the ideal standard of Congressional statesmanship. William Preston Harrison, the Democratic candidate in the 8th Congressional district, will be opposed by many democratic Democrats, as well as by others, and for reasons that appeal to every sense of good citizenship. A brother of the Mayor, he was forced into the nomination by peculiar influences and by means but little if any better than those which controlled the State convention. His democracy, moreover, is known only by the brand, which is a poor recommendation. Quin O'Brien, the Democratic candidate in the 9th district, is of a different type. His democracy, like Dr. Stone's, is Jeffersonian; and, like Dr. Stone, he would make an ideal Congressman. No democratic Democrat who supports either of these men will waste his vote. In the 1st district, Martin B. Madden, Republican, entered into a combination with the Democratic "boss" to prevent the renomination of Congressman Emerich, an able Representative and high order of Democrat. The object was to pit a weak Democrat against the notorious Madden. This was done. But the anti-machine Republicans and anti-machine Democrats have nominated David S. Geer, a Republican, as an independent candidate, and Mr. Geer is under the circumstances worthy of every democratic vote. For the board of tax review the Democrats have nominated Joseph Donnersberger, who, though he would hardly rank as a thorough-going democrat in the radical sense, is a man peculiarly well fitted for this office. His qualifications and his reputation for probity are such that he may be depended upon to enforce the tax laws impartially as they exist. And that is what a taxing officer ought to do. Reforms in tax systems must be sought of the legislature; a strictly honest and intelligent administration is what is properly required of taxing officials. For this reason we have no hesitation in recommending Mr. Donnersberger's present candidacy to democratic Democrats. In the long list of Chicago candidates are seven for the bench. One is F. A. Windes, whose experience in the court of which he is now a judicial member, and the high reputation he has achieved, are ample recommendations of fitness. In politics he is not only a party Democrat; he is a democrat. Among the Republican candidates are two, already on the bench, who have conspicuously demonstrated their judicial unfitness. One is Jesse Holdom and the other Axel Chytraus. Holdom especially has identified himself judicially with the spirit of plutocracy. Excellent successors for these two judges may be found in Joseph O'Donnell and Charles H. Mitchell. O'Donnell was elected a year and a half ago to a place on the bench recently created by a law which the Supreme Court has since held to be unconstitutional. Both he and Mr. Mitchell are in regular legal practice. The fact that both are Altgeld Democrats is an assurance of the democratic spirit in which they would administer justice; their undisputed professional standing is a guarantee of their judicial fidelity in other respects.

There will be at this election a good deal of referendum voting in Illinois. Some of it is local to Chicago; as the question of adopting voting machines, the advantage of which over the present antique system needs no explanation. Another question is that of amending the State constitution so as to enable the city to secure a distinctive charter. While this is local to Chicago in effect, it is to be voted on throughout the State. An affirmative vote will be equivalent to a negative vote on the question of holding a constitutional convention. The amendment is sought by certain financial interests in Chicago so as to obtain what they want without risking the anti-monopoly constitution which a convention might make. Three other questions are to be voted on under the public policy law (p. 457), namely: direct primaries, popular veto by referendum, and local option in methods of taxation. Every proposition is meritorious, and should be carried by an emphatic vote. To make this popular vote effective, the Referendum League is pledging legislative candidates to act in accordance with it if they are elected.

The following extract from a conspicuous editorial in the Cincinnati Times Star of the 28th, makes an astonishingly accurate statement of a natural economic law which is not generally understood—the law, namely, of the incidence or point of pressure of taxation:

> It is an accepted law of economics that the value of the structure is fixed by the law that governs the value of commodities the supply of which can be increased at pleasure; that is, it is equal in the long run to the cost of production, or rather of reproduction. The rent of the house proper is normally equal to the interest on the capital expended plus an annual sum which, when capitalized, will be sufficient, after paying all necessary expenses, to replace the capital by the time the house is worn out. The laws which govern the incidence of taxes on houses, or on house rents, are, therefore, analogous to those which govern the incidence of taxes on capital or on competitive profits—it is shifted in varying degrees to the tenant. On the other hand, the value of the lot is fixed in agreement with the general principles of economic rent, according to which the price paid is measured by the superiority of situation, or more exactly, the value of a lot is determined by the general law of price which governs all those commodities which are not susceptible to an indefinite increase in their supply; that is, the incidence of the ground tax is on the owner. He has no means of shifting it; for if the tax were to be suddenly abolished, he would nevertheless be able to extort the same rent, since the ground rent is fixed solely by the demand of the occupiers. The tax on the land simply diminishes the owner's profits.

