Public reaches in the United States and Canada, and as far as Europe and Australia. For twenty years Mr. White has been a prominent leader in Chicago of the movement which Henry George originated, and echoes of his local reputation have gone abroad.

Until recently he made the propagation of his cause his play rather than his work. He even held aloof from the occupation that would have best enabled him to serve his cause and for which his intellectual qualities and acquirements gave him exceptional fitness. This was not lightly done. At one time he studied law with the intention of practicing. Its theories were in accord with his intellectual bent, and its principles and problems were attractive to his logical and philosophical cast of mind. But his first glimpse of the arena of actual practice repelled him.

It was not from the conflicts of practice that he shrank, for he is a born fighter, but from the pettifogging and chicanery which, with varying shades of difference as to politeness of method, seemed to him to characterize the whole profession, from crude and vulgar police-court practitioners all the way up to oleaginous leaders in the first rank at the bar. So Mr. White abandoned the law while yet a student, and withdrew to a printing office, where he has ever since made his living as a journeyman compositor.

But he did not let his mind run down in the monotony of his mechanical vocation. His theoretical studies were continued, and the single tax agitation, into which he was willingly drawn, has afforded him ample opportunity for that clash of mind with mind, over practical affairs, which is necessary to prevent such studies from degenerating into idle and impracticable dreams. The qualities so developed in White have been the occasion of no little astonishment to men who know nothing of him except that he is a journeyman printer and a single tax agitator. One of these was Lyman J. Gage, late secretary of the treasury. Upon hearing White in an impromptu debate which called for ready application of the principles of philosophy to practical problems in economics and politics, Mr. Gage remarked: "While journeymen printers can think as clearly and reason as logically on public questions as that, we need have no fear for the future of our country."

While Mr. White earned his living as a mechanic he spent his leisure in promoting the cause to which he is devoted, both by study and in public exposition and discussion. The resulting prominence to himself, and the political trend of the single tax movement, brought him into practical politics, and he was twice a candidate for Congress. In 1894 he polled 8,484 votes as the People's party candidate in a triangular contest; and in 1896, in the same Congressional district he polled 28,309 as the fusion candidate. Among the speakers in his support in 1894 were Father McGlynn and Henry George.

Mr. White has now abandoned his mechanical work to devote himself exclusively to the promotion of the Henry George movement, not in Chicago alone but throughout the country. He has done so at the instance of the Henry George Association of Chicago. This association is organized upon a peculiar plan. It combines the principle of democratic control with that of administrative responsibility. The president is elected by the members, and the laws are controlled by them. That is the democracy of it. But the president uses his own discretion in the selection and removal of subordinate executive officers and the prosecution of the work—which is the administrative responsibility of it. Frederick H. Monroe has been president since 1900, having been elected four times. He has organized an executive committee in which are leading men of Chicago of both political parties. He has built up a membership which includes nearly all the active single taxers of the city. He has organized and successfully promoted a variety of methods of association and agitation. He has brought the single tax movement into friendly relations with other political and economic movements of radical purposes or tendencies. Included among these are the socialists, with whom he has arranged occasional friendly debates. He has also put it upon a friendly footing with more conservative movements. But in none of his really effective work has Mr. Monroe's success been more marked than in his utilization of John Z. White's abilities.

Mr. White is a persuasive as well as convincing speaker. He can swing oratorical clubs, when occasion demands it, and logical argument mathematically adjusted is his delight; but he can lead as well as drive, and when his suspicions of bad faith are not aroused he inclines to that course. He is not an orator as Ingersoll was nor as Cockran is. Among single tax orators he is in a different class from Crosby and Bigelow. His is the oratory of colloquial speech, much the same on his feet as in a chair. Yet he is distinctly one of the leading orators of the single tax movement. In this respect he is in a class by himself. If he lacks in the picturesque elements of the orator's art, he more than makes up for it in accuracy and strength. In the art of leading (driving when necessary) his hearers from what they know and believe in to what they do not know or do not believe in, he has few equals. Taking him altogether, his ideals and his powers, Mr. White is the kind of man that one could wish to see on the floor of Congress when minions of plutocracy are pulling at the pillars that support the democracy of our republic.

THE PANAMA FILIBUSTER.

Circumstances are strongly against President Roosevelt when he protests that he had nothing to do with bringing on the Panama revolution. Every fact thus far disclosed points to his complicity.

Why were American war ships ordered to the Isthmus before the revolt occurred?

Why did the American naval commander forbid the use by the Colombian authorities of the railroad for the purpose of putting down the revolt and asserting the acknowledged sovereignty of Colombia?

Why did the American naval commander advise the military representative of the Colombian government to withdraw from Panama?

Why did President Roosevelt forbid the landing of Colombian troops for the purpose of suppressing the revolt?

Why did President Roosevelt recognize Panama as a new nation before Colombia had had any opportunity to act, when President McKinley had declared with reference to Cuba, in his message of April 11, 1898, that "recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away"?

Above all, why did President Roosevelt threaten the Colombian government with some mysterious and dire disaster as early as July? Here is his instruction (made public September 4) to the American minister at Bogota, cabled late in July (p. 502):

> If Colombia neglects to ratify the treaty unamended, the United States will be forced to take measures that will be a source of regret to all friends of Colombia.

