

is now in the courts, brought there by the monopoly itself, and the city authorities ought to be able to push the case to a decision if they want to. The only other point is whether a majority of the board of aldermen can be dealt with without boodle. That goes directly and exclusively to the question of sincerity. There is a point besides, which Prof. Bemis does not mention. His suggestion is upon the basis of a three-cent fare. But Mayor Harrison is opposed to three cent fares, proposing that out of the extra two cents collected from every street car passenger the company shall pay a tax of half a cent (ten per cent. on gross receipts) to the city. The objections to this are obvious. To begin with, it would allow the street car monopoly to tax passengers two cents a ride more than the ride is worth, so as to give the city half a cent a ride. Next, it would maintain a system which would generate competition by tempting the monopoly to undervalue its receipts and to bribe officials in order to facilitate the process of undervaluation. Finally, it would unjustly tax street car passengers. Shop girls, clerks, mechanics, and the like, riding to and from their homes, would be taxed (at two cents a ride besides the fair price of three cents) some \$10 to \$12 a year. Yet Mayor Harrison prefers all this to a three cent fare system; and having that view of the matter he may stand as an obstacle to the plan which Prof. Bemis declares to be feasible upon the two very simple conditions he names.

Perhaps all American believers in the declaration of independence, as they become more familiar with the history of Mr. McKinley's criminal aggression in the Philippines, will be better disposed to sympathize with Gen. Otis's perplexities than to condemn him for his weakness. This is already the view of the Boston Transcript, one of the great papers of New England. Commenting upon the strained relations between Otis and MacArthur which are disclosed

by a recent publication of extracts from their official correspondence, the Transcript significantly concludes:

In his retirement, broken by such invidious publications from his correspondence as that appearing to-day, Gen. Otis might perhaps be pardoned for bitter reflections on what different courses the history-making of which he was so large a part might have taken, had he, on receiving the president's proclamation announcing the enforcement of our possession by conquest, instead of elaborately blue-penciling and emasculating it, in accordance with his ever-conscientious sense of his public as well as his military duty, pocketed it and resigned.

THE DEMOCRACY OF OHIO.

The real fight of the democracy of Ohio this year is on local issues. But both in their news reports and their editorial comments the plutocratic press of both political parties attempt to give it national significance of a sinister sort. They emphasize the fact that the state convention ignored Mr. Bryan and the Kansas City platform, making that appear to be its most important action. One of them, the Chicago Evening Post, a republican paper, frankly says in its issue of the 11th that every "enlightened republican will rejoice and congratulate the Ohio democracy upon its new departure, or, rather, upon its reversion to ante-Bryan doctrines;" and the others express essentially the same sentiment in varying but hardly less guarded phrase.

We have good reason for believing that no deliberate slight to Bryan or the Kansas City platform was intended by the majority of the delegates. Mayor Johnson's associates had gone into the convention with the declared purpose of forcing it to fight a state campaign on the question of local taxation. To that end they confined their energies to the trying struggle in which they found themselves pitted against McLean and the anti-Bryan leaders whom he had brought into the convention. These men represented the Ohio railroad interests as against Johnson's tax reform agitation as devotedly as they represented opposition to Bryan and the Kansas City platform. In that struggle the one demand and constant argument of the Johnson delegates were for a local campaign. This idea

of the Johnson men became the sentiment of a majority of the delegates and secured the adoption of Johnson's taxation planks, of his plan for a referendum on franchises, and of his proposal that hereafter and until federal senators are elected by the people democratic state conventions shall make senatorial nominations.

But the same argument that had been a factor in beating the reactionary leaders surrounding McLean, this democratic argument for a local campaign on local issues, enabled those leaders to influence the committee on resolutions and the convention to ignore Bryan and the national platform.

Since that omission is urged by the reactionary elements of the party as a conclusive indication that the really important outcome of the convention was not the complete defeat of the reactionaries on local democratic policies, but was their assumed triumph in overthrowing Bryan and Bryanism and reverting to old leaders and doctrines, the matter demands consideration. To appreciate the meaning of such a reversion, reference to the more recent history of the democratic party is necessary.

In the first period following the civil war the democratic party was distinguished chiefly by its efforts to get its managers and heelers into office.

It had no principles; or if it had, it kept them well out of sight. Even the good democratic doctrine of state sovereignty, as yet identified with the infamous proslavery cause, received from it only half intelligent and half hearted support. Its righteous and advancing free trade policy of the forties and fifties had been overshadowed by the slavery question, and in the excitement of the war in which that question culminated was forgotten. The democratic idol of this time was a rich New York lawyer who had acquired his wealth by railroad wrecking. He was a fit type of the party at that stage of its history.

