It would probably make less urgent need for the Referendum over there than here—and would certainly account for the different attitude—if the Referendum proposed there were really like that proposed here.



But the British referendum lacks every element save one—and this of little value in itself, and under the circumstances, actually obstructive—of a People's Power referendum. Its one lonely element of democracy is this, that when a question once gets to the people on referendum, they may decide it.

We say *may* intentionally. Under the original British referendum proposal (vol. xiii, pp. 55, 275, 297, 320, 348, 368, 417, 585, 637, 1097, 1139, 1153, 1159) we understand that the popular verdict was to be advisory rather than decisive; and as yet we have no different assurance on this side of the Atlantic regarding the referendum proposed last week (p. 229) by Lord Balfour of Burleigh. If only advisory, the British referendum would be like our Illinois referendum which legislators once elected seem disposed to regard as a pretty toy for the people, except that the British people couldn't even play with the toy without the previous consent of their "representatives."

Let the British referendum be never so democratic in the decisiveness of its results when used, the people could not set the machinery for it in motion themselves.

In that respect it would be like our Constitutional amendment referendums, which get to the people for their approval or rejection only when both houses of a legislature agree, under peculiarly difficult circumstances, to let the people use it. It is these referendums in the States to which Liberal statesmen and other publicists of Great Britain allude when they cite referendum experience in our country as unsatisfactory. They are right. It has been unsatisfactory. But these are not examples of the People's Power referendum, which has been adopted by several States, and has been proved to be of the highest democratic value (governmental value, too, if anyone wishes to distinguish) in an experience of ten years in progressive Oregon.

There is no sincere and intelligent referendumist in the United States or Canada who would toler-

ate the thought of such a referendum as is proposed for Great Britain. And the more intelligent and sincere and keen for the referendum he was, the stronger would his opposition be. For he demands the referendum in the interest of popular government; and he would see that the British referendum is a "joker," with none of the genuine democratic essence in it, having indeed no resemblance to a democratic referendum except in name, and being brought forward for the purpose of obstructing a Liberal program such as referendums are intended to promote.



In contrast with that House of Lords "joker" of a referendum, consider the referendum as we have it in America in some places and are trying to get it in others. With us the Referendum is a power reserved by the people to themselves, to veto the legislation of their representatives. If the latter misrepresent by enacting a law which a certain percentage of the people regard as bad and unpopular, those objectors—not lords, but folks, just folks—can file a demand for a referendum, and thereupon and therefore there is a referendum. If, then, a majority of the people interested either way in the subject vote to veto, the legislative measure is not a law; if they vote not to veto, it is a law. Let our friends in Great Britain put their Lords' "referendum" to that democratic test. But this is not all. We of the United States regard the referendum as less valuable, if there be a difference, than the Initiative, which goes with it in order to complete the idea we call Direct Legislation.

By the Initiative the people can not only say, "Veto!" to objectionable laws which their representatives thrust upon them, but they can say, "Be it enacted!" if their representatives refuse to enact laws they are elected to enact. A certain percentage of the people can file a signed demand that rejection of a proposed law by representatives be not final, but that the people decide the question directly. It is an appeal from the legislature to the people. If, then, a majority of the people vote against making that measure a law, the inaction of the legislature is sustained; if they vote the other way, its inaction is overruled.



John Z. White makes a good illustration when he compares Direct Legislation to the proceedings of parliamentary bodies.

A member of the legislature offers a bill. Here is the Initiative in the legislature. The bill goes to committee. If the committee reports adverse-

ly, a member, seconded by one or more others, may move to adopt it nevertheless. The Initiative again. If the committee reports favorably, a vote of the legislature is taken, which is a Referendum. But what is the legislature? It is to the people what the committee is to itself. If then the people are to govern themselves, and not be governed by a committee, the proposed law must go from the representative body to the body it represents. In that larger body, if the legislature (now a committee of all the people) has acted adversely on the measure, a member of the larger body, one of the people, seconded by as many others as it is fair to require, may move the people to adopt the measure notwithstanding the adverse action of their committee, the legislature. Here you have the Initiative raised from legislative power to people's power. But if the legislature (a committee of the people) has acted favorably, a member of the larger body, one of the people, seconded by as many others as it may be fair to require, may move the whole people to veto the action of their committee, the legislature. Then you have the Referendum raised from legislative power to people's power.

In other words, the Initiative and the Referendum are to the political body as a whole, what motions and rules and appeals from the chair are to their representative bodies.

To understand the referendum in this way, and to know its history in the United States, is to know why it is popular with American democrats, while its House of Lords' namesake is unpopular with British democrats.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THOSE QUEER CANADIANS.

Portland, Ore.

I use the term "queer Canadians" advisedly. I mean that they are "at variance with what is usual or normal" in the United States, "differing in some odd way from what is ordinary"—on this side the line; but not strange, suspicious or questionable. And I am speaking of the Canadians from Winnipeg west to Victoria, for our party—Joseph Fels, Daniel Kiefer and I—went from Minneapolis to Winnipeg and then followed the line of the Canadian Pacific to Vancouver and Victoria.

At Winnipeg we were joined by Robert Lloyd Scott, of Winnipeg, who accompanied us to Portland. I mention Scott because he is worth mentioning; young, but a big part of the democratic movement in Canada.

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Yes, those western Canadians are "queer." Most of them, as far as I could see, are demo-

crats; and while they know we have the worst government on this continent north of Mexico, they are too courteous to tell us so unless we insist on "annexation" of Canada to the United States. Then they tell us plainly, but still courteously, why they forbid the bans.

They, subjects of a king, have more democracy in government than we have, and they are getting ready to have more than they have. So are we, for that matter; but they are not tied up and hampered with Constitutional handicaps against democracy as we are. They are not shouting for a "republican form of government;" they see that we have the form without the substance, and what they want is the substance, remembering what the Pope said about forms of government; they know that "a painted ship upon a painted ocean" is not a merchant marine.

"Nominally we are ruled by a king, but actually we are not," say those Canadians; "nominally you Americans rule yourselves, but actually you are ruled by your servants; and as your Congress, your President and your Federal courts are seldom in harmony, it is discordant rule." Queer, aren't they?

They say, also: "You have a Congress to make laws, and a President to enforce the laws made by your lawmakers; but your Federal courts nullify the laws made by your representatives and prevent your Executive from enforcing the laws. So you are ruled by nine men, not by yourselves, and the nine men are not responsible to the ninety million in any way. So we would rather be excused from annexation." Am I wrong in saying that they are "queer"?

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Once more, "God save the King" is always the last course of any public luncheon or dinner in Canada. As well try to prevent an American political crook from barking about the flag when he's trying to work a crooked deal as try to adjourn a Canadian public luncheon or dinner without "God save the King." But, really, they don't care any more about the King than Joe Cannon does about the farmers when he tearfully pleads for "Protection for American farmers." The difference is that Cannon knows he isn't telling the truth, while the Canadians don't try to deceive anyone with their after-dinner song. But the Canadians don't make one-tenth the fuss over their King, what he says, what he has for breakfast and how he looks when he's trying to think, as we make over our President in the same circumstances.

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Perhaps I haven't proved that the Canadians are "queer." Well, then, when a member of the Canadian parliament is defeated for re-election he takes no further part in making laws; in most of the Provincial parliaments there is no Senate; the term of Provincial legislators is five years, unless the "government" is defeated on a bill or resolution, in which case there is a new election—the theory and generally the fact being that a defeated government doesn't represent the people and has no business remaining in power. The "government"—that is, the party in power—may be returned to power by