If that threat meant that the United States would encourage Panama to secede and would support its secession, then the circumstances are consistent. If the threat meant anything else, it needs explanation.

No attempt to explain it has been made.

President Roosevelt is said to have had in contemplation a message to Congress recommending that Congress proceed with the construction of the Panama canal by force if Colombia would not accept the Hay-Herran treaty. But that is a poor explanation.

It is unthinkable that even Roosevelt would have had the hardihood to press this high handed policy deliberately upon a Congress which had instructed him to construct the canal across Nicaragua if he could not secure peaceable permission to construct it across Panama.

The fact that such an explanation of Roosevelt's threat to Colombia can be made, is significant of an attitude toward the Isthmian canal question which reflects little honor upon the Administration, no matter in what way it is looked at.

Why is President Rosevelt so determined that—Colombia or no Colombia, Congress or no Congress, law or no law—the Isthmian canal shall be constructed across Panama?

Is it because Nicaragua would be the poorer route? That is not for him to decide. The responsibility for choice of route is upon Congress, not upon the President. It is the President's duty to execute the law as he finds it, quite as much as it is the citizen's duty to obey the law as it is.

Is it because $40,000,000 is to be given to the influential gentlemen in Wall street who own most of the stock of the French company, provided the canal goes through Panama, and that there is no such "watermelon" to be cut in connection with the Nicaragua route? That is hardly probable. Roosevelt's weaknesses do not lead him toward mere plunder.

Is it, then, because the continental railroad ring prefers the Panama route as the best way of killing off the canal project? It is incredible that railroad passes should be so effective.

Perhaps President Roosevelt, eager as a schoolboy in circus time for nomination and election to the office he now holds only by accident, is influenced by these considerations without knowing it. He may not trace to their sordid source the influences that are guiding him. However that may be, the truth is that large stakes in that $40,000,000 have played no inconspicuous part in strengthening the Panama forces. And this influence has been reinforced by the railroad interests. They do not want any canal to compete with them; but since the demand for some canal is irresistible they advocate the Panama route as least likely to be successful enough to disturb their interests.

Whatever the President's motives may be he has plainly violated the act of Congress which required him, when the Colombians rejected the American ultimatum as to the Panama route, to proceed with the Nicaragua route. More than that, he has placed the United States in a position of extremely humiliating dishonor.

It is a dishonor of deeper hue than that of the British, which we connived at in South Africa, or that which we took upon ourselves in the Philippines. Dishonorable as was our policy with reference to those black episodes in Anglo-Saxon history, it was only morally so. Or, at least, the legal dishonor was not pronounced enough to remove it from the field of debate. And as for mere moral dishonor, what of it? What man could get rich, what nation could become a world-power, if mere moral considerations were allowed to interfere? The day of moral philosophy, has it not passed? Aren't we living now in the day when everything from forgery to benevolent assimilation is tested not by motive but by results? Moral dishonor, therefore, such as we incurred in connection with the British conquest of South Africa and the Yankee conquest of the Philippines, may be forgotten in the glorious outcome of those buccaneering enterprises. But our dishonor in connection with the recognition of Panama is not only revolting to the moral sense; it is a consequence also of international bad faith on our part, and of our deliberate violation of the generally accepted law of nations in a manner so unambiguous as to admit of no defense.

In behalf of the Administration it is argued, indeed, that the old treaty of 1846 with New Granada (now Colombia) required the United States to protect the Isthmian railroad and therefore necessitated a course which, without that requirement, would have been indefensible.

This flimsy excuse has been torn to shreds by the Springfield Republican. We quote liberally from its article, because the Republican is neutral on the question of Nicaragua or Panama for the canal, and because it presents in condensed form an irrefutable answer to the only defense the Administration has offered in support of its Panama filibuster:

> Much is heard of our rights at the Isthmus of Panama under the treaty of 1846. In that treaty, if anywhere, an adequate defense may be found of the government's course in denying to Colombia the right or the opportunity to suppress an insurrection within its own sovereign jurisdiction, even before the insurgents had been recognized either as belligerents or as a de facto government. It will be recalled that on the first day of the rebellion at Panama city Com-

mander Hubbard, of the United States cruiser Nashville, sent to the Colombian prefect of Colon a letter declaring that the United States would not permit the transportation of Colombian troops across the Isthmus for the purpose of putting down the uprising against the Colombian government. At that time, the insurgents had no international standing whatever, even as belligerents. In the eyes of international law, they were then mere disturbers of the peace, or "bandits," as such people are sometimes called. Had they sent a cruiser to sea, it would have been technically a pirate. The authority under which Commander Hubbard acted, in behalf of his government—notwithstanding that the Panama Railroad company is obliged by its charter, or contracts, to transport the troops of the Colombian government—is drawn entirely from article 35 of the treaty, which merits a somewhat closer analysis than has yet been given to it.

A clause of article 35 which is seldom quoted, comes first, in these words:—

> The government of New Granada [Colombia] guarantees to the government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may hereafter be constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States.

