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It is one of the blessings of the Spanish-American war that nobody has got any glory out of it. There was glory in the civil war on both sides. It clung to the heroes and shed a dazzling radiance over into the next generation, engendering a war spirit in men who had been too young to fight or had not yet been born. These belated patriots were consequently hot for another war; that they, too, might have a chance to be crowned with a halo of military glory.

Typical of such ambitious spirits was the belligerent young Roosevelt, who preached the necessity of war as an antidote for the dessicating influences of inglorious peace. Their martial ardor broke bounds when President Cleveland nearly involved the country in a war with Great Britain; but to their intense disgust no blood flowed, and the fore-gleams of glory faded away in the dusk of a pusillanimous diplomacy. To them, therefore, the Spanish-American war was a godsend. Whether fought to revenge the Maine, or to free the Cubans, or to make a conquest of territory, or only for the wholesome effects of a little strenuous blood-letting, made no difference. It was war, and war meant glory. That was enough.

But none of the expected glory has come. There is no glory for this greatest of republics, because recent disclosures show that all that justified the war could have been accomplished and was in process of accomplishment by peaceful diplomacy; and also because the war has cul-

minated in a policy of imperial dominion like that of Great Britain. There is no glory for the participants, either in army or navy. There never is in foreign wars for those of lower grades, who do not secure promotions; but in this case there is none for those of higher grades. Roosevelt got place through it, but not glory. Sampson's glory was commuted in prize money—"loot" it would have been called if got under analogous circumstances by barbarian Filipinos. Even if there had been no prize money, his glory was overshadowed by Schley. Schley's, in turn, was obscured by the naval inquiry and President Roosevelt's confirmation of its verdict. And now what little was left of Dewey's, after the truth about his apparently brilliant advance into Manila bay transpired, and the President officially excoriated him for his dissent in the Schley case, Dewey himself has thrown away by becoming a special pleader, in the guise of an expert witness, for the imperialists. Future generations of Americans will certainly not be encouraged by the results of the Spanish-American war to precipitate another war for the sake of military glory.

Admiral Dewey's testimony before the Philippine committee of the Senate, is, if it is fairly reported, truly remarkable. Regarding his famous message that the Filipinos were more capable of self-government than the Cubans, which was always understood to mean that both were so capable, he now explains that he thinks "that neither the Filipinos nor the Cubans are capable of self-government," an interpretation of his message which is certainly not complimentary to the intelligence of his fellow countrymen. As to his urgent dispatch from Hong-Kong, in response to a message of inquiry from the American consul at Singa-

pore, "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible," he says: "I attached so little importance to the message that I sailed without Aguinaldo, before he arrived." Does Admiral Dewey forget that on the 23d of April, 1898, the British governor at Hong-Kong notified the American fleet to depart from that port by the afternoon of the 25th, and that Aguinaldo did not leave Singapore for Hong-Kong until the 26th? Was it not, then, out of respect for British neutrality, rather than indifference to Aguinaldo, that Dewey sailed without him? Perhaps the question is answered by the fact that he afterwards sent for Aguinaldo by the first American boat that returned to Hong-Kong.

Admiral Dewey also testifies that it was two months after Aguinaldo landed before he knew of any Filipino aspirations for independence; that he did not know it until the 15th of July, when he saw Aguinaldo's first proclamation of independence for the first time and then paid no attention to it. Yet that proclamation was issued and widely circulated and reported before the 20th of May, 1898, pursuant to Dewey's own instructions to Aguinaldo, when he put him ashore, "to organize his people." What was it that occupied Admiral Dewey's mind so absorbingly that he did not know of this proclamation, nor of one of May 24, to the same effect, nor of the proclamation of June 18 establishing a dictatorial government as the necessary preliminary to the organization of an independent republic? Or did he know of them? But if he did, why was he so long ignorant of the Filipino aspirations for independence?

Admiral Dewey also repeats his denial of having treated Aguinaldo as an ally. But now, as before, there is

a verbal equivocation. In his first denial he said: "I never treated him as an ally except to make use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards"—that is, he never treated him as an ally except to use him as an ally; and in his testimony now he says that he interfered with German operations in Subig bay and took possession because a German man of war was preventing Aguinaldo from passing. His prime motive, as he says, was that he "did not want any other power to interfere in the Philippines;" but the exciting cause just the same was a German menace to a vessel carrying the Filipino flag, and he protected it. His testimony that Aguinaldo was not his ally, therefore, remains as before, an inference and not a fact.

