ment of this expenditure to congress, and with it a recommendation that Admiral Dewey and Gen. Otis, who were on the committee but have received nothing for their services except their regular army and navy salaries, be paid $10,000 each. Exactly why they should be paid is not apparent. Neither appears to have done anything beyond allowing the use of his name. Otis did his best, we understand, to prevent the committee's coming to a friendly arrangement with the Filipinos, and Dewey did sign the preliminary report for campaign uses in Ohio last fall. But as Otis's interference was quite unnecessary to prevent a friendly understanding, and Dewey signed the report without knowing its contents, $10,000 should strike the frugal taxpayer as an elaborate allowance, especially as both men were drawing from the government full salaries, allowed for their full time and energies, during all their "service" on the committee.

Senator Hoar has an uphill fight before him if he really expects the republican party machine to come over to his side in the battle against imperialism. In his devotion to the traditions of the party and his veneration for its noble leaders of another generation who breathed into it the spirit of liberty, he seems quite blind to the fact that the party machinery has fallen into alien hands. Its powerful leaders are no longer democrats of the Lincoln type. They are on the contrary the most perfect types of the plutocrat in modern history. And its masses, while abundantly made up of men of democratic impulses, are largely recruited from members of the well-dressed mob, whose highest aspiration is to move in what they take to be "respectable" circles. It would have been as reasonable to expect the democratic party of the sixties, bestrided by the slaveholding oligarchy, to free the negro, as to depend upon the republican party of the new century, with its medley of plutocratic incubuses, to reverse a plutocratic policy of imperialism.

In the case of the Texas anti-trust law, the federal supreme court has decided that any state may arbitrarily prohibit corporations formed in other states from doing business within its borders. The only strange thing about this decision is that any one should ever have supposed a contrary decision to be possible. While it is true that no state can deny to the citizens of any other state the same business opportunities that it grants to its own citizens, it is not and has never been judicially regarded as bound to recognize the corporations of other states. They are only fictitious persons which may or may not be recognized as such by the states into which they go to do business. Such possible doubt as there may have been about this matter is now removed. The supreme court holds that the state of Texas had a complete right to prevent one of the standard oil corporations, created in another state, from doing business in Texas; and it places the decision squarely upon the broad ground that a corporation has no legal existence beyond the limits of the state that creates it. There is, therefore, no longer any excuse either for Mr. Bryan or for the republicans in congress to urge the enactment of federal laws against trusts. Any state can within its own borders put the ban upon incorporated trusts as completely as congress could by any law short of one repealing the protective tariff.

It should be in order to castigate the supreme court of the United States for deciding, as it has done, in a case coming up from Michigan, that express and telegraph companies may lawfully shift the one-cent tax on messages and packages from themselves to their patrons. But if the supreme court were always as loyal to principle when deciding cases in which great monopolies are interested, there would be no outcry against it. In their opinion in this case, the judges say:

> **To say when and how the ultimate burden of a tax shall be distributed among all members of society must necessitate taking into view every possible contract which can be made and compel the weighing of the final influence of every conceivable dealing between man and man. A tax rests upon real estate. Can it be said that the law imposing such a tax intended to prevent the owner of real property from taking into consideration the amount of taxes thereon in determining the rent which is to be exacted by him? A tax is imposed upon stock in trade. Must it be held that the purpose of such a law is to regulate the price at which goods must be sold, and restrain a merchant therefore from distributing the sum of the taxes in the price charged for his merchandise? It is apparent that such a construction of the statute would be unnatural and strained.**

Most assuredly such a construction would be strained. Even if the legislature were to specify the persons or interests upon whom the ultimate burden of taxation must rest, its law would be a dead letter. There is a higher law than any that legislatures can enact, which determines the ultimate resting place of tax burdens. It is that law of human nature that every man, be his desires good or bad, seeks to satisfy them with the least exertion. This law is to social adjustments what the law of least resistance is to mechanics. And under its operation, no matter what legislatures may decree or courts decide, the burden of all taxes levied upon services to be rendered—whether in the form of goods or of direct labor—rests ultimately upon the person who seeks the service, just as it has done so obviously all over the United States in this stamp tax on telegraph messages and express packages. The only considerable taxes that stay where they are put, are those that fall upon the value of past services, as income taxes, or upon the value of monopolies.

Let no Bryan democrat be deceived by the acquiescence in the inevitableness of Bryan's nomination of those unhorsed "democratic" leaders who supported McKinley four years ago.