This clause cannot be ignored, especially as it must be assumed that Colombia may properly claim the right and the opportunity to make good the guarantee she offered in the treaty. When the Isthmus, therefore, is threatened with disorder, menacing free and uninterrupted commercial traffic between the oceans, Colombia, under the clause quoted, must at least be granted a chance to fulfil her own obligations. This treaty right was positively and absolutely denied to her when Commander Hubbard sent his note to the prefect of Colon. Colombia was forbidden to suppress the disorder which was reported from Panama city, and at a time when the rebels had no conceivable standing even as belligerents. Legally, our government might as well have prevented Colombia from arresting a band of robbers in the canal zone. Yet Colombia was the sovereign, and anxious to fulfil her treaty obligations in this respect.

The natural working of the clause above quoted having been paralyzed by the action of the United States navy, we are bound to consider immediately the bearing of the fifth section of article 35, which declares:—

> If, unfortunately, any of the articles contained in this treaty should be violated or infringed in any way whatever, it is expressly stipulated that neither of the two contracting parties shall ordain or authorize any acts of reprisal, nor shall declare war against the other, on complaints of injuries or damages, until the said party considering itself offended shall have laid before the other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified by competent proofs, demanding justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have been denied, in violation of the laws and of international right.

Surely this section has been utterly ignored, in spirit at least, by our government. It first infringed upon Colombia's obvious treaty right to maintain, or seek to maintain, order on the Isthmus, as the sovereign power; and then it recognized the initial disturbers of the peace and traffic as a republic, thus dismembering a friendly nation, without so much as deferring its eminently hostile action until news of the uprising could reach the capital of the Colombian government. . . . The first guarantee, which was obviously to be enforced by Colombia, if possible, was followed by a compensating guarantee from the United States—"as an especial compensation for the said advantages and for the favors they (the United States) have acquired by the fourth, fifth and sixth articles of this treaty," so runs the clause. Clearly, if the United States were offering a guarantee of "the perfect neutrality" of the Isthmus, in return for "favors" from Colombia, it would be absurd to urge that the American guarantee was designed to empower the United States ever, under any conceivable conditions, to prevent Colombia from maintaining her sovereignty on the Isthmus against either foreign foe or domestic brigands, or even revolutionists. Yet that is exactly the power which our government now claims and asserts against the much weaker nation with which it covenanted.

It is now argued that there is no vitality, as against domestic revolutionists, in the third guarantee, which reads: "The United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory." Our government's interpretation is that this guarantee applies only to an invasion of the Isthmus by a foreign power. Very well. We may accept that view. Yet let us also be consistent. If this third guarantee applies only to foreign powers, why does not the second guarantee of "the perfect neutrality" of the Isthmus apply only to foreign powers? How can we shuffle off our obligation to maintain Colombia's sovereignty against rebels, in the one case, and at the same time, in the other case, stretch our power so far as to deny to Colombia the bare opportunity to maintain order or put down rebellion in the Isthmus? Are we promoting, by such legerdemain, the true national interests of the United States? Is it something to be proud of that the results we contemplate are justified by such amazing distortions of a treaty as these?

The truth is that this interpretation is entirely new, and an outgrowth of recent policy. Secretary Seward wrote to the United States minister at Bogota, in 1866: "The United States have always abstained from any connection with questions of international revolution in the state of Panama, . . . and will continue to maintain a perfect neutrality in such domestic controversies." Perfect neutrality has not been maintained; nor even an imperfect neutrality. Our government's acts have been warlike acts, which would never have been committed against a second-rate power. The alleged necessity of preventing the transportation of the troops of the sovereign government across the Isthmus is in itself a humbug, for in times past traffic on the railroad has been easily guarded, in a period of civil war, by merely stationing marines, if needed, along the line. In other cases of insurrection, the Colombian government has used the railroad freely for its troops without the slightest protest by our government. In the quick growth of the new interpretation, our naval officers, a year or two ago, decided to allow Colombian troops to be transported without arms, and now they have denied them all transportation whatever.

So we find the United States in the disgraceful position of having done with reference to Panama in 1903, what we successfully protested against with reference to South Carolina in 1861; of having violated a treaty in doing so; and of excusing their turpitude by placing upon that treaty an interpretation at variance with all our previous interpretations of it. Nor is that the worst. By executing with Panama, so hurriedly that the new nation was obliged to borrow a seal from our secretary of state in default of one of her own, a treaty which is stuffed with present plunder and future benevolent assimiliation, we have given the whole affair an aroma of interestedness which it is not easy to distinguish from a stench.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

New York, Nov. 23.—The political situation here, as I view it, is this:

Grout is slated for the gubernatorial nomination. This was talked of when the comptrollership nomination was offered him. The Republicans may have heard of it, and that may be part of the reason why they ordered Grout to get off one ticket or the other. At any rate, Grout is now grooming for the race. He believes he will have a good chance, as the feud between Odell and Platt is strengthening. Odell wants to succeed himself, but the belief is that Platt will oppose his nomination. I don't know who Platt has in mind for a substitute. With this friction between Republican leaders, Grout hopes