Really, pretty much all of Admiral Dewey's testimony is inferential, notably so that with reference to Aguinaldo's character. Without specifying any facts, and contrary to the tributes of other American officers, he testified that Aguinaldo is a small man intellectually and a dishonest one morally. Yet he refused to answer the crucial question on this point. For whatever Aguinaldo may be, nothing is clearer than that for more than a year he has had only to do what Buencamino has done to get good fame and money from the Americans and not improbably to be brought like Buencamino to this country to testify before Mr. Lodge's committee. Yet he has retained a dignified silence under aspersions and remains a prisoner without American office or its inviting spoils. This may not prove either greatness or honesty, but it is a situation which tends to discredit Admiral Dewey's bad opinion, and he so recognized it by his silence when it was made the basis of a searching question. Altogether Admiral Dewey has proved to be what the lawyers significantly call a "swift witness"—not necessarily a false witness, but swift.

One part of the admiral's testimony

is simply shocking—or would be if it were not so improbable. He says, in effect, that the battle of Manila was a sham fight, made to save the face of the Spanish governor; that the lives lost were wantonly sacrificed to the vanity of a commandant, who had already surrendered. This statement is so incredible that we quote it just as the Associated Press reported it in the papers of the 27th. Being asked, "What would have been the effect of permitting the Philippine force to enter Manila when our troops entered?" Admiral Dewey replied:

The Spaniards were fearful of the result of such a course, and, therefore, they surrendered to me in advance. That was all arranged and there was no need for the loss of a man in the capture of the city. It was to be done at a signal and no gun need have been fired by us, but for the desire of the governor general, who said his honor demanded that a few shots should be fired. So that I had to fire and kill a few people, but the Spaniards did not fire because of my warning that it would be disastrous to the city for them to do so. They had in the city 15,000 troops and 47 rifled guns.

This confession presents an interesting problem in the ethics of war for military moralists to solve.

The exploitation by the Philippine committee of Dewey's testimony comes suggestively just at a time when this committee, of which Senator Lodge is chairman, is reported as having denied the petition (p. 191) of Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz and other such men, for a searching investigation. Buencamino, the Filipino Benedict Arnold, has been paraded as a witness before it; but Lopez is not allowed to testify, and Aguinaldo is gagged while Dewey belittles his record as a patriot and denounces his character as a man. The truth is that Mr. Lodge's committee deliberately designs to deceive the American people regarding the disgraceful American history that is being made in the Philippines. So famous and responsible a correspondent as Henry Loomis Nelson has become sponsor for this accusation in

the columns of the Boston Herald. He writes:

The time has come when the country may as well recognize that it has never been the intention of Mr. Lodge's committee to seek the whole truth. The purpose of the investigation, as it lay in the mind of the chairman of the committee, was undoubtedly to secure some information which might appear to be useful in the framing of legislation.

Commenting severely upon that all too evident purpose of suppression, City and State, of Philadelphia, is more tender with President Roosevelt and Secretary Root than with Mr. Lodge. That is generous, but it isn't just. Roosevelt and Root are as innocent or as culpable, whichever it may be, as is Lodge; and if the insinuations of the following quotation from City and State are true as applied to Lodge alone, they are as certainly true in substance of Root and Roosevelt:

Our readers will remember that Senator Dietrich said last winter, when a correspondent urged that this investigation should be made open: "We will do nothing that Senator Lodge does not wish;" and "if it were to be thrown open something might come out that we do not wish." Surely, Senator Dietrich spoke with refreshing frankness. This was the plain truth. Senator Lodge's ability and experience make him the controlling force on this committee. This he well knew when he saw the dangerous weapon of a Philippine investigation about to be wielded by Senator Hoar's honest hand. He saw the danger and averted it by demanding that the work of investigation should be transferred to his committee. And well has he worked toward his end—to save the administration from a scandal, a burden of responsibility that would have swamped it before the haven of the next presidential election could have been reached. Mr. Lodge is very tired with the long and difficult task as he prepares for the summer's rest. He has fought his fight splendidly. He could not keep all the damning truth hidden, but some of the worst of it is still behind the curtain, and that which has been revealed, thanks to his skillful tactics, and to the ingenious explanations given by his associates, has been robbed of much of its true significance. He has fought on until the American summer, which with most Americans renders seriousness impossible, is upon us before any real investigation has begun. Meanwhile we understand the President's letter to