

abroad, together with a reasonable profit to American industries." So does the great "insurgent" rank and file in the Republican party of which he is a leader.

But this idea of Protection cannot survive a thorough going popular discussion. Its fallacies are so vulnerable that a political campaign between it and tariff for revenue only, would probably give the whole tariff system its death at the polls.

And though it were to win at the polls, the impossibility of realizing it in legislation, would offer such tempting opportunities to the greedy Interests whom Senator Cummins is fighting, that they themselves would open the public eye to the iniquity of Protection and bring down upon it in the very hour of its apparent victory the great big public fist with a smashing knock-out blow.

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A small thing it seems, that over which Senator Cummins in behalf of democratic Protection challenges the plutocratic Protectionists to mortal combat politically.

But political revolutions break out over small things.

In the very nature of affairs political it must be so. The party leader who would command the support of a discontented faction of his party in order to make it progressive, cannot be extreme even if he would. Votes are few at the extremities of political pathways, and political leaders must have votes just as military leaders must have soldiers.

Votes in masses are to be got not by appeals to extremists, but by appeals to the middle minds, to those that are as yet but barely distinguishable from those from which they are ready to secede, or whom may be unwilling yet to secede at all.

It is for this reason that radicals in agitation are seldom successful in politics. Leadership in thought and leadership of men are totally different functions, usually requiring different faculties. And neither kind of leader can long fool anybody by merely posing for the other kind.

It is because Senator Cummins sees no further than "fair" Protection "for all"—which is as far as the revolting masses in the Republican party yet see—that he is a better political leader for his time and opportunity than if he were at heart a free trader. The point is that he and his followers in Iowa, like La Follette and his followers in Wisconsin, and other Republicans in other States, are raising the real issue, and raising it so gently that their party will be shaken up and racked to pieces over it before its radical tendency is

generally recognized. It was not over the question of slavery but over an extension of slave territory, that the two great parties of the 50's went to pieces and a new one came into power.

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The disintegration going on in both great parties now, over the vital political question of democratic Protection which Senator Cummins is defiantly raising in one, and over the vital political question of tariff for revenue only, which William J. Bryan is vigorously pressing in the other, has but one political meaning. Senator Cummins sensed its meaning when he said in his Chicago speech:

In a country developed as ours is developed, with our abstract ideas of liberty and free government thoroughly established and never questioned, national politics relates almost entirely to economic, industrial, commercial and financial questions. Under these conditions the natural dividing line, politically speaking, puts the progressives into one party and the conservatives into the other. The traditions of the olden time, when the issues were of a different character, necessarily obscure this division, but nevertheless the potential forces of one party will be progressive and of the other conservative. Hitherto, although there have been some irreclaimable and hopeless obstructionists who have been and are Republicans, the party as a whole has been progressive. There are some signs now that a number of our distinguished leaders think that we have gone far enough and that we should settle down, for a period at least, into the quiet and peace of inaction. I hazard the prediction that if we do, the camp we pitch will be our burial ground. There are things to be done, and if we are not willing to do them some other party will undertake the task and we will become nothing more than a memory in the life of the nation.

But party progress as to the tariff spells, not gradations toward more Protection, not gradations toward more refined Protection, but gradations away from Protection and toward Free Trade—toward free trade not as to customs tariffs alone, but to all taxation.

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THE BRITISH SUFFRAGETTES.

There are two ways of looking at the lawless aspects of the suffragette movement in England, and they are so different that they cannot to any advantage be considered together.

We may on the one hand regard these phases of that movement as unpremeditated outbreaks, irresponsible and uncontrollable, the promoters of which can no more be reasoned with than persons in a panic, or than you can reason with smallpox epidemics, or with anything else of a pathological nature. The victims have taken the disease and

that is all there is to it. So considered, the subject is one for the advice of pathological experts.

But if, on the other hand, these outbreaks are purposeful, and the persons responsible for them are reasonable and responsible creatures, then the subject is one for rational discussion as a species of political tactics. So considered, we are not prepared to condemn them sweepingly. On the contrary we are disposed to acknowledge that lawless demonstrations by outlawed classes—disfranchised women are an outlawed class—may be both legitimate and effective as modes of protest and a means of agitation.

It all depends upon the object, and the good faith and good sense of the leaders (vol. xi, pp. 535, 849, 866; vol. xii, p. 55), together with the circumstances under which the demonstrations are made.

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The first inquiry regarding the British suffragettes, considered as persons in possession of their faculties, is their object. Not what most of them say their object is, or think it is, but what it really is.

Suppose the demand of the suffragettes were fully granted to-day, what would be the relation of British women to the suffrage to-morrow?

The question is not a difficult one to answer. The demand is very specific. It is that women shall be admitted to the suffrage on the same terms as men. To know, then, the practical effect of that demand, we have only to ascertain the terms on which men in Great Britain are admitted to the suffrage.

