

should subject him to cross-examination, and make further inquiry in other quarters. For it should be remembered that in this denial Otis is contradicting both Gen. Reeves and himself. Gen. Reeves reported nearly a year ago that Aguinaldo did apply for a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a neutral zone, and that Otis replied that as the fighting had begun it must go on to the grim end. That report by Gen. Reeves has been widely published and never before denied. It was confirmed by an official dispatch which Otis himself had sent to Washington on the 8th of February, 1899, in which he said:

Night of 4th Aguinaldo issued flying proclamation charging Americans with initiative and declared war. Sunday issued another calling all to resist foreign invasion. His influence throughout this section destroyed. Now applies for cessation of hostilities and conference. Have declined answer.

This report of Otis is so directly at variance with the explanation he now gives that it cannot be brushed aside by his remark that it was so hastily written as to be "misleading." No degree of haste, if the facts are as he now relates them, could have led him to say that Aguinaldo had applied to him for a cessation of hostilities and that he had declined to answer. We do not say that there is prevarication or falsehood here; but we do say, as every unbiased reader must, that there is flat self-contradiction. That being so, the matter ought to be investigated by congress, at least to the extent of a cross-examination of Otis.

Whether the Philadelphia North American is controlled by John Wanamaker or his son, it is earning a right to the gratitude of a ring be-deviled city. And John Wanamaker himself, quite on his own account, has proved his right to share in that gratitude. The North American was purchased about a year ago by Wanamaker's son Thomas, who put at the head of its editorial staff that sterling journalist, Arthur McEwen, who long before had made his name a household word on the Pacific slope and whose work contributed so notably to the

editorial power of the New York Journal four years ago. The paper at once started upon a straight-forward career in the interest of civic righteousness. This brought it in conflict with the corrupt politicians of Philadelphia, who not unnaturally held John Wanamaker accountable; and a few days ago two of them waited upon him at his store and tried to intimidate him by threats of personal exposures. But they had mistaken their man. Telling his visitors that his son owned the North American and that he himself would not interfere, Mr. Wanamaker defied them to do their worst by ordering them out of his office. There could be no more convincing testimony to the excellent work the North American is doing than this effort to intimidate its proprietor by threatening his father; and Mr. Wanamaker has won a host of new friends by his behavior in the matter.

THE SUFFRAGE A NATURAL RIGHT.

Fundamentally, government is of two kinds—government by all the governed, and government by superior force.

Government by all the governed, which is commonly designated self-government, can be administered only by universal suffrage. All the people do not govern unless all have a potential voice in the government. Universal suffrage may indeed fail to secure government by all, but there is no such thing as government by all without it. The question, then, of whether or not suffrage is a natural right is determined by the question of whether government by all or government by superior force is the natural kind of government.

As a term in social philosophy, "natural" does not mean either brutal or primitive, though professors of social science have used it in both senses. While some have gone, with ludicrous complacency, to the brute instincts of the lower animals for examples of what is natural in the social life of man, others have in an equally absurd way assumed that primitive social life and natural social life are the same. Francis A. Walker, the

famous university economist and author, is on record for the latter blunder. With astounding composure he confessed his inability to understand what is natural to man because he had never seen man in the natural state! These are inexcusable confusions. Whether a form of government be natural or not, is not to be solved by reference to the habits of the lower animals or the customs of primitive man. It is to be solved by reference to natural moral laws.

Many learned men deny that there is any natural moral law. It is fashionable in some quarters to do so. They contend that questions of righteousness are questions of expediency; and that in nature, including human nature, there is no such thing as a right to be claimed or a duty to be performed. They profess to recognize no absolute moral standards, holding only that to be right which from experience appears to them to be wise. Such men are atheists. Though they preach from pulpits or teach in the class rooms of pious universities, they are atheists nevertheless. To deny the eternal sway of invariable moral law is to deny God.

It is impossible, consistently with sincere recognition of a supreme ruler of the moral as well as material universe, to regard problems of right and wrong as mere questions of experience. Though moral laws may be discovered by experience, it is not out of experience that they take their rise, nor do they vary with its variations. Just as the physical laws of gravitation existed and operated with unvarying constancy during all the time before Newton's experiments, so the moral law must be coeval with that personification of infinite justice whom men call God, and be as immutable. It was as truly a violation of moral law to steal before Moses promulgated the eighth commandment as after some social experimenter had discovered that honesty is the best policy.

But it is not to atheists, either of the pious or the impious sort, that we address these considerations regarding universal suffrage. Since they do not believe in natural rights at all, they are in no mental condition to reflect upon any argument for suffrage as a natural right. That universal

suffrage could be defended in their atheistic forum we have no doubt. Simply as a matter of wise expediency, having reference to the general good, its superiority over no suffrage and limited suffrage could doubtless be shown. But we now address readers who, believing in a God of infinite justice, believe therefore in the immutability of moral law, with its natural equilibrium of rights and duties.

