

property, in which case the owners would pocket a public income. But that is not done, and the State gets the annual value, consequently, of the very valuable privilege of using the land under the waters of the bay. Suppose those waters should recede, leaving the bottom permanently dry and increasing opportunities for production from one industry to many, would it then be wise to divide the bottom of the bay among private owners? If so, what explanation is there for thus preserving common rights to land under water while turning over the dry land to private persons? How do the superincumbent waters make any difference?

Gen. Chaffee takes advantage of the facilities offered by newspaper interviewing to deny Maj. Glenn's contention at his trial that he ordered Glenn to resort to cruelties in order to extort information from native Filipinos. But this is not enough to exempt Chaffee or the war department from suspicions of having authorized the systematic atrocities which it is now demonstrated were perpetrated by the army in the Philippines. Maj. Glenn charges that such orders were given by Gen. Chaffee and were understood by his subordinates generally in the barbarous way in which Maj. Glenn understood and executed them. In view of this statement, and of Glenn's further statement that such orders have been abstracted from the official files, together with the fact that Secretary Root and Senator Lodge, one at the head of the war department and the other at the head of the Senate committee of investigation, have been caught in the act of suppressing inculpatory facts, Gen. Chaffee should be ordered to go upon the witness stand and submit to cross-examination. An irresponsible newspaper interview is not satisfactory.

In the course of his interview Gen. Chaffee makes a lame attempt to explain the written order Maj. Glenn has unearthed, in which he required

of his subordinates that certain information be obtained of the inhabitants, "no matter what measures may have to be adopted." Now, when subordinates are commanded to procure information, "no matter what measures may have to be adopted," they may be regarded as having been allowed a pretty free hand. If John Mitchell, for illustration, could be shown to have given written orders to local leaders in the anthracite strike to prevent the operation of the mines, "no matter what measures may have to be adopted," his responsibility for the boycotting of "scabs" and the dynamiting of their houses would be regarded as proved. No explanation from him, made in a newspaper interview, he refusing to go upon the witness stand and submit to cross-examination, would be accepted as satisfactory if he had no more to offer than that in saying "no matter what measures," he meant lawful measures only. Why, then, should Gen. Chaffee's gauzy explanation be accepted as final? That he used in his order to get information the unqualified language that it must be done, "no matter what measures may have to be adopted," is both proved and conceded. That the "water cure" was extensively resorted to by his subordinates in order to extort information has been proved in several cases, and admitted, case by case, as the proof has come out. What other inference is possible, then, than that Gen. Chaffee is responsible for the cruelties, unless he is to be regarded as so angelic that his bare word, unverified by cross-examination, and given without responsibility to an irresponsible reporter to be published in an irresponsible newspaper, must be accepted without further question? Has not the work of officially whitewashing these army atrocities in the Philippines gone far enough? Is it not time for a complete exposure? The atrocities were committed. Of that there is no longer any doubt or excuse for question. Then why not fearlessly and fairly trace the responsibility to its source?

We know a man who is renowned as a universal faultfinder, a chronic "knocker," a "kicker" always ready to "take a fall" out of anything. Venturing once to ask him why he indulges his propensity so immoderately, what was our surprise to have him instantly deny the propensity. "I am no 'kicker,'" he retorted. "I am no 'knocker,' no faultfinder." He actually tried to convince us that in spite of his reputation it was his weakness, if he had a weakness, to be favorable to good things—even unduly so, perhaps. So far from being a "knocker," he confided to us that he prides himself upon being a "booster."

"Now, there was the Cuban question," said he; "didn't I plead, in season and out of season, for Cuban independence during all the time when American 'knockers' were trying to make a colonial possession of that country? And wasn't I persistent in encouraging the Filipinos to fight for their country against the invader who finally conquered them? And didn't you find me trying to 'boost' the cause of the Boers when British 'knockers' overran their land, and that of the coal strikers and the coal consumers when the trust threatened them? But those are only the more prominent instances," he went on. "When I was but a boy I tried, in my weak way, to help the Negro slave to his freedom, and to-day I espouse the cause of both Negroes and white men who are denied their natural rights. So I espouse that of the millions of all races who are victimized by tariff robbery, and trust robbery, and robbery even of their God-given birthright to a place upon the earth. I stand for the Declaration of Independence at all times and under all circumstances. No matter where you look into my record, you will find that I am never a faultfinder but always a helper, never a 'knocker' but always a 'booster.'"

We could not controvert our friend. Still, there was his reputation, and we pushed the probe farther in. "Why