margin, their candidate won. On the singletax amendment, they drew the full fire of the enemy. Every daily newspaper but one was against them, every disreputable business interest was against them, every investor in vacant lots angling for a prize at the expense of the common interest was against them, and education on the subject had not gone far enough to enable the average citizen of unselfish instincts to understand. Under these circumstances a vote of 12,000 for the Singletax in 40,000 cast on the question, is a guarantee for the early future. Those were intelligent votes. The voters who cast them knew what they wanted and why. And now, with the arguments of the opposition laid bare in the cleanest cut and most vigorous contest over the Singletax ever had anywhere, Singletax progress in Seattle is hardly more than a matter of keeping at it. With the excitement of the campaign over, and a people aroused to the thinking point, those hostile arguments that served so well in the heat of the fight will look naked and forlorn in the calmness of the coming months. That an election should be carried frankly and brazenly in the interest of obstruction to improvement, in the interest of squatters on vacant lots, in the interest of a little group of rich monopolists of the most desirable locations in Seattle, and as frankly and brazenly against the interests of improvers and workers, is in itself the best kind of indication that the result was abnormal. But a chestnut burr was put under the saddle of the land capitalists by the Singletaxers of Seattle last week that will soon unhorse them.

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The Judicial Recall and Mr. Roosevelt.

Nothing in the mechanism of government could be simpler than the judicial Recall. The question it raises is not whether we shall have a Recall especially for judges. It is whether or not, if we have a Recall at all, we shall exempt judges from its operation. The Recall for judges elected by the people, stands or falls upon the merits of the general Recall as a method of securing to the people constant control over all the officials they elect.

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If there are sound objections to the popular Recall for administrative and legislative officers elected by the people, then there are sound objections to the popular Recall for judges elected by the people. But if it is reasonable to reserve to the people the power to recall elected executives for corruption, incompetency, despotic conduct in office or other defiance of the popular will, or if it is reasonable to reserve to the people the power to recall elected legislators for corruption, incompetency, treachery to pledges, or other misrepresentation of their constituents, then it is reasonable to reserve to the people the power to recall elected judges who prove to be corrupt, incompetent, despotic or otherwise false to the duties of the judicial office.

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Every attempt to make an exception in favor of judges may be traced to one or the other of two sources. It is either rooted in a survival of the influence of the "divine right" superstition, which now bolsters the bench as once it bolstered the throne, or else it is strategy on the part of persons who oppose all applications of the Recall but dare not meet the issue directly with reference to executives and legislators. The question is in reality the exceedingly simple one of Recall or no Recall, of Recall *with* exemption of bad judges, or Recall *without* exemptions. As someone has well defined the principle of popular Recall, it leaves to the people themselves the power to shorten at their own discretion the term of any office which they have the power at their own discretion to fill.

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With so simple an issue before him and with his Napoleonic temperament, it is not strange that Mr. Roosevelt in advocating the Recall should undertake to improve upon it. Without his own hall-mark of ingenuity, nothing seems to him to be sterling. According to his Boston speech* he would not recall judges, but their decisions—God bless us! Here indeed would be a trial of lawsuits at the polls, something which no intelligent advocate of the Recall expects or desires. It is an "improvement," this of Mr. Roosevelt's, which plays so straight into the hand of objectors to judicial applications of the Recall that one must wonder if Senator Lodge or Senator Root didn't have "a finger in the pie." Nobody with any sense wishes to have the facts in lawsuits tried at the polls, nor technical questions of law. To avoid that necessity is the one reason for having courts at all. Their function is to settle disputes for the people—to settle them by ending them with as near an approximation to substantial justice as possible. Back of Mr. Roosevelt's proposal, however, lies the thought that in settling disputes, the courts interpret Constitutions and thereby make precedents which operate as laws, judge-made laws—not alone in a given dispute but throughout the whole domain of government.

*See current volume, page 201.

To nullify such decisions by popular vote is what Mr. Roosevelt appears to have in mind in proposing his ridiculous "recall of judicial dericions"—his "recall of legalism to justice" as he quaintly puts it—as a substitute for allowing the regular Recall to apply to judges.

The evil to which Mr. Roosevelt alludes is indeed a serious one. Popular government is menaced by the judicial power of making law. But Mr. Roosevelt's amazing plan, which would be clumsy if it were necessary, would be neither necessary nor excusable with the popular Initiative in operation. Surely this is plain. If judges so construed a Constitutional provision as to make it unacceptable to the people, or to tie them up in the leading strings of dead men, the people could by the Initiative amend the Constitution. And they could do this without disturbing judges in whose ability and good faith they might really confide, or unsettling private contracts made on the basis of objectionable precedents. Doubtless this is what would be done under the Initiative, Referendum and Recall—with the latter "unimproved" by Mr. Roosevelt. If, after such amendment, the judges pettifogged, with the evident purpose of nullifying the amendment, doubtless the Recall would then be invoked. It ought to be invoked in such cases. But it would seldom otherwise be successfully invoked against judges.

The Initiative, Referendum and Recall would not be used idiotically. They would be used sanely. All experience thus far testifies to this. Even without special experience, it might safely be inferred. The people as a whole are no such fools as a few of them like to think all the others are. They would be fools, however, if they fell into any such pit as the substitution of a popular "recall of judicial decisions" for a popular Recall for all elective officials. For thereby they would make law suits instead of judges subjects of trial at the polls, where the latter but not the former ought to be tried; and while providing an unnecessary and clumsy remedy for unjust "legalism," they would make no efficient remedy for judicial usurpation, judicial despotism, judicial incompetency and judicial corruption.

Death of Joseph Keane.

Joseph T. Keane, whose death at Santa Monica was reported last week, will be recalled by hundreds of Chicago radicals of various kinds, and by their guests from other States and other lands, as the "Joseph" whose supervisory social service at the "Washington" furnished forth daily the table at which they daily met to wrangle while they ate. And wider than that was Mr. Keane's circle of friends in Chicago. His interest in politics, his sensitiveness to the currents of political opinion, and his honesty of purpose and thorough-going loyalty, cemented many friendships for him among leading citizens. At the time of his death, when 52 years of age, he was president of King's restaurant company, of which Oscar Smedberg is the manager. His wife and a child of six are the family he leaves.

Death of "D. K. L."

Every reader of The Public for three years past will recall the excellent contributions which have appeared in its columns, some as Editorial Correspondence and some as signed editorials, over the initials "D. K. L." Many a reader has asked with friendly interest who the writer was; and well they might, for his contributions were among the most useful and most acceptable that have come to us. Perhaps there was never a very good reason for concealing "D. K. L.'s" identity, but all such reasons as there may have been, disappear with the death of David K. Larimer.

Mr. Larimer, who died suddenly of Bright's disease at Sioux City on the 8th, was telegraph editor of the Sioux City Tribune. He came into that connection after a long and varied newspaper experience. Beginning on the Spokesman-Review of his native city, Spokane, he served on the Portland Oregonian, on the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, on the Salt Lake City Tribune, and on the Omaha Bee, before going in August, 1909, to the Sioux City Tribune, where for a man of his rigorous non-partisan democracy he found delightful editorial companionship. Not long before his employment on the Omaha Bee, Mr. Larimer grasped the doctrines of Henry George, and it was early in his employment there that he introduced himself to The Public with an expression of a wish to give work for the promotion of Henry George democracy, since he could not give money.

After that, from time to time, when there was something to be said which he felt it incumbent upon him to try to say and in the line of The Public's policy to publish, his welcome contributions