Let us revert, then, to the main point. Which kind of government is natural—government by the governed or government by superior force? For, as we have already indicated, the solution of that question determines whether or not the suffrage is a natural right.

The question really answers itself. Without hopelessly confusing power with righteousness, it is impossible to conceive of a moral commission which any man or set of men may hold to govern other men against their will. The superficial plausibility of the theory that power to govern implies right to govern, we concede. But the theory is really without validity, even in experimental philosophy; and in morals it is not so much as plausible. Nothing could be more repugnant to moral principle than this idea that might makes right. Though might and right may often coincide, yet might is no more right than weakness is. Might never coincides with right except by accident. Mere force cannot possibly give a moral right to govern. We must, therefore, either exclude government from the domain of morals, as philosophical anarchists do, or conclude that fundamentally it rests not upon force but upon the consent and participation of the governed.

This conclusion is in accord with the natural law of morals. For harmonious moral adjustment in the social sphere implies equilibrium of rights and duties. The duty of every one not to steal or murder, springs from and is balanced by the right of everyone else not to be murdered or stolen from. In these respects the rights of each correlate with corresponding duties of the others. And so with all other rights and their correlative duties. Among these is the

right of each to be free within the limitations of like freedom to all—limitations which are defined by the corresponding duty of all to respect the freedom of each. As to rights and duties, therefore, all persons are naturally equal. And where all are naturally equal, none can coerce by force as matter of natural right.

In this view of the moral law, government by superior force has no warrant. Such government as may exist at all by natural right, must be a government in which the governed participate. It follows that universal suffrage, even though it might not secure government by all, yet, because there can be no government by all without it, is a natural right.

The same conclusion follows the more definite premise that rights to life and liberty are natural. No moral philosophy worthy the name would deny the natural quality of these rights. Nor does any political philosophy which defends government at all deny that its primary function is to protect them. Yet government by all, which implies suffrage by all, is the only kind of government that essentially recognizes the right of all to life and liberty.

Under an absolute monarchy, when life or liberty is at stake, the only appeal is to the individual generosity of the monarch. His beneficent acts are not dictated by any recognition of another's right; they are prompted solely by his own grace. If he recognizes rights and duties at all, it is only as rights and duties between master and slave are recognized—the monarch has rights and the subject owes duties. The great fundamental natural rights to life and liberty are not guaranteed, either in fact or theory, by absolute monarchy. The conception is wholly foreign to that system. Absolute monarchies, therefore, are not natural.

Of oligarchies the same thing is true. Though oligarchies, like monarchies, might give security to life and liberty, it would be as matter of grace and not in recognition of a natural right.

No less comprehensive a system than government by all can secure those rights as natural rights. That is the only system which essentially recognizes them as natural, and un-

der which every person is armed with the best weapon of peace yet known for protecting them. Where all are accorded an equal voice in government as matter of right, none is likely in practice to be denied equal consideration with reference to his life or his liberty; and none can be denied it consistently with the principles of the government.

It may well be objected that a majority under universal suffrage is in no wise different from an oligarchy under restricted suffrage. For it is true that majorities are often autocratic. But this is chargeable to defective methods.

In essential principle, and to a very high degree in actual practice, majorities are radically different from oligarchies. Majorities proceed upon the principle that rights to life and liberty are natural and equal; oligarchies proceed upon the theory that these rights are neither equal nor natural, but are gifts from superiors. In actual practice an oligarchy, which is a stable class placed over other classes, is unresponsive to their demands; whereas a majority, a shifting quantity in one class, is affected by all.

Objections to universal suffrage as a right, which rest upon the absurdity of extending the suffrage to minors, to convicted criminals and to the insane, assuming that universal suffrage logically demands that extension, are the veriest pettifogging.

There is a period in every one's life when he is concededly incompetent to participate in government. This is indubitably true of an infant in arms. Later there comes a period when, if of sane mind, he is competent. This is certainly true of the man or woman of 30. But as no general rule can be formulated for determining as to each person when he crosses the line between the incompetency of childhood and the competency of manhood, it is customary to fix an age period of general application arbitrarily. If the period fixed be reasonable, it involves in no rational sense a denial of the suffrage.

A similar principle applies to the insane. Men who are adjudged incompetent from insanity to manage their own affairs, may be denied the

suffrage without the slightest prejudice to the principle of suffrage as a natural right. And as to convicts, the same principle that justifies the denial to them of life or liberty consistently with the theory of natural rights to life and liberty, may deny them the suffrage without raising any question of inconsistency with reference to the suffrage as a natural right.

