

what a Russian paper smiles at grimly as the novel crime of "treason against foreign nations." They require a huge money indemnity. The amount is left to future adjustment, but it will doubtless be big enough to give the powers a long lease of military occupation while China takes the measures necessary for furnishing satisfactory guarantees of payment. Nor is that all. With the legation quarter at Peking perpetually fortified and garrisoned; with all the Chinese forts from Peking to the sea destroyed; with the right of the allied powers to perpetually occupy with military forces any points from Peking to the sea which they may designate; with the right of importing arms and munitions of war denied to China—and these are among the "irrevocable" conditions—with these advantages secured by a treaty to the powers, what possibilities of defense would the Chinese have when the powers had agreed upon a scheme of partitioning the empire and concluded that the time for action was ripe? None. There is no disguising it—indeed, the representatives of the powers do not seem to have tried to disguise it,—the joint note of the powers to the Chinese envoys is a bald proposition for the establishment over the empire of an international suzerainty. When that shall have been firmly established dismemberment will be a simple process, provided only that the powers agree upon their portions. The Chinese government and people will have ceased to be a party in interest. The distribution will concern them only as the distribution of loot by brigands concerns the owner who looks on in silence, being gagged, and without resisting, being bound.

We fail to find in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, as amended by the senate, any substantial grounds for objection. If Great Britain accepts it, the United States need not complain. The treaty as now framed would abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which gives Great Britain a right

to dictate with reference to the Nicaragua canal, and would relinquish to the United States all power over construction, ownership and operation. Very wisely, as it seems to us, provision is made for preserving the neutrality of the canal and for its use by all nations upon equal terms under all circumstances. The United States ought not to have the right to make the canal part of its warlike equipment. This great waterway should be maintained primarily as a channel for commerce. At the same time, since it is to be built and operated by the United States—and all may agree that no European power should be permitted to join in the enterprise—the United States ought to be invested with full power to protect it. This power is acknowledged. There does not appear, then, to be anything objectionable in the treaty. Nor is anything of vital importance omitted.

Yet all is not bright in connection with the matter. So far as international relations are concerned, we of this country may be content with the proposed treaty as the senate has amended it; and Great Britain has no just reason for feeling otherwise. But there are ample reasons for disquieting fears with reference to certain home relations. Instead of itself building the canal and owning and operating it, our government purposes investing a private corporation with that authority; and out of this relationship no end of trouble will probably arise. We shall have in worse form a repetition of our experience with the United States bank in Jackson's time, and with the Pacific railroads at a later day. The government will furnish most of the capital, while the corporation ring will reap all the profits. Worse still, this powerful ring will invest the lobbies of congress and the vestibules of the white house, and the people will fall a prey to a greedy and powerful Nicaragua canal corporation. What will be needed most with reference to the Nicaragua canal should the treaty

be finally ratified, is a vigorous agitation for government construction, government ownership, and government management of the canal.

It would appear that the Baptist ministers' conference of Philadelphia is a patriotic rather than a Christian organization, one which loves colored bunting more than the neighbor. A member, Rev. Dr. Poteat, introduced to the conference at its meeting on the 17th, Sixto Lopez, the Filipino envoy, with a request that he be heard. This request was seconded by Rev. L. Sensholes. We mention these two names for much the same reason that Lot's is mentioned in connection with Sodom and Gomorrah. Mr. Sensholes urged with reference to the Filipino question that "all reports that we have had from the other side have been garbled," and asked if it would not "be better to give a hearing to this man that we may determine the truth." But the truth was not what the conference wanted. One Wayland Hoyt, a doctor of divinity, thought that it would be virtually an acknowledgment of a traitor to listen to Mr. Lopez. It is to be hoped that Mr. Hoyt knows more of divinity than he appears from this remark to know of law. Since one must owe allegiance to a country before he can commit treason against it, Mr. Lopez, who has never, directly or indirectly, actually or constructively, owed allegiance to the United States, can hardly be regarded legally as a traitor. If he were a traitor it would be the duty of the authorities to have him promptly prosecuted. The function of traitor baiting ought not to be relegated to the Philadelphia conference of Baptist ministers. But Mr. Hoyt's objection proved sufficient. The conference summarily refused to hear Lopez. It had a right, of course, to refuse. We make no complaint of its action. But the reason for the action has precious little of the flavor of Christmas season.

Against the narrow patriotism of