

they lived was invariably their home, their children were their cherished responsibilities, fidelity to conscience was their solemn obligation, development of their intellectual powers in the service of truth as they saw the truth was their inspiration and pleasure. In all this they were one in affections and one in mind; each supplemented the work of the other in the promotion of their common purposes.

It was no unusual thing for Henry George to tell his friends that his wife was his best adviser and critic. Nor was this an empty compliment. Into all his books her best thought entered along with his, and in the weeding process her judgment was often his court of final appeal. It was not alone as child-bearer and home-keeper that she was his help-mate. Without neglecting any of the functions that are distinctly those of wife and mother, neither did she attend to these exclusively and at the expense of ignoring those which while less distinctive are assuredly among the functions of wifehood. She was his wife and he her husband in all the relations of their common life, from dining-room to library, from kitchen to lecture platform, from home-making to citizenship.

Yet each respected the individuality of the other. Neither admitted coercion into their marital scheme. In no circumstances did either rank as inferior or superior. If they had lived in a State where all citizens may vote, one might have expected them to go arm-in-arm to the polls, and to come arm-in-arm away after having cast independent ballots, expressive of individual convictions, without dictation, and subject to no influence of either upon the other except that beneficent influence which flows from reciprocal confidence in a condition of actual and mutually conscious equality.

Their personal affection, though intense, was not alone in giving this character to their married life. They were influenced also by convictions with reference to masculine and feminine functions of the mind.

Not merely because she was his own wife did he exalt her judgment. While he realized that this gave it peculiar value to him-

self, his dominant thought sprang from a recognition of the superiority of feminine perceptions, and a belief that these perceptions are at their best when cooperating with masculine deliberation under the impulses of a happy marriage. Responding to the same thought, she received from him as he from her. Their marriage consequently grew into a type of those full-rounded marital unions of which the great world seldom hears but of which it is always full—those myriad unions of "sweet and patient souls who in narrow circles live radiant lives."

After thirty-six years, this union ended with the death of Henry George. It was on the eve of the mayoralty election of 1897 in Greater New York, at which he was one of the three principal candidates. Mrs. George's life since then has seemed like a crowning of the work in which she and her distinguished husband were so long jointly concerned. The principles for which he stood, the affections by which he was drawn, the work he left unfinished, have all come within the influence of her quiet life. Her own death marks the end of an old and the beginning of a new era, in the cause with which both their names are inseparably linked.

THE SPENCER-GEORGE CONTROVERSY.

When we discussed the posthumously published letters of Mr. Herbert Spencer relative to this controversy (p. 146), we supposed that all his letters on that subject had then been published. The manner of their publication seemed to warrant this supposition. But after an interval of five weeks, another installment appeared in the Independent of June 30. There is nothing in these later letters, however, to call for revision of our article, nor for extended supplementary comment. Without in any important respect controverting George's "Perplexed Philosopher," they only reveal an intolerable uneasiness on the part of Spencer to attack George in the American press behind somebody else's signature.

The merits of this controversy are admirably summed up and

fairly judged in the same issue of the Independent in which the Spencer letters appear—June 30—in a very brief review by Mr. T. Scanlon. Three searching questions which go to the heart of the dispute are asked and answered by Mr. Scanlon:

(1) What was Spencer's position on the land question in 1850? (2) What was it in 1891? (3) Was the process a valid one, whereby the change from the earlier to the later position was effected?

Mr. Scanlon considers that what Mr. Spencer meant by "compensation" in 1850 in "Social Statics" was compensation both for land value itself and for the value of those improvements which merge into the land in the process of reducing wildernesses to fertile fields—"but in a mild form and as a matter of expediency, not as a matter of right."

That is a totally different thing, as he proceeds to show, from Mr. Spencer's meaning in 1891, when, in "Justice," he lengthened out the idea of "improvements" so as to "include practically all that human labor has done to the land since the days of Adam."

Concluding that Mr. Spencer's position on the land question did change between 1850 and 1891, and that it changed so radically as to involve "a virtual surrender of the fundamental position" he originally assumed "respecting the people's rights in the soil," Mr. Scanlon implies that the process whereby Mr. Spencer changed from his earlier to his later position was not a valid one. Vigorous as is his condemnation, few of his fellow Spencerians will venture to dispute its justice. We quote him:

In the field of philosophy at large Spencer was great, and his methods were unassailable; he weighed every fact and shrank from no conclusion to which it logically led; but there is no longer the disinterested inquirer after truth; he has the manner of the special pleader, whose function is to make facts accord with ready-shaped conclusions. Hence the bungling and pettifogging nature of his new doctrines; doctrines which need only to be placed alongside his former noble utterances in order to show how worthless they are. "The rod of civilization is bent," says the earlier Spencer, in effect, "and we must bend it back so as to get it straight." But the later Spencer says: "No; if the rod is bent, let it stay bent." "At

what rate per annum does wrong become right?" asks the earlier Spencer. "Oh! that's easy," says the later Spencer, "just count the years the wrong has been in operation; make that number the denominator; then write '1' above it for numerator; the resultant fraction gives the rate required." It is impossible to resist the conclusion that as years went by he lost that warm sympathy with the struggling masses which oozes out from the pages of his earlier books. He tried to unsay some of the truths which he formerly said. But it was too late. They had already passed into history and are part of the heritage of future ages. They will continue to animate and inspire fresh seekers after truth, who will think of Spencer as he was when he wrote them; not as he was when he tried to blot them out.