Turning to Lowell's "Government of England"—the Lowell who is now president of Harvard University—we find in the first volume at page 209 the following classification of voters: (1) Men who own land worth \$10 a year, or are lessees of land under 60-year leases or longer at \$25 a year, or under leases of 20 to 60 years at \$250 a year (these values varying somewhat in Scotland and Ireland); (2) men who were freemen or male descendants of freemen of boroughs prior to 1832; (3) men who occupy as owner or tenant land worth \$50 a year; (4) men who occupy as owner or tenant any dwelling house or part of one as a separate dwelling, including caretakers who occupy in dwellings in which the employer does not reside; (5) men who occupy lodgings of the value (unfurnished) of \$50 a year.

Now, if the suffrage were extended to women on those terms, which are the terms of the suffragette demand, how many women would be enfranchised?

Those who own land worth \$10 a year capital-

ized—say, \$200 in capital value; which would practically exclude all working women.

Those renting land for 20 years or more at \$250 a year, or 60 years or more at \$25 a year; which would exclude most, if not all, working women.

Free women of boroughs and their descendants; and of these there are probably none.

Women who occupy land worth \$1,000, or \$50 a year; which would exclude most, if not all, working women.

Women who occupy, individually, as owner or tenant, a dwelling house or part of one as a separate dwelling (including women caretakers occupying in dwellings in which their employers do not reside); which would exclude nearly all unpropertied women, for they occupy, as a rule, as members of the family of a husband or father.

Women who occupy, individually, lodgings of the value (unfurnished) of \$50 a year; which would exclude all working women except the few of the better paid classes.

When it is remembered that under the suffragette demand women could not vote in virtue of the right of husband or father, but only in virtue of their own separate and distinct property rights, it is evident that the suffragette extension of suffrage would extend the suffrage not very far beyond women with property in their own name, and that the largest woman vote would be cast by rich women. It is roughly estimated that hardly more than 4 per cent of the women of England would be enfranchised if the suffragette demand were literally allowed.

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There are two replies to the above criticism.

The first is the reply that municipal suffrage, which gives to women the same voting rights that men have, has enfranchised nearly 90 per cent of the women municipally. But British suffrage for men rests upon a far more liberal basis for municipal than for Parliamentary purposes. According to Lowell, at page 146 of his second volume, the proper qualifications for municipal suffrage include occupation, joint or several, of any house, warehouse, counting house, shop or other building, without regard to its value. Even with this greater liberality as to qualifications, municipal suffrage for women in England appears, says Lowell, to have added only about one-eighth to the municipal voting register.

The second reply to the above criticism of the suffragette demand is to the effect that the women whom this extension of the franchise might invest with voting rights, whether many or few,

would use their greater influence to confer the right upon their still unenfranchised sisters. "I doubt it," said the carpenter, and shed a bitter tear." Much more likely would the force and influence of the enfranchised women of property be exerted against further extension of the suffrage. Not for sex reasons, nor with sex discriminations. God forbid! But because "property and intelligence go together, don't you know," and intelligence thus certified to should govern. Whereupon, if the suffragette tactics now used to coerce favorable Parliamentary action by "ministers of the Crown" were logically followed, the unpropertied and therefore unenfranchised of both sexes would proceed to break up the dinner parties and smash the windows of the propertied classes in order to coerce their favorable action as voters!

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The second inquiry regarding the British suffragettes, is the good faith or good sense of the leaders (whichever you prefer to call it), or both, in connection with the circumstances.

These outbreaks did not begin until the Liberals had come into power charged with a commission by the electorate to do certain things—things that could not but have been, and which have proved to be, highly offensive to propertied persons of both sexes—especially to those whose property rests upon privilege. But very soon after the Liberals so commissioned had come into power, the suffragette outbreaks began.

If these outbreaks were of a socio-pathological nature, as some of their defenders explain, the peculiar fact that they began just at that time is of no importance. Nobody can regulate or be responsible for the period of the beginning of social hysterics. But if the outbreaks are deliberate, responsible, rational and controllable, the time chosen for beginning them is a highly significant fact.

For nearly a score of years the privileged classes had been in power in Parliament through the Tory party. Yet the Tory party was undisturbed by these lawless suffragette tactics. Hardly, however, had the Liberal party come into power, with its commission to undermine some of the hoary privileges the Tory party stands for, than suffragette lawlessness set in.

Why it should have embarrassed the Liberal ministry, most Americans do not understand. But it evidently did, and the radical wing most of all. Considered as a responsible program, it was inexcusable to any progressive who realizes the vital importance of making reforms one by one so as

to concentrate popular influence instead of dissipating it.

Before the Ministry could do anything effective in a progressive way, it had to "get together." A score of officials, just invested with vast responsibilities, cannot agree upon progressive policies the instant they come into power, if some of them are temperamentally progressive and others conservative. The progressive elements must first convince the others. And if at that critical juncture there are lawless demonstrations which can be identified with the progressives, the delicate task of the progressive members of a ministry is multiplied immensely. It was this task (which had fallen upon Lloyd George and Winston Churchill and Mr. Ure and some of their sympathetic associates) that the lawless suffragette tactics loaded down as with a cargo of lead.

