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At last Spain has yielded to the superior physical forces of the United States, and consented to sell her interest in the Philippine archipelago for \$20,000,000. It is on the whole a good price, for Spain had nothing to sell but the sovereign right to carry on an interminable war against the natives. And it is not improbable that we shall discover when too late that that is what we have bought.

Whether this bargain will hold, depends now upon the action of the United States senate. Senator Gray, who is one of the peace commissioners at Paris, has been reported as so outraged by the greedy demands of his associates, that he intends, upon resuming his place in the senate, to oppose the treaty. That report is of doubtful accuracy; but for Senator Gray's sake and the nation's sake, it is to be hoped that it is true. Nothing but the barely possible refusal of the senate to approve the Paris treaty, now stands in the way of our entering upon a corrupting career of empire.

All pretense of establishing a temporary protectorate over the native government of the Philippine islands has been thrust aside. We are to buy the islands, with the natives thrown in, and to force upon them a colonial government, in principle the same as that which Spain has so long maintained. In the face of our national polity and history, we are to go as a nation into real estate speculation across the seas. We are about to forcibly annex distant territory for the purpose of governing its people as England governs

Ireland—as England once governed us.

When President McKinley was considering the future of Cuba in his message to congress, he said: "I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of; that, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression." But he sees no such objection to the forcible annexation of the Philippines. Pray how do Cuba and the Philippines differ in this respect? What charm works the miracle of turning what would be criminal aggression in respect to a neighboring island, into patriotic and Christian expansion in respect to a distant archipelago?

In connection with the grabbing of the Philippines, the pretense has been made that we will adopt the "open door" policy. But we cannot do that without either establishing free trade for the Philippines or treating them as a foreign country. The "open door" policy would require Philippine ports to be open to every other nation upon the same tariff terms that they were open to ours. Now, upon what terms could they be open to our nation? If the archipelago were treated as part of our own territory, subject to our constitution, its ports would be free to us. There would then be no tariff against us. For our constitution requires free trade throughout the American nation. But in that case the "open door" would mean free trade. If there were no tariffs in the Philippines against us, there could be none against the rest of the world—if we adopted the "open door" policy. Consequently, to pursue the "open door" policy in the Philippines without establishing free trade there, we should have to keep the islands out of the reach of our constitution. It would be necessary to treat them as foreign,

and to have them set up a tariff against ourselves. This could be done only by means of a permanent irresponsible military government, similar to that which we now impose temporarily upon Puerto Rico and some parts of Cuba.

And if that were done, how would the acquisition of the Philippines benefit our trade? Would trade follow the flag even where the flag did not represent our fundamental law? even where the laws, though of our own making and though they admitted the flag, put fines upon our trade? If our exports to the Philippines are to be taxed as much as exports from other countries, of what advantage can our ownership of the islands be to our exporters?

He who tries to fathom the purpose of Philippine acquisition along these or kindred lines of thought, will make but little headway. The object in acquiring the Philippines has in truth only an incidental relation to the Philippines themselves. Those islands are to be merely a vantage ground for enabling this country to participate in the adjustment of the eastern question. Let them once come under the dominion of the American government, and we shall from that moment be in the very center of the quarrel between Russia, England, France and Germany. This is the culmination toward which the expansion policy of the administration is leading us; and signs that it is the preconceived object of that policy accumulate.

Senator Hoar, the veteran republican of Massachusetts, is as pronounced as ever against the revolutionary ambitions of President McKinley in connection with the Philippine purchase. He says he does not believe the treaty will be or ought to

be agreed to by the senate, and gives his reason in this fashion:

Spain has little sovereignty in the Philippines to sell just now, and I do not think the people of the United States are in the market to buy sovereignty just now, or that the constitution has conferred upon anybody the right to buy any such commodity. The constitution was framed upon the theory that sovereignty is not salable. The people of the United States have conferred upon nobody the power to make such purchases in their behalf. We have acquired territory, either vacant or so sparsely settled that there were no people capable of governing it and no germ of a national life. We have, also, in one recent case, acquired a territory where the original germ of national life had perished. But neither of these precedents applies to the Philippine archipelago, with its millions of inhabitants.

