

ucts except munitions of war have been permitted to be sold to belligerents by the provisions of international law.

Now this is one of those half truths which are "ever the worst of lies." It is true that foodstuffs, horses, etc., may be sold in this country to belligerents without breach of neutrality. It is true, also, that belligerents may freely buy them. The same is true of powder and guns. There is no such difference, as the Journal would imply, between guns, etc., and horses, etc., to be used for belligerent purposes. Everything to be so used comes within the category of "munitions of war," with the exception only of money and men. Nor has anyone complained of the sale by Americans of horses and mules to the British. What is complained of, and what constitutes the breach of neutrality, is not the purchase of these munitions, but their shipment by British army agents, at an American port, on board British transports, to the seat of the war.

Questions of neutrality in connection with the shipment of war supplies from any neutral country are determined by the simple consideration of whether, when shipped, they are commercial commodities in the regular channels of trade, or war supplies in the possession of a belligerent. The horses and mules purchased in this country cease to be commercial commodities the instant they come into the possession of British army agents for British army use. They are then no longer commodities in the channels of trade, but army supplies in the possession of a belligerent. And if the belligerent loads them upon one of his own army ships, in a neutral port, for shipment to the seat of the war, the neutral nation knowingly permitting him to do so is guilty of breach of neutrality. This is an old principle of international law, which was acknowledged by the treaty of Washington when it declared that—

A neutral government is bound . . . not to permit or suffer either belliger-

ent to make use of its ports or waters . . . for the purpose of renewal or augmentation of military supplies. . . .

#### THE CAUSE OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

British partisans place the responsibility for the South African war upon the Boers, pointing to the Boer ultimatum of October 9, 1899 and the Boer invasion of Natal of a few days later, as its wanton beginning. But intelligent nonpartisan investigators into the origin and causes of the war have long since concluded that it began virtually with the Jameson raid of 1895-96. The Boer ultimatum and the Natal invasion were inevitable effects of the same British spirit of aggression that caused the raid. They were defensive acts against the manifest policy of the Salisbury government of forcing all South Africa into the British empire; and the Jameson raid was the first overt act in furtherance of this aggressive policy.

That the British government disavows all responsibility for the Jameson raid makes no difference. The plea of "not guilty" is as common in the history of national as of individual crime, and as insignificant except for the purpose of putting the prosecution to its proofs. What is of real importance is that this criminal responsibility is fixed upon the British government by the conceded facts.

For instance, the latest defender of the British government, Dr. Conan Doyle, that ingenious creator of the slippery Sherlock Holmes, while he disavows British responsibility for the raid in his partisan argument, discloses it most plainly in his statement of facts, incomplete as that statement is. Referring to the aliens resident at Johannesburg, who wanted to be citizens of the South African Republic without forswearing allegiance to the British crown, and were plotting to overturn the existing republican government, Dr. Doyle says:

Unfortunately they had complicated matters by asking for outside help. Mr. Cecil Rhodes was premier of the Cape, a man of intense energy and one who had rendered great services to the empire. The motives of his action are obscure—certainly, we may say, that they were not sordid, for he has always been a man whose thoughts

were large and whose habits were simple. But whatever they may have been—whether an ill-regulated desire to consolidate South Africa under British rule, or a burning sympathy with the uitlanders—

meaning aliens—

in their fight against injustice—it is certain that he allowed his lieutenant, Dr. Jameson, to assemble the mounted police of the Chartered company—

one of those hybrid commercial corporations with comprehensive governmental functions, which have made so much of British history hateful—

of which Rhodes was founder and director, for the purpose of cooperating with the rebels at Johannesburg. Moreover, when the revolt at Johannesburg was postponed on account of a disagreement as to which flag they were to rise under—

whether under that of the South African Republic or that of Great Britain—

it appears that Jameson (with or without the order of Rhodes) forced the hand of the conspirators by invading the country with a force absurdly inadequate to the work which he had taken in hand. Five hundred policemen and two field guns made up the forlorn hope who started from near Mafeking and crossed the Transvaal border upon December 25, 1895. On January 2 they were surrounded by the Boers amid the broken country near Dornkop, and after losing many of their number killed and wounded, without food and with spent forces, they were compelled to lay down their arms.

Dr. Doyle does not say so, but it is a well-authenticated and undisputed fact, that this invading force, sent out by Cecil Rhodes, head of the Chartered company which exercised political authority in the British territory that it exploited commercially and which bordered on the Transvaal, included officers as well as privates of the British army and carried the British flag.

That would seem, *prima facie*, to make the British government itself responsible for the raid; and from this *prima facie* responsibility there is no escape short of serious criminal proceedings by that government for what, if not authorized, was a gross misuse of the British army and the British flag. Such proceedings were indeed instituted. But only against the mere tools of Rhodes—Jameson and a few of his raiding band. Even these proceedings were not for an offense so se-

rious as the use of the army and the flag for levying unauthorized war upon a friendly power. They were for a simple misdemeanor such as any filibustering civilian might have been charged with, and the accused were most mildly and delicately, not to say lovingly punished. As to Rhodes, the head-devil of the raid (as Doyle admits him to be, though in more deferential language), no proceedings at all were instituted against him. His misuse of British officers and the British flag, as head of the Chartered company, was ignored. Nevertheless, Dr. Doyle has the temerity to argue that the British government was not responsible for that raid.