Spencer proclaimed in 1850 the right of all to the use of the earth, and denounced landlordism as a social crime which ought to be abolished. In his later years he insisted that this abolition could be effected justly only by compensating landlords for the difference between the value of land now and its value in primitive conditions when it had no value! If that is what he meant in 1850, his meaning was foolish. Yet it is what he did mean in 1891 and in these posthumous letters, for he says so in terms which leave room for no other inference.

Whatever may be thought of Herbert Spencer as a philosopher constructing a theory of the universe out of nebulous data, one must rebel against common sense to respect the reasoning of his special plea for land monopolists. One must cherish, moreover, a more generous estimate of character than he expresses in his Skilton letter of May 10, 1895, to regard his efforts at reconciling his earlier with his later position on this subject as the product of an ingenuous mind.

NEWS

Week ending Thursday, July 23.

The butcher workmen's strike against reduction of wages in the packing houses of the country, the settlement of which by arbitration was reported last week (p. 246),

has broken out anew and now includes the allied trades.

This strike began originally on the 12th (p. 236), after the packers had offered arbitration. It was supposed at the time that the strikers had declined the arbitration offer; but that appears to have been a mistake, for on the 13th Mr. Michael Donnelly, the president of the butcher workmen's international organization, wrote as follows to J. O. Armour, in answer to the arbitration offer, which had been made on the 11th:

Your esteemed favor of July 11 was duly received, and, according to agreement, I made every effort to reach K. H. Bell on the telephone on Monday last. Being unable to reach him, I decided that the packers had their minds made up that all negotiations were broken off. I desire, however, to say that our organization has never refused to arbitrate any question, and while I regret much the present state of affairs, I also want to say that we are yet willing to arbitrate on certain conditions. I hope that you will not misconstrue the meaning of this letter, that while I am and our organization is willing to arbitrate, but only along certain lines. If you consider this favorably I shall be glad to meet you and outline on what terms our people will arbitrate.

Soon after the delivery of this letter a joint conference of the representatives of the packing houses and the strikers was held. It met at Chicago on the 14th. The packers demanded that the strikers submit their arbitration proposal in writing. This was done. Their proposal required the reemployment of all strikers within three days, the payment of the existing rate of wages (18½ cents an hour) pending arbitration, and that the arbitration award should not involve a reduction of wages. The proposal was rejected by the packers, who wrote in reply:

We are willing to arbitrate the whole matter, covering wages and working conditions of all employes out on strike, you having the privilege of bringing before the arbitrators for decision any question of wages or conditions, or any other grievance you may think you have, we to have like privilege, and both to abide by the decision of the arbitrators. We will retain all men now at work, and will re-employ all the men now out, as fast as possible, giving preference in order of application for work, employes to return to work at the wages received when go-

ing on strike, pending the decision of the arbitrators.

Replying to the foregoing letter of the packers, the strikers wrote as follows on the 15th:

Your proposition does not cover the requests which the butcher workmen have submitted to you for consideration. It does not meet the present situation, nor does it offer a method by which future relations of mutual good will may be protected or promoted. We favor arbitration, not as a general proposition, but as a method of adjusting the present dispute. We submit that there must be some definite proposition for intelligent satisfactory arbitration, for without specific limitation arbitration tends to confuse rather than to adjust. The present strike is the result of the dissatisfaction of the butcher workmen with the wages they receive, and certainly in view of the fact that the cost of the necessaries of life have been increased rather than diminished they should not be asked to face even the possibility of a reduction in wages. You say that you are willing to "arbitrate the whole matter covering wages and working conditions of all employes on strike." On the surface this may seem fair, but inasmuch as you have reduced wages and the strike is the insistence of the workmen that these reduced wages should be restored, your suggestion that the "whole matter covering wages, etc.," involves the possibility of a reduction in the present wages against which and for the rise of which the present movement was inaugurated. You must therefore know that we cannot agree to arbitration in which even the present low standard of wages is by some possibility likely to be reduced. We do not apprehend that an impartial arbitration would award a reduction of present wages, but the submission of the question involves in itself a concession at the outset—that it is a debatable question, one that can be awarded and accepted. In view of these considerations we repeat that "we are in favor of arbitration" of the matters really in dispute, and maintain that such arbitration does not and should not involve any possibility of a reduction in wages. Your proposition to re-employ the men on strike in the order in which they "make application for work" is, in our opinion, neither justified on your part nor is it possible of acceptance by us. The proposition implies that we are defeated in our effort to secure fairer conditions of labor than have recently been accorded us. It implies that we have been defeated and that our people may be discriminated against as the whim, fancy or prejudice that any superintendent or foreman may feel or display. We are most anxious to end the present dispute, but we cannot consent to any settlement that will involve the sacrifice of the men and women guilty of no greater wrong than their intense and earnest desire for