This period ended with the first administration of President Cleveland. Mr. Cleveland had been elected not because he represented anything. He was a democrat by tradition, and represented nothing. His victory was merely negative. The corruption of

the republican party, together with a long period of hard times under republican administrations, had excited a restless popular demand for a change. "Give us a change!" was the universal cry. Tilden had started it and Cleveland got the benefit of it.

During the greater part of his administration, Cleveland gave entire satisfaction to the so-called "money power." By that term we do not mean the banking interests merely. We include also to the leaders of the great industrial combinations that have since become so menacing, but were then just beginning to crystallize. By pleasing this element he had made his reelection almost a certainty. His party and not the republican, he and not McKinley, would in that event have been foster father to the trusts.

But toward the end of his term, Mr. Cleveland wrote his famous "free trade" message to congress. It was not really a free-trade message. Yet it was so far imbued with the free-trade spirit as to reawaken, to an astonishing degree, the dormant democratic sentiment of the country. But, that same spirit in the message aroused the hostility of all the monopoly interests; for it was a signal of danger to the embryonic trusts which have since grown so great and which protection had then brought almost to the hatching point. In his campaign for reelection, consequently, Mr. Cleveland was defeated. But he had given a democratic impulse to his party.

The second post bellum period of the democratic party began with Cleveland's free-trade message. Although he suffered defeat as the champion of the reinvigorated democracy in its first battle with the plutocratic forces that Mr. McKinley has since so shrewdly fortified, his defeat did not end the struggle. It was a struggle for freedom that Mr. Cleveland had begun, and—

freedom's battle, once begun,
Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son,
Though baffled oft, is ever won.

The democratic free-trade campaign of 1888 was continued without cessation through the intervening years until the next presidential election. It was a glorious campaign, one of the most inspiring in the whole his-

tory of the country. As its climax approached, such an impression had been made that the democratic platform builders ventured to declare for free-trade principles more boldly than these principles had been formulated since the war, as an issue in national politics. But that was not all. Against the vigorous opposition of the reactionaries, then led by David B. Hill, Mr. Cleveland was nominated as preeminently the leader for a struggle over that issue. When the votes were counted, the victory proved to be overwhelming. Even hide-bound republican states had come into the democratic column. The democratic party had won in a fight for democratic principle. That was a grand era in the history of the party.

But it came quickly to a close. Mr. Cleveland was not the democratic leader he had been taken to be. No sooner did he return to power than he discarded the issue upon which the people had elected him, and brought forward a new one. It was Cleveland, not Bryan, who substituted the money question for the free-trade question in national politics.

That is easily demonstrated. Cleveland had been elected to put down the protection fraud. A congress strongly democratic had been elected for the same purpose. Had he realized the obligation of his responsibilities, he would have called congress together at once, while it was fresh from the people and as yet free from the influence of the protection lobby and protection leaders within the party, and in calling it together would have made the abolition of protection the object of the call. But he thought the tariff question could wait until the regular session, thirteen months after the election. So he let it wait. Meanwhile the protection interests managed to divide the party on the tariff bill, so that this bill when finally formulated turned out to be about as villainous a piece of protectionism as its republican predecessors. Though Mr. Cleveland thought the tariff question, on which he had been elected with such magnificent enthusiasm, could await the regular session of congress, that was not his opinion of the money question.

This he treated as urgent. Yet it had not been an issue at all. There was a free coinage movement in the west, but it affected both parties and nothing had occurred to crystallize it into a political issue. Left alone by the opposition it would never have become an issue. It was too shallow as compared with free trade to gather to itself enough momentum to displace free trade and the more radical reforms that free trade involves. But President Cleveland gave it the momentum it needed. Although he would not call congress together in special session to kill protection, he did call it promptly together to antagonize free silver. Not only did he promptly call congress together for that purpose, but he used the patronage of his office, with every other influence he could command—which he should have used instead to abolish protection—in order to attain his end, specifically the repeal of the silver purchase law. His success, together with his indifference to the tariff question, had a two-fold effect of disastrous character upon the democratic party. By ignoring the tariff question, on which he had been elected, he created widespread distrust. People felt that the democratic party could not be depended upon to carry out its election pledges. As a democratic doctrine, therefore, free trade ceased to appeal to the free-trade sentiment. Republican and independent free traders, as well as a large proportion of democratic free traders, were disgusted with what they reasonably regarded as treachery. Thus room was made for the money issue, which Cleveland's attack upon the silver coinage sentiment by means of the repeal of the silver purchase law, created. The silver coinage doctrine became at once, consequently, the issue in national politics.

Whether Mr. Cleveland was inspired in his fatuous policy by the so-called "money power," we do not know. But we do know that if that power had formulated the programme, it could not have made one better calculated to serve its own peculiar interests. To substitute an issue so comparatively superficial as the money question, for one so far-reaching and deep-probing as free trade, would in a conflict between democracy

and plutocracy be exactly what intelligent plutocrats would desire.

