

Chicago Commercial club last week Mr. Hollis said that "arbitration is as impossible between Great Britain and the Transvaal republic as it would have been between the north and the south in our civil war, or, as it would be between Great Britain and Ireland on the question of home rule." The American who utters that sentiment must have either a misty conception of the fundamental law of his own country, or a defective knowledge of the treaty relations between Great Britain and the Transvaal. The northern and southern states had by mutual consent formed a nation of which the states were subordinate members. The issue between them was whether that nation could be disintegrated except by the consent of all these members; and of course that was not a question which could be submitted to foreign powers for decision. It had to be determined by our courts, subject only to an appeal to arms under the reserved right of revolution. Precisely so with Ireland and Great Britain. Legally, they are parts of one nation. However unjustly this condition may have been established, it is an established condition. Consequently, Great Britain, which is legally the law maker for Ireland, could not consent to arbitrate the propriety of the laws she enacts for Ireland's government. But with reference to the Transvaal, there was and is no such condition. The Transvaal was a sovereign nation in the full technical sense until 1877. She was then subjugated by Disraeli. In 1881 her independence was restored in degree; and in 1884 it was completely restored, with the single reservation as to treaties. Then arose the conflict. It was not over any question of the treaty revision power reserved to Great Britain. It was over questions of internal government, regarding which the Transvaal was as independent as she had been prior to 1877. To say that Great Britain cannot arbitrate those questions, any more than she could arbitrate the parliamentary question of home rule in Ireland or than the north

could have arbitrated the constitutional question of secession with the south, is to assume that in international relations there is no eternal fitness of things.

While on the subject of the South African war, we wish to call attention to an article published some time ago in the *Anglo-American*, from the pen of Thomas G. Shearman. We shall refer to the final paragraph only, because the rest of the article, while it compares the Boers to the British very much to the advantage of the latter, advances nothing to justify the cause for which the British are fighting. But the final paragraph has been several times referred to us as embodying an analogy in conclusive justification. We give it in full:

Let any American ask himself this question: even if our own country had acted in a threatening, and, if you please, a bullying manner toward Mexico, but had still religiously abstained from entering upon Mexican territory, and then the Mexican government had suddenly demanded, by telegraph to Washington, that our government should withdraw all soldiers from within 500 miles of the Mexican boundary line and should pledge itself never to the end of time to send another soldier into California or Texas, giving notice that unless this pledge was telegraphed back within 48 hours Mexico would begin war, what would have been or ought to have been the response of the American government and people? Let him ask himself, further, if the Mexican government on receiving no answer in 48 hours had immediately invaded California and Texas and declared a considerable part of each state annexed to Mexico, what response he and all other Americans would make. Let him ask himself whether he would, for a moment, after that, have discussed the question of the previous attitude of the American government, or whether he would not, if able to do so, have rushed to the front as a volunteer to defend his country and to drive out the impudent Mexicans. I have never yet met a Boer-loving American who was willing to answer these questions, for the simple reason that they can be answered only in one way, and that is precisely the same way in which the British have answered the challenge of the Boers.

The great strength of Mr. Shearman's question lies in its minimizing if not ignoring, the most vital facts. What, for instance, are we to infer

from the assumption that the British "had still religiously abstained from entering" Transvaal territory? Surely not that Mr. Shearman never heard of the British conquest of 1877 nor the Jameson raid of 1895. He may, of course, have concluded that the former was not a conquest by the British but an abdication by the Boers. But to do so he must disregard the necessity of those formalities which should attest every abdication of independence, for there were none. So he may regard the Jameson raid as an unauthorized filibustering expedition. But as a filibustering expedition that affair was remarkably enveloped in British officialism. The leader was the agent of the chartered company, and his little army, largely officered by British army officers, entered the Transvaal carrying the British flag. On the surface of the facts at least, it is not altogether consistent with unbiased judgment to speak of the British as having "religiously abstained from entering" Transvaal territory. Doubtless Mr. Shearman intends to limit his remark on this point to the period immediately preceding hostilities. But the Jameson raid cannot be so lightly disregarded as one of the causes of the war.