Accepting this elucidation as true—and it is really so all the way down to the dotting of the i's and the crossing of the t's—what moral inference would a sane mind naturally draw? Would it not be that taxes ought to be laid upon lot values, so that the rent which owners "extort" from this class of property, common property in its nature, should go to the public good instead of enriching land mo-

nopolists? But not so the Times-Star. It thinks, along with monopolists generally, that that would be immoral. Its own conception of the morality of the case is that taxes should fall on houses, so that landlords may shift them in varying degrees to tenants, thereby making tenants pay taxes which landlords themselves boast of paying, and making taxes collectable out of the value of earnings instead of the value of privilege. What explanation is there of this moral upside-downedness on the part of the Cincinnati paper? Isn't its inverted ethics due to the fact that the really immoral tax upon house values is the "going thing," whereas the tax on lot values is the "single tax" of which Tom L. Johnson is an advocate and which every plutocratic paper in Ohio is therefore sworn to attack whenever it rises above the economic or political horizon?

THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM—DIVORCE

Granting that society may properly exact binding contracts of marriage, and may inhibit the making of a second marriage contract while a previous one subsists between either party and a third person (p. 468), questions regarding divorce arise. The first relates to divorce simply as a decree of nullification, regardless of its bearings upon successive marriages. In considering this question, we are confronted with the third and fourth of the five queries heretofore (p. 454) reserved for examination, namely:

> (3) If society has the right to exact binding and exclusive contracts of marriage, has it also the complementary right to annul marriage contracts?
>
> (4) Assuming society to have this right of nullification, may the parties to the contract or declaration of a marriage which has come to an end through the dissolution of the unifying love that made it—may they themselves, or either of them, properly call upon society to annul the contract?

In harmony with what has preceded, conventional divorce must be correlative to conventional marriage. To think otherwise is difficult, if not impossible, without ignoring the essential difference between ceremonial marriage and natural marriage, between the symbol and the thing symbolized.

If there were no such thing as natural marriage back of the conventional, if it were the ceremony and that alone that constitutes marriage, then, indeed, divorce might not be regarded as a correlative of marriage. For in that case, marriage would be an arbitrary custom, not a natural principle; and arbitrary custom alone would consequently determine the legitimacy of divorce. It might even abolish marriage altogether. But the ceremonial theory is too paganistic, not to say materialistic, to demand attention in any discussion in which marriage is regarded as a vital ideality. The materialist may consider divorce as raising only questions of expediency. The pagan may regard it with superstitious horror. But he who is neither pagan nor materialist must bring it to the test of ideal principle.

Doing this, he sees that marriage does not consist in conventionality or contract or ceremonial, but that it consists in an ideal relationship, of which ceremonials are only the symbols or outward expressions. As to divorce, then, the primary consideration with him is not whether the ceremonial of marriage is an indissoluble contract, but whether the ideal relationship is indissoluble in its nature.

If he finds that marriage is in reality constituted not by ceremonials but only by marriage love, and that marriage love, although abiding in its nature, may nevertheless die, he realizes that the ideal relationship itself is not indissoluble. Thereupon he concludes that when the natural force of marriage love, which alone makes a marriage, is dissipated by natural law, the marriage itself is dissolved by natural law. With that principle to guide him, divorce ceremonials take their place in his mind by the side of marriage ceremonials. Reasoning that there ought to be some ceremonial of conventional marriage wherever there is a real marriage, he reasons in like manner that there ought to be some ceremonial of conventional divorce wherever there is a real divorce.

The correctness of that view cannot reasonably be disputed, on the basis of what has preceded in this discussion. Grant that natural marriage is ideal and not merely conventional, being created by marriage love and not by a ceremonial; grant that the ceremony of marriage is a useful conventionality publicly declaratory of natural marriage; grant that natural marriage may end in natural divorce because the marriage love that sustains it has died,—grant these propositions which we have already advanced with reference to marriage, and you must concede the propriety of conventional divorce. The ceremony of conventional divorce is to natural divorce what the ceremony of conventional marriage is to natural marriage—the declaration or symbol whereby society may be advised of the true relation of the parties as they themselves regard it.

By what means, then, if conventional marriage may be dissolved, shall the ceremony of conventional divorce be performed?

To remit it to church control would be grossly improper. Churches have no coercive function in the matter. They cannot prevent that natural divorce which results from death of marriage love, and they must not be permitted either to grant or deny conventional divorce. Their only function is that of spiritual influence. In so far as the parties may voluntarily submit to be ecclesiastically governed and the rights of society as a whole are not infringed, churches may either regulate or prohibit divorce. That is, they may freely appeal to the individual conscience. But here their function ends.

Nor should conventional divorce be left to the control of the parties themselves. While they alone can decide whether there is a real divorce or not, just as they alone could decide whether there was originally a real marriage or not, all this being in the nature of things, yet the ceremonial of conventional divorce affects civil rights in such manner as to entitle all concerned to their "day in court." These rights might be jeopardized if married persons were allowed to proclaim natural divorce at will, and without adju-