The effect was disclosed in the election returns of 1894. In two short years Mr. Cleveland had, by side-tracking free trade and raising the money issue, disorganized his party and brought it to disaster. The democratic plurality of 95 in the lower house of congress elected in 1892, was overcome and the overwhelming republican plurality of 159 returned in its place in 1894.

In popular disgust did the second post-bellum period of democratic history thus come to a close. So utterly hopeless were the democratic leaders of winning the next presidential election, that even as late as the spring of 1896 the democratic nomination went begging. No one wanted it. By common consent, as reference to the newspapers of the time will show, it was regarded as a foregone conclusion that the democratic candidate, whoever he might be, would have to carry into the campaign the enormous handicap of the record of Cleveland's second administration, and must, therefore, be overwhelmingly defeated.

It was in those depressing circumstances that the third period opened.

The democratic spirit in the party had been disappointed and disheartened, but it was not crushed. Around the free-trade standard it could not gather, for the national leader who had carried that standard four years before was now discredited and distrusted. But those who held aloft the banner of silver coinage, the owners of silver mines excepted, were at any rate moved by democratic impulses. Their financial policy might be shallow, their financial doctrine might be economically unsound, their reform might be an ephemeral fad, but they themselves were as a whole men of democratic mind, who sincerely believed the silver side of the coinage question to be a genuine expression of democratic principle. Silver coinage, became, therefore, the shibboleth of democratic democrats; while the standard of "sound money," so called, became the rallying point for all the sanctified corruption, all the plutocratic projects, and all the political

reaction that had dominated both parties.

Not that everyone who stood for "sound money" was a plutocrat, any more than everyone who stood for silver coinage was a democrat. Many rallied around the "sound-money" standard not because they liked the plutocratic company it brought them into, but because they could not accept the economic doctrine of the other side. They were academical rather than political. The point is not at all that the democracy of individuals at that time is to be tested by their position on the money question. It is that the "sound-money" side of that question was the plutocratic side, with reference to its tendencies as a political force; and that the silver side was democratic, with reference to its tendencies as a political force.

So the democratic spirit which, under the banner of free trade, Cleveland had revived in the democratic party toward the close of its first period after the war, only to baffle it in the second period, rallied at the opening of the third, under the banner of free silver. The old discredited, distrusted, and plutocratic leaders of the party either withdrew or sulked. Cleveland threw the influence of his administration against his party, Hill played for Cleveland's place as the great democratic representative of aggregated financial interests, and all the little Cleverlands and the little Hills followed suit. The campaign was left to Bryan and the democratic democrats whom his courage, ability and sincerity drew about him.

Defeat came. But it was one of those defeats of which history affords illustrious examples, where the victory of the victor is overshadowed by the manifest superiority in all but numbers of the vanquished.

This period of democracy extended over from 1896 to 1900. It is not yet closed, though possibly it may be closing. With nearly the entire press of the country against him, with all the financial institutions exerting their subtle influences to crowd him off the pedestal of party leadership, with ambitious members of his own party begging him to face both ways so that they might get into office, with new and trying questions coming up to make the situation complex, with odds

such as no party leader ever before had to meet, Mr. Bryan, nevertheless, almost alone in leadership, and supported faithfully by only a small group of men having political experience, held the party to its democratic course.

When for a second time the plutocratic power of the country, reinforced by blatant jingoism and neurotic patriotism, had defeated the democracy behind Bryan, this defeat, like the one before it, was instantly made the occasion for demands from plutocratic sources that the party be returned to the control of its old leaders. For this is the true meaning of the plutocratic opposition within the party to the party policy of the past five years. It is not at bottom so much a question of general policy. It is a question of particular control.

Upon the determination of that question depends the future career of the democratic party—whether it shall on the other hand go backward, under reactionary leadership, to a career of spoils hunting like that of its first ante-bellum period, or to one of treachery to its pledges such as that which characterized the close of its second; or whether, on the other hand, it shall go forward under genuine democratic leadership, from the silver question to the higher ideals and truer policies of democracy.

Only silver enthusiasts object to advancing from the demand for silver coinage to demands more truly democratic and radical. Only platform fanatics insist upon clinging to the Kansas City platform merely as a platform. Only man-worshippers insist upon unnecessarily obtruding Mr. Bryan's personality. But when the silver issue is laid aside, when a substitute for the Kansas City platform is brought forward, something more distinctly and radically democratic must take the place of the silver issue, and the new platform must breathe the democratic spirit of the old one. Moreover, the change must be made by the democratic democrats of the party as a step in advance along the pathway of democracy, and not by plutocratic reactionaries as a step backward. With all the rest, this must be done in no spirit of hostility to Bryan and Bryanism, but in full and cordial recognition of Bryan's de-

servedly high place in the councils of genuine democracy.