There is another omission, one that goes to the heart of the subject, in Mr. Shearman's Mexico-Transvaal analogy. Besides ignoring the offer to arbitrate which accompanied the Boer ultimatum, he disregards the hostile action of the British which provoked it, except as he may have intended to summarize it in the mild and indefinite phrase "threatening and bullying manner." The ultimatum did not come like a bolt out of a clear sky, as Mr. Shearman's analogy would imply to the uninformed reader. Let us try, then, very briefly to recall the leading events of which it was the culmination. All through the summer of 1899, negotiations were proceeding between the two countries, ostensibly, on England's part, for the sole purpose of securing a naturalization law which would give full voting

privileges to foreigners after five years' residence. This was a domestic question over which the Transvaal government was supreme. While these negotiations were in progress Great Britain was advancing troops toward the Boer frontiers and bringing extraordinary supplies of troops from India and England into South Africa. That was not a "threatening" or a "bullying." It was a distinctly evident preparation for invasion—one which, if not guarded against, would have put the Boers at a fatal disadvantage; and to meet these preparations, the Boers advanced troops towards the frontiers on their side. After several fruitless propositions in August, the Boers offered to concede all that Great Britain had specifically asked and to arbitrate all other disputes, provided this concession should not be taken as a precedent for further interference in the domestic affairs of the Transvaal and that a recently asserted British claim of suzerainty should be abandoned. The offer was declined. After it had been declined the Boers withdrew it, intimating that they had made it upon a semi-official notification that it would be accepted. This action on their part was followed by a warning from the British ministry that on this account Great Britain would now propose terms of her own for final acceptance. There was no other inference, under the circumstances, than that she intended to back up some as yet unrevealed demands with military force. That was about the 20th of September. Nothing further was heard from her until October 7—more than two weeks; and during all that time she kept pouring more troops into South Africa and up about the Boer frontiers, until her regular force was exhausted. Then, on the 7th of October, without having yet notified the Transvaal of the terms they intended to propose for final acceptance, the British ministers called out the army reserves and assembled parliament. What did it all mean, if not that Great Britain intended to invade the Transvaal with an over-

whelming force? The British press so understood it. The rest of the world so understood it. How could the Boers have regarded it otherwise? They could not and did not. But not until two days afterward, October 9th, did they issue the ultimatum, which Mr. Shearman describes as if it had been an unwarranted if not unprovoked demand. And when they did issue it, they did not confine it, as Mr. Shearman's analogy implies, to a demand upon Great Britain. They offered also to withdraw their own troops from the frontier, and to submit all questions to arbitration. These facts are derived not from Boer but from British sources. They are derived from official British sources. And since they are so derived we submit that Mr. Shearman's analogy, however fair he intended to make it—and of his just intentions we have no doubt—is in fact misleading.

Reports from China by way of London do not picture the Philippine situation in the agreeable colors that characterize Gen. Otis's dispatches. The Hong-Kong correspondent of the London Daily Mail, for example, asserts that the condition of affairs is far from satisfactory. With reference to commercial conditions he acknowledges the truth of Otis's reports that the ports are open for ships to come and go; but he says that no one can leave the towns to collect merchandise in the interior. For there the Filipinos are in power. Consequently, as soon as the stocks accumulated at seaports were exhausted, commerce at those ports practically ceased. He compares the situation in the interior to that in Acheen, which the Dutch have been trying to conquer for 100 years, but without securing a foothold further inland than the fringe of shore line. While this report is less satisfying than Gen. Otis's censored dispatches, it bears a deeper impress of truth. And it is sadly confirmed by the latest military reports which tell of the destruction of an American garrison, 20 out of 30 of them being killed.

Newspaper reports of public speeches are as a rule so untrustworthy that we hesitate to accept as true the one which tells of Senator Tillman's lecture at Ann Arbor on the 28th. Though quite prepared to believe that his sentiments were essentially undemocratic, since his subject was "The Race Question in the South," we are not prepared to believe, without better proof, that he deliberately insulted a negro gentleman in the audience. According to the news report—

The audience was composed of students. Directly in front and alone sat a colored student, and the senator looked at him in making his remarks. "You scratch one of these colored graduates under the skin," he said, "and you will find the savage. His education is like a coat of paint, like his skin."

That is something which no man, himself possessing the instincts of a gentleman, could possibly say, under the circumstances described, even though his race prejudices were never so bitter. And while Senator Tillman is notable for his scathing language, it is not to be believed without good authority that he would indulge that faculty in a manner so cruel and unprovoked.

The dubious report from which we quote goes on to describe what followed Senator Tillman's alleged assault upon the negro student. "There were hisses," it says, "from various parts of the house." Senator Tillman smiled and retorted:

You must excuse me for my frankness. There is nothing of hatred in my nature for the negroes. When that man who hissed gets ready to give his daughter in marriage to a negro, and proves by his action and not by his hisses that he means business, I will apologize, and not before.

Wholly aside from the question of whether Senator Tillman said this, the sentiment deserves a moment's consideration upon the theory that he did say it. In fact this is something which he might not improbably have said. For while he is a much better democrat in some important respects than many a man who professes a higher regard for the negro,