The simple and incomplete facts which he himself narrates stand out in plain refutation of his own argument. That the British government did not connive at the raids affirmatively and openly, is, of course, quite true. No one accuses it of having done that. The point is that Cecil Rhodes, acting in pursuance of one of those "understandings between statesmen" which constitute part of Mr. Chamberlain's stock in trade, went ahead with a policy of which the Jameson raid was part, leaving the British government to disavow the raid if it failed and to adopt its results if it succeeded. Rhodes imitated the near-sighted Yankee sportsman whose rifle was so adjusted that when he aimed at an animal he would hit it if it was a deer and miss it if it was a cow.

There was no difference in this particular between the Jameson raid of 1895-96 and the Shepstone raid of nearly two decades earlier, except that in Shepstone's case the game proved to be a deer instead of a cow. Shepstone had no more authority from the home government to invade the Transvaal than had Rhodes. Had he been as unfortunate in calculating the Boer strength at that time, and, like Rhodes and his accomplice, Jameson, gone about the matter "with a force absurdly inadequate," his raid also could have been disavowed and doubtless would have been. But Shepstone, whatever may have been the size of his force, had one that was adequate for the occasion; and when he, without right, without authority, contrary to the principles of international law, and, as Dr. Doyle admits,

against a formal protest signed by "a majority of the Boer inhabitants," annexed their territory to the British crown, the home government adopted his act and accepted his conquest until, three years later, the Boer victory at Majuba hill had forced a compromise.

There is no reason for believing that the home government would not likewise have adopted the Rhodes-Jameson raid of 1895-96, had it been successful. On the contrary, there are many good reasons for believing that it would have done so.

One of these reasons is a statement by Cecil Rhodes, made public in Rhodes's own phrases since his death. We quote from a cable dispatch from London to the Chicago Tribune, dated March 2, 1902, and published in the Tribune of the 28th:

Cecil Rhodes never publicly avowed the reasons why he organized the Jameson raid. They are now set forth in his own words by one of his biographers. He quotes Mr. Rhodes as saying:

"There were three reasons. In the first place, I found that old Kruger was an insuperable obstacle to the union of South Africa, even for commercial purposes and for the development of the country. I tried him in every way I could on what you may call Afrikaner principles, but it was of no use, and so long as he ruled the Transvaal the brake was put on all progress in South Africa.

"The second reason was that there was an English-speaking minority opposed to Kruger, but at least as much opposed to seeing South Africa under the British flag. That was then a small minority, but a growing one, and, if left to develop, it would have become a majority. When the hour came to get rid of Kruger that would have balked the policy for which I had struggled all my life—to make South Africa an integral part of the British empire.

"The third reason was, you cannot make revolutions in these days without money, and I had at my command at that time a combination of millionaires ready to support me whom I might never be able to get together again.

This post mortem approval is not necessary to prove Rhodes's responsibility for the raid. The proof on that point is abundant enough without confessions. It is, however, a helpful interpretation of the circumstances which so connect the Jameson raid of 1895-96 with the war of 1899-1902

as to make the raid in reality the first battle of the war.

Consider the second reason Mr. Rhodes is quoted as having given. There was a minority in the South African Republic, which was opposed to Kruger's hostility to South African progress. But this progressive minority was also as much opposed as Kruger "to seeing South Africa under the British flag." And it was a growing minority. "If left to develop it would have become a majority." Consequently, "when the hour came to get rid of Kruger," his retirement and the reversal of his unprogressive policy would not have been signalized by the flying of the British flag over the South African Republic. The republic would have been all the stronger in its independence. With a progressive party in power there, there would have been no excuse, not even the flimsy ones that are now urged, for a British conquest. The progressive minority party once developed into a majority party would, as Rhodes is quoted as saying, "have balked the policy for which" he "had struggled all" his "life—to make South Africa an integral part of the British empire."

There you have an explanation at once of the motive for the Jameson raid and of the origin and cause of the British war in South Africa. Both were for the extension of British empire over all South Africa. The raid failed. But the same satanic influence, the same ambition for British conquest, that had instigated the raid kept on working, like yeast in the dough tray, until the Boers were driven, as the British blue books amply testify, either to submit to absorption into the British empire or to fight for their national existence.

The policy of the British government in all this matter has been a reflection of the policy of Cecil Rhodes, and it was his policy to fly the British flag over all South Africa. If the British cabinet was not in fact in collusion with him, it has nevertheless disclosed its sympathy with his imperial ambitions, and its conduct has been in accord, step by step, with his imperial plans. But for his imperialism, vitalized by the greed of "a combination of millionaires" and fostered by the government's hearty sym-

thy and active even if discreet cooperation, there would have been no Jameson raid and no war. The South African farmer republics would have gone on working out their own ideals and destiny in independence and peace.