Let no one suppose that the bitter antagonism of plutocracy to Bryan rests upon his adherence to the silver-coinage policy. There are plenty of silver coinage men to whom no such antagonism attaches. Plutocratic hostility to him is due to two causes. In the first place, he is known to favor silver coinage because he believes it to be democratic; and, in the second, he deservedly commands universal confidence in his unyielding integrity. As was innocently objected to him in the recent campaign, "he is dangerous because he is honest."

So much for the action of the Ohio convention, on the assumption that it deliberately intended the slight upon Bryan and Bryanism that the plutocratic press attributes to it.

But Mayor Johnson declares, doubtless upon the assurance of his friends who were there, that there was no such intention. In an interview published in the Cleveland Plaindealer of the 13th Mr. Johnson says—

I am just as ardent an admirer of William Jennings Bryan as I ever was, and I stand in the same position on the silver question that I formerly did. I do not believe that the action of the democratic state convention was a repudiation of Mr. Bryan at all; it simply indicated that the convention wanted the battle this fall fought out on strictly state issues. This not being a presidential year there was no reason why any reference should be made to either the Kansas City platform or to Mr. Bryan. The eastern papers have carried strong accounts about the repudiation of Bryan and silver by the Ohio democrats, but I do not believe that Ohioans see it that way at all.

Even if Johnson were mistaken, even if the plutocratic press and reactionary democratic leaders are right in treating the omission from the platform of all reference to Bryan and the Kansas City platform as indicating a reversion of party control to the old and recreant leadership, nevertheless it would be folly to meet this reaction in blind passion. It must be met with definite purpose and intelligent methods. Likewise it must be met with that superlative form of courage which men call patience—the patience that endures until the time is ripe to strike. The sugges-

tion of a bolting party now is suicidal. Nothing could be more earnestly desired by the reactionary reorganizers. Every democrat who goes into a third party movement in Ohio this year weakens by that much the power of the democratic democrats of the state to prove by the action of the convention two years hence, or in the next presidential year, that the old leaders are after all not in the saddle.

Nor should the jubilation of the reactionaries be allowed to foster the impression that the most important action of the state convention was the omission from its platform of references to the national platform and to Bryan. That was not its most important act. The most important act of the Ohio convention, for the real democrats of the nation as well as for those of the state, was the adoption of Johnson's planks on taxation. Johnson's tax reform is democratic. It is radical. It attacks plutocracy where its armor is weakest, and it cuts deep. It was adopted by the convention in spite of the determined opposition of McLean and the other plutocrats. It should be made the burning issue of the campaign. Its indorsement by the people of Ohio would put a quietus upon the jubilant outcries of the reactionaries.

By the adoption of those taxation planks the power of McLean, heretofore unquestioned, has been broken. In two years it can be destroyed. And with the destruction of McLean's power in Ohio will go all the plutocratic manipulation that has bedeviled democratic politics in that state since he began to influence its management.

The duty now before the democratic democrats of Ohio is not to abandon the democratic party to plutocratic control, but to get full command of it and head it unmistakably toward radical democracy. And manifestly the way in which to do that is to make the best possible fight, within the party and not guerrilla fashion, for a legislature which can be depended upon to vote against McLean for senator, and to give legislative sanction to the far-reaching tax and franchise reforms to which the party is now committed. Were that successfully

done, the seal of popular condemnation would be ineffaceably stamped upon the plutocratic proclamation that the Ohio democracy has discarded Bryanism and gone back to bourbon leadership.

NEWS

The event of the week is the steel strike. Though this strike began on the 30th, there was supposed to be a possibility of settlement until the 13th, and it did not actually become formidable until the 15th.

As explained two weeks ago (p. 200), the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, which, under the leadership of its president, T. J. Shaffer, has declared and is conducting the strike, is striking neither for higher wages nor for shorter hours, but for the life of the organization. Before the consolidation of the various steel plants into one great trust, some of the plants were accustomed to making contracts with their employes which prohibited the latter from becoming members of unions. In that and other ways these plants prevented the organization of their employes. So long as the plants that did this were independent, the matter was not vital to the Amalgamated association. But it became vital when the nonunion plants were absorbed in the trust and still continued their custom of preventing organization. The Amalgamated association soon realized that the trust would not long continue part union and part nonunion. Obviously it must be wholly unionized, or by gradual extension of the customs and labor contracts of the nonunion plants the Amalgamated association would be crushed by the trust. But a direct demand for the unionization of all the plants was not made by the association. Its demand was that all obstacles to organization should be removed, the association maintaining that if the nonunion employes were left in freedom they would join the union. Even this demand was not made in specific terms. The specific thing demanded by the Amalgamated association was an agreement making the new wages scale apply to all the mills of the trust, whether union or nonunion. In other words, the organization put itself in the position of acting for the protection not alone of its own members but also of workmen who do not belong to it. Like the an-