In other words, to withhold the suffrage from persons incapable of performing ordinary obligations is not inconsistent with the principle that suffrage is a natural right. Liberty is a natural right. But consistently with that right children are held under tutelage. Consistently with that right also the "non compos" are restrained. Consistently with that right again convicts are imprisoned. To argue that the suffrage is not a natural right because it is properly withheld from immature individuals, from individuals adjudged "non compos," and from criminal convicts, is to argue that liberty itself is not a natural right. And if liberty be not a natural right, then the only basis of natural right is superior force, which is a moral absurdity.

These questions of government and suffrage would be very much simplified, if a clear distinction were drawn with reference to the legitimate functions of government. No form of government has any right to coerce an individual in regard to his individual concerns. Coercion of individuals in individual concerns is an invasion, an aggression; and it does not cease to be such because the invader and aggressor is a government instead of another individual or a mob. This is as true of government by all under universal suffrage, as of government by one under absolute monarchy.

The sole moral justification for government is the fact that social life is not limited to individual concerns. There are also common concerns. It is for the regulation of these, and only for that purpose, that government of any kind possesses just powers. Its solitary function is to protect common rights and administer common property. When government attempts to coerce

individual action except for the protection of such common rights as life and liberty, and the administration of such common property as highways and site values, it becomes a marauder.

With this distinction clear all rational objections to government by majority are removed. When government is conceived of as possessing power to regulate private concerns, government by majority is as intolerable as any other species of tyranny. But when it is conceived of merely as the agent for protecting common rights and administering common property, government by majority commends itself as fair and natural. It is the only method of securing common action in accordance with common agreement.

The same distinction also makes the naturalness of the right of suffrage self-evident. To have a voice in the management of the organization which is charged with the protection of every one's life and liberty and the administration of every one's interest in common property is a natural right if anything can be.

NEWS

In the British war in South Africa the advance from Kroonstad to Pretoria has begun. At our last report Lord Roberts was at Kroonstad, which he made the center of his line, with the right wing, under Rundle, somewhat to the north of Thaba N'Chu, and the left, under Hunter, on the Vaal river not far east of the Bechuanaland border. On the 22d the center of the line, under Roberts, began its advance. At this writing it had reached the Rhenoster river, about half way between Kroonstad and the Vaal. The Boers in large force retreated before it, carrying all their supplies and munitions with them. There was but little fighting, the reports indicating that the Boers were outflanked by Roberts's long lines.

Buller's forces in Natal have made no decisive movement beyond Glen-coe, where they were last week; but over on the western border of the Transvaal the British have at last succeeded in relieving Mafeking.

Of the relief of Mafeking the first report came from Pretoria on the 18th, when the Boers announced that after one more severe bombardment of Mafeking, they abandoned the siege, which they had maintained since October 9, and that a British force from the south took possession of the place. There was no confirmation of this news until the 21st. Lord Roberts then reported that the flying column under Col. Mahon (reported last week as having passed through Vryburg) had entered Mafeking at four o'clock on the morning of the 18th, at the cost of five hours' fighting the day before.

Without waiting for this confirmation London crowds went into a frenzy upon receiving the first report. To quote from the cable dispatches:

By midnight the thoroughfares of the metropolis were overrun with jostling, howling crowds, and drum and fife corps paraded the streets, followed by vast, straggling processions of men, women and children, madly waving flags and yelling without intermission. The reminders of most conservative persons that the report might possibly be untrustworthy had no effect on the celebrators, who noisily rejoined: "Bobs said he'd relieve Mafeking today, and he's done it." And so the outpouring of popular ecstasy continued and grew in volume until all London was little else than a maelstrom of unreasoning revelers.

This hysterical excitement spread all over England. Says one of the dispatches: "Bells were rung and whistles blown and bonfires built all over the island, and at one o'clock in the morning the demonstrations were reported as still in full swing." The London Times described these demonstrations as having "had no parallel in recent times." They were kept up through the next day, when all business was suspended, say the reports, "except flag, button and drink selling." To continue quoting from the London dispatches:

Every conveyance save that of society, in the streets, is decked with union jacks. Cab drivers fly flags on their whips and horses' heads and tails. Some wear paper caps of red, white and blue. It is an exception to find anyone not wearing a favor. The vast majority have flags of various sizes. All the younger and a good many of the elder section of the population carry tin trumpets which they blow incessantly when not cheering vociferously, and aimlessly display on the whole an utterly childish, effusive unrestraint, absurd in its disproportion to the occasion. In the city yesterday shops were closed, while groups of stovepipe-