member as an amendment to the Democratic caucus measure. It was offered so swiftly that no inference is reasonable that it may have been offered to overcome insuperable obstacles to the caucus measure; the more obvious inference is that its purpose was to sidetrack the caucus measure. It was opposed by the Democratic leader, Champ Clark; and while supported by every one of the four Democrats who had voted with the Cannon Republicans in favor of the old and arbitrary rules, it was opposed by all but two of the "insurgent" Republicans. These circumstances are suspicious. And what does this Fitzgerald amendment accomplish, anyhow? If it does much toward restoring deliberative functions to the House, its adaptability to that purpose is not very apparent.

The Proof of the Pudding.

Once upon a time a young mechanic who believed in protection fell into a dispute with an old veteran of the Civil War over the tariff question. Said the young mechanic: "You were all right, old fellow, in your day; but you are behind the times now. You don't know what you are talking about." "Perhaps not," replied the canny veteran; "but I've been voting for pensions while you've been voting for protection, and here's some of my pension money. See? Now, can you show any protection money?"

The Negro Problem.

It has remained for a Southern white man of Southern ancestry, to make a clear, true, complete and thoroughly democratic exposition of the Negro question. We allude to Quincy Ewing's discussion of "The Heart of the Race Problem," in the March Atlantic. One by one, Mr. Ewing takes up the white man's objections to the Negro, and gently but mercilessly tears them to shreds.

Is the Negro lazy, and does that make him a problem for his white neighbors? The facts are against it. In Southern communities Negroes are choice workmen, workmen of highest efficiency, workmen who are so much in demand that he who should "attempt to inveigle a few dozen of the laziest away" from any Southern community, would "be likely to take his life in his hands after the usual warning is disregarded."

Is the Negro peculiarly criminal, and does that make him a problem? No. What if the white

man's statistics of the white man's administration do indicate it? The fact is otherwise. Although Negroes of the South occupy the social plane "which everywhere else supplies the jail, the penitentiary, the gallows, with the greatest number of their victims," yet "in every other community the doers of society's rough work, the recipients of its meagerest rewards, are chargeable, relatively, with the greatest number of crimes." It is the Negro's economic condition that brings him under the ban of the criminal law, and not any racial trait. Indeed, "it is abundantly certain that no race of people anywhere are more easily controlled than the Negroes by the guardians of law and order." Nor do the facts support the frequent charge that "the Negro's worst crimes partake of a brutality that is peculiarly racial." One need but observe for a week the crime reports of any cosmopolitan newspaper to see that "the Negro's worst crimes, with all their shocking accompaniments, are, not seldom but often, duplicated by white men."

Is it the Negro's ignorance then that makes him a problem? "Hardly," answers Mr. Ewing; "for, almost to a man, the people who most parade and most rail at the race problem in private conversation, on the political platform, and in the pages of newspapers, books and periodicals, are disposed rather to lament, than to assist, the passing of the Negro's ignorance."

Neither does Mr. Ewing find "the heart-throb of the race problem," in personal aversion. There is no such thing in Southern communities. "How could there be," exclaims this writer, "where from infancy we have all been as familiar with black faces as with white; where many of us fell asleep in the laps of black mammies, and had for playmates Ephrom, Izik, Zeke, black mammy's grand-children; where most of us have had our meals prepared by black cooks, and been waited on by black house servants?"

What, then, is the Negro problem? Simply that it "is the white man's conviction that the Negro, as a race and as an individual, is his inferior," and that it "is the white man's determination to make good this conviction, coupled with constant anxiety lest by some means he should fail to make it good." This is evident from general considerations alone. "Everywhere in the South friction between the races is entirely absent so long as the Negro justifies the white man's opin-

ion of him as an inferior, is grateful for privileges, and lays no claim to rights." The specific evidence with which, layer upon layer, Mr. Ewing further establishes his contention that "the race problem is the problem how to keep the Negro in focus with the traditional standpoint," is overwhelming. And so it would be, Mr. Ewing rightly concludes, if the Southern white people were to give place to white people from any other section of the United States.

The question is not sectional in any profound sense. It is a question growing out of the traditional status of the Negro in this country. In other words, the Negro problem is nothing but the old problem of Jew and Saxon and peasant —the same old problem, but with an ebony setting. Mr. Ewing does not undertake to say whether the policy of the whites at the South is "expedient or inexpedient, wise or unwise, righteous or unrighteous." That is for each reader to determine for himself. Mr. Ewing merely explains-and this he proves-that the Negro problem of the South does not, in fact, hinge upon the alleged laziness, criminality, ignorance, or repulsiveness of the Negro; but upon the conviction of white men that the Negro is inferior, and their determination to verify this conviction.

Success.

The cheapest commodity in the world is human lives—retail or wholesale. In warfare, it is as Mahomet commanded at the capture of Constantinople: "Fill up the ditches, drive in the hordes!" They were driven in, in order that fresh hordes might cross to the real assault. In business the same cry wins, only it is coffers instead of ditches that are filled, and Greed instead of Mahomet that gives the command.

The War on Tuberculosis.

One man has put his finger upon the reason why the campaign of the doctors against the "white plague," is to such a high degree unsuccessful. He is Benjamin C. Marsh, of New York. In a talk before the City Club of that city recently, Mr. Marsh gave as his reason that the doctors are working against impossible conditions. Congested populations breed tuberculosis faster than doctors can cure it, and with a persistency that defies even the most effective preventives. "The solution of the problem," he added, "is to keep land cheap." For doing this, Mr. Marsh made suggestions that might or might not be effective.

He would limit the number of buildings to the acre and provide for plenty of light and air. We should distrust his confidence that this would keep the price of building sites down to a minimum. It might, indeed, tend to increase their price. But there is a simple way of keeping the price of building lots down to a minimum, and the price of buildings, too. Exempt buildings and building material from taxation, and buildings would rent on the basis of cost without taxes added; tax building lots on full value, whether built upon or not, or whether well or poorly used, and building lots would glut the market and their prices fall to bedrock. If congested populations breed tuberculosis in cities-and we believe they do breed that disease as well as other diseases, physical and moral-and if this would be stopped by keeping land cheap, as we believe with Mr. Marsh that it would be, the general and effective way is the better way.

The Children.

Oh, my brothers, do you hear them? Do you hear the children moaning? Certainly you do not. If you did, and were human, you would storm your legislatures for relief. You would do it though the relief made you bankrupt—if you heard and were human.

Progress at Panama.

The amount of work yet to be done on the Panama Canal (vol. viii, pp. 9, 41, 202, 218, 723, 782; vol. ix, pp. 158, 299, 465, 506, 530, 611, 657, 801, 1141, 1167; vol. xi, pp. 913, 919; vol. xii, p. 121) is much greater now than when the United States took over the enterprise. So is the expense yet to be incurred. In explanation of this interesting situation The Canal Record for February 24 contained data worth considering quite as much for other reasons as for those intended.

When the New French Company sold out to the Americans at \$40,000,000, it was understood that 40 per cent of the work had been completed. The Americans took possession on the 4th of May, 1904, nearly five years ago. After some two years had been spent in formulating plans and providing a plant for operations, it was estimated by the minority of the board of engineers of 1906 that there remained to be excavated 103,580,000 cubic yards. Between the time of that estimate and the 1st of November, 1908, there had been excavated 53,730,955 cubic yards, leaving approximately 50,000,000 cubic yards still to be excavated. But behold! the revised estimate of the Commission,