

those laws. It would be the most remarkable modern instance of the creation of a despot so absolute that millions of human beings are dependent upon him even for their lives. He would be literally legislator, judge and executioner, with no one to check him or hold him to account. And as to the perpetuation of this despotic power, the whole story may be found in a single sentence of the proposed law—that which provides that the power shall continue “until otherwise provided by congress.” No provision otherwise can be made by congress, except through the enactment of a law. The president’s unlimited power would continue, therefore, until congress should repeal, or amend, or enact a substitute for the imperial clause proposed by the senate as a rider on the army appropriation bill. But congress could not do any of these things by less than a two-thirds vote of each house, without the president’s consent. If he refused that, by vetoing bills terminating his imperial power, the power would continue until two-thirds of the members of each house were sufficiently aroused to the growing dangers of imperialism to pass a bill over his veto.

We have no notion that any such usurping programme is now contemplated. Mr. McKinley doubtless expects to yield up his despotism as soon as “good government” is established in the Philippines. Doubtless, also, his supporters in congress expect him to do so. There is probably no other iniquity intended now than such as relates to the distribution of Philippine lands among presidential favorites. But never in all history has a novelty in despotism been made permanent at the start. Seldom has its permanency been intended. Despotism of the most vicious character usually develops from mischievous benevolence. Before the good Mr. McKinley succeeds in benevolently assimilating the Filipinos, his term may expire with this despotic power still attaching to his

office; and a president may come in with less inclination to part with such tempting authority. Should that contingency occur, the real despot would need the support of only one-third of each house to continue him in office as the absolute monarch of the Philippine islands. Beyond that point, all is conjecture. It may be worth considering; however, that imperialism seldom subsides until it has spent its force. And there would be much force, even at home, in absolute imperial power over 10,000,000 people, though they were 10,000 miles away.

Another move of the McKinley confederacy is dishonorable as well as imperialistic. We refer to the Cuban clause which the senate has also, under the white house lash, attached to the army appropriation bill. With unparalleled cheek this amendment makes the solemn declaration of our government, put forth at beginning the war with Spain—the declaration that we would leave Cuba to her people as soon as they had established a stable government there — makes that declaration, by a bold distortion of language, the basis for insisting upon suzerain conditions. It is enough to say of these conditions that if conceded by Cuba they would furnish all manner of pretexts for invading the island whenever the party in power in the United States might wish to do so. A repetition in Cuba of the British policy in South Africa would be a perennial danger. But more than that, they dishonor our country, by making of its solemn pledge an indecent mockery. For these conditions fly full in the face of our national declaration regarding Cuba, upon going to war with Spain, of the declaration already referred to and which reads:

That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accom-

plished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

What Cuba ought to do is to ignore any suzerain conditions which the United States may seek to impose. She is represented by a constitutional convention which this country recognizes. That convention has adopted a constitution which her people would approve. Let them vote upon it. If they confirm it, as they doubtless would, let them proceed calmly and peaceably to organize their government under it. Then let them send a minister to the president of the United States for recognition. Mr. McKinley would be obliged either to recognize him, and thereby admit Cuba into the family of nations, or to refuse to recognize him, and thereby take the responsibility upon himself of stultifying the declared purpose of this government in going to war with Spain. To the doctrine that it is the function of the president, and not of congress to recognize new nations, President McKinley is already committed. For after both houses of congress had recognized the republic of Cuba in 1896, President McKinley as well as President Cleveland refused to acknowledge their authority. The Cuban republic was therefore denied recognition, notwithstanding the action of congress, upon the ground that the constitutional power of the president to receive foreign ministers carries with it exclusive authority to decide for the United States the question of recognizing new nations. We do not believe in the soundness of that doctrine. But Mr. McKinley acted upon it when he wished to overrule congress in recognizing the republic of Cuba. Let him, then, have an opportunity to overrule congress in directing that the republic of Cuba shall not be recognized unless it makes concessions that this nation has no right to exact and which if conceded would be destructive of its independence. This would be a wise policy for Cuba to adopt. But whether she adopts it or not, she is now at a point where only the most

discreet behavior can save her independence. A peaceable, persistent, patient policy, which withholds acceptance of American suzerainty, yet continually but not boisterously forces upon the attention of our government and our people the Cuban pledge of 1898 and the fact that the time for redeeming that pledge has arrived, is the policy that all good friends of Cuba will hope to see her statesmen pursue. Her constitutional convention has already indicated its inclination toward that policy. The adoption by it of the series of concessions to the United States, printed in another column, which in dignified form yet with full regard for the island's independence intimate a "thus far and no farther," is the most encouraging event of all this Cuban controversy.