For part of the program of the progressive ministers which fell under that load was woman suffrage. Not the limited kind of the suffragette demand, which, while giving the vote to no workingman's wife, to hardly any workingman's daughter, to only a few unmarried workingwomen, would give several votes to each woman of property who held property in different voting places—not that spurious kind of woman's suffrage was it that the progressive ministers were striving to make a part of the ministerial program, but the genuine kind of one man one vote and one woman one vote.

Lloyd George was urgent for this electoral reform, and the Prime Minister was not unfavorable. Curiously enough, however, Lloyd-George, an outspoken woman suffragist on the principle of one woman one vote, has been the victim of the worst attacks from violent suffragettes, if we overlook the horsewhipping of Winston Churchill as a piece of insanity. Next to George, perhaps, the worst sufferer was the Prime Minister, whose acquiescent disposition toward George's suffrage programme could hardly have been stimulated or emphasized by his personal experience with suffragette tactics.

It is not to be forgotten either, if we consider the suffragette movement with reference to thoughtful tactics and not as an uncontrollable disease, that the speeches of Asquith and George and Churchill and the others that were so violently interrupted, were speeches in favor of the land clauses of the Budget, which are radical in their tendencies, and are urged on the one hand and opposed on the other because they are recognized as a death blow to feudal landlordism.

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We are not disposed to regard the suffragette

movement as tainted with bad faith, notwithstanding the suspicious circumstances. There are too many other possibilities of explanation. Nor have we a word to say against it if it is pathological. But if it is a responsible movement, generated in good faith, nothing can be said in its favor. It has placed itself across a progressive Liberal program, to the embarrassment of progressive Liberals and the delight of reactionary Tories; it has done all it could to thwart the efforts of radical ministers for womanhood suffrage; and its demands would place upon woman suffrage a property qualification which, while liberal with reference to men, would be enormously restrictive as to women.

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AN IDEAL CHICAGO, AND THE COST OF IT.

VI. Of Detailed Plans for Meeting the Cost.

Having seen, with sufficient probability for practical purposes (p. 1086), that the growth of Chicago and the consequent increase in Chicago land values in the next fifty years, if the Ideal Chicago were realized, would be amply greater than the cost of that realization, we come now to a consideration of the practical details.

We assume, of course, that in fairness to all interests the cost ought to be paid out of the consequent increase in land values, if practical provision for this is possible. The policy being conceded—and what honest man can oppose it in principle?—details for executing the plan remain to be proposed.

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The first inquiry in this connection is as to the differentiation of increase in land values that would result without the Ideal Chicago, from the increase which would be due to its idealization.

Without idealization, land values would doubtless go on increasing in the future as they have in the past; but, considering the city as a whole, in a diminishing ratio.

Mr. Hurd in his "Principles of City Land Values," at page 18, truly says: "The life of value in land, whether the unit taken is a city, a section of a city, or a single lot, bears a close analogy to all other life in being nominally characterized by a small beginning, gradual growth, and increased strength, up to a point of maximum power, after the attainment of which comes a longer or shorter decline to a final disappearance. Thus all value in city land undergoes a continuous evolution from a state of non-existence,

through a cycle of changes to a final dissolution, or to a new birth, when the process is repeated on the same land."

We direct attention to Mr. Hurd's "new birth" of value.

Evidently he does not mean that city land values actually disappear after reaching a maximum. That would not be true. What he doubtless means is that there is a maximum beyond which they do not go under the old impulses; and that when this maximum is reached they have a backward tendency unless new impulses give them, as it were, "a new birth." That this is true every intelligent real estate expert knows.

Under that natural law of city land values, the effect of existing impulses in Chicago might soon be spent. Were Chicago to stop growing and improving, Chicago land values would stop increasing and begin to decline.

That this will not occur, but that the reverse of this will occur, is highly probable. Chicago land values will doubtless keep on growing phenomenally in the future as in the past. But it will not be due in great measure to the impulses of past growth. It will be due mostly to new civic impulses. Chief of all these new impulses, and far and away ahead of all other influences, would be the influence of the proposed idealization for which we are seeking an expense fund.

Other influences would come in, to be sure. There would be a wonderful increase of population; there would be a far reaching extension of city area; there would be tremendous improvements and economies in industry and intercourse, in life, work and enjoyment.

Some of these value-creating influences would come in some degree without the idealization; and with idealization the increased value of Chicago land would be somewhat due to those influences. Let that be so, and yet the owner of the site of Chicago could lay no more claim to the consequent values. Why should land owners be entitled to those values? Due to general causes, why should they be diverted to individual advantage? But that is not the question we are discussing. Our object here is to concede to Chicago land owners—however preposterous the concession—all the values so produced.

In an excess of social generosity, we are proposing to leave to Chicago land owners, their heirs, successors and assigns, all the land values that may come from increase of population not caused by the contemplated idealization of the city; all that may come from public or private