Some one having said, apropos of the imperial and colonial policy of the administration, that "God never intended one nation to govern another," some one else wants to know how the other some one happens be so familiar with God's intentions. This is a common inquiry when moral problems come up for solution. It is invariably propounded by advocates of the immoral side, and is usually regarded as a conclusive reply to appeals to the public conscience. But God's moral intentions are not so very difficult to understand. Nothing is easier. Even children understand them. Indeed, there is respectable Christian authority for the statement that God reveals his intentions unto babes. Whoever indulges a lively sense of justice, pushing selfishness behind him, knows the moral intentions of God. It is only men that put selfishness first, who find God's intentions in moral affairs complex and obscure.

That pet scheme of the national banking ring for killing the greenbacks and placing the control of the volume of the currency with the ring, the scheme which is embodied in the McCleary bill, has met a deadly foe in an unexpected quarter. Its new foe is no other than the comptroller of the currency, Charles G. Dawes. Mr.

Dawes, in his annual report, shows by the experience of his bureau that the McCleary bill, besides stimulating the flow of money to the great centers, would cause the greatest losses, when banks failed, to the depositors in small banks. This report, which saw the light prematurely, has temporarily demoralized the McCleary bill ring.

The cotton-mill operatives of Augusta, Ga., are enjoying a large slice of Mr. McKinley's peculiar species of prosperity. This species of prosperity, as we have already been advised by good McKinley authority, is especially notable for the fact that while it makes more work it provides less pay. And that is the peculiarity about it which the Augusta cotton operatives are now beginning to experience. Some 6,000 of them are striking against a reduced scale of wages which the mill owners are trying to enforce. Mills are open and work is to be had, but upon condition that operatives accept reduced pay.

When Mr. McKinley went upon the road as "an advance agent of prosperity," he neglected to enlarge upon this peculiarity of the prosperity he was about to introduce. But too much must not be expected of Mr. McKinley. It is impossible, even for so good and great a man as he, to increase the incomes of workers and also those of monopolists. Whenever one of these classes is benefited the other must correspondingly suffer. Now, Mr. McKinley has unquestionably increased the incomes of monopolists. Workers, therefore, must be content if they get more work; it were extravagant, in these circumstances, to expect more work and more pay too.

Commissary General Eagan gives but little aid and comfort, in his annual report, to those apologists for the mismanagement of the war, who attribute the suffering of the soldiers to general unpreparedness for war. He reports that rations sufficient for 16,000 men for 1,472 days were loaded upon the trans-

ports that carried Shafter's army from Tampa to Santiago. These rations consisted of bacon, beef, flour, hard-tack, beans, rice, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, coffee, sugar, salt and other provisions. Gen. Eagan also reports that additional supplies were soon afterward shipped to Santiago, consisting of such delicacies as canned fruit, canned soups, lime juice and jellies; and that when the transports left for Montauk there was an abundance of subsistence stores at and near to Santiago, with which the transports might have been provisioned. All this being true, the country appears to have been admirably prepared for war, so far as subsistence goes. No soldier should have suffered for want either of substantial food or of delicacies. Yet all the soldiers did suffer for both, not only on the way to Santiago, on the way back, and at Montauk, but also in front of Santiago. Col. Roosevelt has testified of the need of the soldiers for vegetables, and how he stretched his conscience to get only 500 pounds of beans for his men, being refused any vegetables unless he would certify that they were for officers. Why was not the whole army supplied with beans, rice, potatoes, onions and tomatoes, if, as Commissary Eagan now reports, such vegetables were available in sufficient quantity for 16,000 men for 1,472 days? Must we assume that Gen. Eagan's detailed report is false? There is no apparent reason for doing so. Then we are driven to the conclusion that although there was at all times an abundance of appropriate food within reach of the army, the officers who had it in charge withheld it from the soldiers.

In other words, the suffering of the soldiers was due not to lack of time for preparation for war, nor to lack of preparation, but to the indifference or incapacity or both of officers upon whom rested the responsibility for distributing the stores. And for these officers—Gen. Shafter and the sons and nephews of administration favorites—the responsibility is upon