## NEWS

At the municipal election in Chicago on the 1st, though in all other respects the election was of local interest only, there was one outcome which is so significant of political progress in certain directions as to challenge general attention. This was the result of the advisory referendum vote, which (pp. 690, 777, 803) we have heretofore explained. The law under which the vote was taken was enacted by the Illinois legislature one year ago. It provides for an advisory vote in municipalities on any question, upon the petition of 25 per cent. of the registered voters. The high percentage is almost prohibitory, but under the energetic management of Daniel Cruice, a young Chicago lawyer and radical democrat, who was cordially and effectively aided by the Chicago American, a petition with 109,000 signatures—some 30,000 more coming in after the expiration of the time limit—was secured. This petition called for a vote on the following propositions:

**Ownership by the city of Chicago of all street railroads within the corporate limits of said city.**

**Ownership by the city of Chicago of the gas and electric lighting plants. Said plants to furnish all heat and power for public and private use.**

**The nomination of all candidates for city offices by direct vote of the voters at primary elections to be held for that purpose.**

Since 104,000 was the number of signatures required by law as the condition of submitting the propositions to a vote, and as the margin beyond that number was only 5,000—but 109,000 of the 140,000 having signed in time—an attempt was made to discredit enough signatures to reduce the total below the legal requirement. A sharp and somewhat prolonged legal fight ensued, but the adversaries of the petition were unable to make a case. The propositions were consequently submitted in due course to the voters of Chicago, who have responded with a full vote and overwhelming majorities for all the propositions.

By full vote is meant a large proportion of the total vote cast for candidates at the election. The total vote for candidates, not yet officially reported, was about 207,926, and the total vote for these amendments was approximately 150,000, or about 72 per cent. The total vote on the propositions was distributed as follows:

For municipal ownership of street railways, 124,594, or nearly 60 per cent. of votes for candidates; against, 25,987, or less than 13 per cent; affirmative majority, 98,607.

For municipal ownership of lighting plants, 124,190, or nearly 60 per cent. of total vote for candidates; against, 19,447, or about 9 per cent; affirmative majority, 104,743.

For nominations for city officers by direct vote of the people at primary elections, 125,082; against, 15,861; affirmative majority, 109,221.

A comparison of this vote with that for abolishing the old township system in the city indicates the relative interest of the voters in all the referendum questions. The total vote on the township question was only 69,281. No legal effect is directly produced by the vote on the advisory referendum described above. As the result is only suggestive, the object of the law being merely to provide for definite expressions of public opinion, the effect can be only political. Advocates of the measures regard the expression of opinion as having been so emphatic in this instance that hostile councilmen and legislators will hereafter be more cautious, while friendly ones will be encouraged to become more bold and uncompromising.

The effect of the Chicago election upon the politics of the city council is not noteworthy. The Democrats elected 17 members and the Republicans 19. The political complexion of the new council will be 39 Republican to 30 Democratic, with 1 independent. Some of the men who were most earnestly opposed by independent voters were reelected. The total number of reelections was 23. Permanent side-party votes were larger than usual, though small, the aggregate of the councilmanic votes for the different wards being reported as follows:

Socialist, 6,031, or 3 per cent. of total.  
Prohibition, 2,866, or 1½ per cent. of total.

Single tax (local party), 1,816, or 4-5 of 1 per cent. of total.

Votes of these parties since the presidential election of November, 1900, have been as follows, as reported

at the times respectively, in the daily press;

	Nov., 1900.	Apr., 1901.	Apr., 1902.
Socialist . . . . .	6,009	7,195	6,031
Prohibition . . . . .	4,751	2,804	2,866
Single tax . . . . .	465	950	1,816

Other candidates independent of the two principal parties received at the election of the 1st an aggregate of 7,000 votes.

An exciting mayoralty election came off in Milwaukee, also on the 1st, resulting in the reelection of David S. Rose, Democrat, as mayor, by a plurality of 7,000. A large Socialist vote and defections of Republicans who are opposed to the Payne domination in the Republican party of the State are referred to as accounting for this result. But other influences may have been at work. This is not Mayor Rose's first election. He went into office four years ago by 7,000 plurality and two years ago by 2,401.

Previous to these municipal elections the results of the Democratic primaries held in Arkansas on the 29th had been reported with sufficient fullness to show that Senator James K. Jones, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, has been defeated for reelection as United States Senator. He will be succeeded by ex-Gov. James P. Clarke, who is reported to have from 74 to 84 supporters who will be elected to the legislature. Only 67 are necessary to elect. Mr. Jones's defeat is a triumph for the wing of the party which is led by Jefferson Davis, who will be reelected as Governor. The contest between Jones and Clarke was a hot one, though entirely within party lines, as are all the political contests in Arkansas, the election being only a formal confirmation of the action of the Democratic primaries.

Another Southern State, Alabama, is registering voters for election purposes under the new constitution. As predicted, this constitution is being used to disfranchise Negroes, nominally for educational but really for race reasons. A press dispatch of the 27th from Montgomery states that the registration is nearly finished in all the big towns and that less than 1 per cent. of the voters registered are Negroes. Citizens of that race are reported as having been so persistently "turned down" by the registrars, arbitrarily, that in large numbers they have ceased to apply for registration. The constitution under