that the public conscience must be now aroused. I am therefore convinced that there will not be another subway steal.

FREDERICK C. LEUBUSCHER.

INCIDENTAL SUGGESTIONS

THE SUPERSTITION ABOUT "JUDGES."

Brooklyn, N. Y.

In view of the "current" (i. e., steadily flowing) sanctimonious nonsense as to our "Judges," whom the Interests, and their attorneys (journalistic and professional, as well as legal) are now begging us to accept as the modern "American" Medicine-men or as oracles of new, "up-to-date" priestcraft or Theocracy, the publication of the following quotations in The Public may be a timely service:—

"If it be charged that the exercise of this power"—i. e., of refusing to enforce, in a "case" coming up for decision, any statute which they, the courts, deem "unconstitutional,"—"virtually constitutes our courts the masters of the Constitution, with capacity to nullify its provisions and thus to override the will of the people, the Answer may be found in the Fact that the Constitution nowhere imposes the duty upon either department of government of obeying the rulings of another, but leaves each free to act within the sphere of its own appropriate functions. Consequently, the decisions of even our Highest Courts are accepted as a finality ONLY in relation to the particular cases with which they happen to deal, and their judgments DO NOT impose compulsory limitations upon the action of any other department."—"Constitutional Legislation," by Prof. John Ordroneaux, LL. D., Professor of Constitutional Law in Columbia University, N. Y. (pages 419 and 420 citing Bancroft's History of the Constitution, vol. 2, pp. 198-202; Inaugural of President Lincoln, as to Dred Scott case; Marbury vs. Madison, 2 Cranch, 137, etc., etc.).

"It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College case, that the most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in the country at large, and upon the legislation of the country, than the States to which they owe their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right conferred—no matter by what means or on what pretense—being made inviolable by the constitution"—i. e., as "construed" by Marshall, under Webster's manipulation—"the government is frequently found stripped of its authority in very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation; and a clause of the Federal Constitution whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and perpetuates the evil." (That is, it is made to do this, by our infallible, impeccable, "independent" courts).—"Constitutional Limitations," by Judge Cooley (one of our most distinguished jurists and legal writers).

The toadies and panders of Privilege and Plutocracy are pleading for the "independence" of the judiciary. *Let us* ask: "Independence" of WHAT? *And WHY? Why* must Taft as "Judge" be more "independent" than Taft as "President," or as "Senator," or as "Governor"? Why? Why? Why?

CHARLES FREDERICK ADAMS.

NEWS NARRATIVE

The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to volumes and pages of The Public for earlier information on the same subject.

Week ending Tuesday, August 15, 1911.

End of the Lords' Absolute Veto.

The power of the House of Lords of Great Britain to sit in absolute judgment upon legislation by the House of Commons is at an end. [See current volume, page 827.]

✣

Following our last report, the next formal step was taken on the 8th and in the House of Commons. This body rejected the vital amendments proposed by the House of Lords. It did so by a vote of 321 to 215—a majority of 106. With minor concessions it then readopted the measure and returned it to the Lords, where it was formally received on the 9th.

✣

The amendments conceded by the Commons are reported by cable as two, one of which relates to money bills and the other to the duration of Parliaments. The bearing of the former is upon that provision of the veto measure which forbids any veto whatever of money bills passed by the Commons; that of the latter is upon the provision that the Commons must pass other than money bills three times before the Lords' veto is ineffective, and this amendment also prevents an extension of the maximum period fixed for the life of a Parliament. A motion made by Lord Hugh Cecil (who led the disorder that prevented the Prime Minister from speaking in the Commons), that action on the measure be deferred for three months, was defeated by 348 to 209—a majority of 139.

✣

Before the veto bill reached the House of Lords on the 8th, that body had adopted, by 282 to 68, a motion like the Balfour motion which had been defeated in the Commons by a majority of 119. But this did not stand in the way of final acceptance of the veto-abolition bill. On the 10th Lord Morley moved in behalf of the Ministry that the House of Lords recede from its amendments and pass the bill. In his speech he gave warning that every vote against his motion would be in effect a vote in favor of the prompt creation of a host of new lords. The King had consented, he