The part played by the McKinley confederacy in this crusade against the independence of Cuba has been in the last degree hypocritical. Here and there obscure confederates have turned up who made no secret of the matter. In the presidential campaign one of them, less obscure than the other candid ones—we allude to Senator Beveridge—declared at a great campaign meeting in Chicago, with the boldness of a pirate, that the United States ought to disregard its pledges to mankind in general and the people of Cuba in particular, and seize upon the richly-stored little island without ceremony. But as a rule the confederates have protested, with hand upon heart, their most earnest, most heartfelt, most pious desires to surrender Cuba wholly to her people, provided only they were fit for self-government. The hypocrisy of these protestations is now apparent. The Cubans have proved their capacity for self-government. Never before, under such trying circumstances, have a people proceeded to organize their own government with so much regard for peace, order and sound principle. Their elections and the sessions of their constitutional convention were marvelous in-

stances of popular self-control. The pretense that they must be left under American tutelage for their own good, has consequently of necessity been abandoned. It is a bird that will no longer sing. And now the mask is thrown off. The whole McKinley confederacy comes out as boldly as Beveridge for the subjection of Cuba not for her sake but for ours.

Boston has been listening, at her Lowell Institute, to 12 lectures in series by Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott on the general principles of government and the rights of man. Ostensibly these were the topics, but the evident purpose of the course was to whitewash imperialism. As for the rights of man, in Abbott's extraordinary apologetics for the holy wars waging in the Philippines, South Africa and China, they are practically disposed of in the manner of the chapter on snakes in the celebrated account of Ireland. The barbaric dog in the manger of the Anglo-Saxon ox has no rights, says Dr. Abbott, in so many words. Rev. Dr. Berle, another Congregational clergyman, suggests the substitution of the word "hog" for "ox" in Dr. Abbott's golden aphorism, and there are other signs that Dr. Abbott has slopped over badly and well-nigh worn out his welcome with the enlightened part of the New England public. But there is a good deal of the genuine, unadulterated article of British jingoism entrenched in the Boston public and Harvard university. There are two or three professors there who were born and reared in Canada, like President Schurman, of Cornell and the Philippines commission. Boston had a bad habit of importing English and Scotch divines a little while ago, and some of them still linger to impose the Anglo-Saxon gospel upon their hearers. One of the most prominent of these, Rev. Dr. Gordon, of the Old South church, last Sunday week actually introduced Mark Twain into his prayer, not by name, of course, but in a way to give the savage gratification that all Christians of the

Abbott type must feel to have the author of "The Person Sitting in Darkness" lambasted in God's sight. Dr. Gordon prayed that those who criticised Mr. McKinley might be led to see the impropriety of their conduct, not knowing the difficulties of the job in hand as do Mr. McKinley, the Almighty—and Dr. Gordon.

What a time-serving opportunist a doctor of divinity is apt to be when he gets into politics! A few years ago Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott, as Henry Ward Beecher's successor, was raising all kinds of trouble to get a probation for the heathen in the next world, in the American board trouble; and now he wants them to have only a limited liability (Anglo-Saxon Salvation Co., Limited) chance in this.

Admiral Sampson has had a chance to learn that discretion is the better part of American snobbery. He is probably no worse snob than a large majority of naval officers. They, as well as he, look upon enlisted men as inferior creatures, and shrink from promotions that give to these inferiors a place among themselves. But Sampson has made the mistake of saying so. In a letter advising the secretary of the navy not to issue commissions to warrant officers, for no other reason than that warrant officers "are recruited from a class of men who have not had the social advantages that are requisite for a commissioned officer," he explains:

In time of peace the navy's function consists to a certain extent of representing the country abroad, and it is important that the navy's representatives should be men of at least refinement. While there are perhaps a certain few among the warrant officers who could fulfill this requirement, I am of the opinion that the vast majority of them could not. Once they are commissioned they will have the same social standing as other officers, and no distinction properly could be made in extending general invitations. The consequences that would arise from their acceptance might not redound to the credit of the navy or the country which the navy represents. I do not mean to detract from the sterling worth of the warrant officers of the