

to establish German unity. He was a royalist, he said, because he believed in God. In other words, believing that God governs the universe, he inferred that vice-regents of God must govern nations. Thus the worn-out doctrine of divine right was galvanized in Germany by Bismarck.

And as Bismarck supposed, evidently, that God governs the universe with an iron sceptre, he taught by example if not by precept that God's vice-regents should so govern their subjects. The inner quality and essence of this man's statesmanship was revealed by our own Gen. Sheridan, a man not unlike Bismarck though of lesser mould, who told with an air of approval of a characteristic incident that came under his observation. He was out driving with Bismarck over a road which was crowded with carters' teams. The carriage in which Bismarck and Sheridan were seated was consequently making but slow progress, when Bismarck extricated himself from the tangle in much the same way that he inclined to settle difficulties of state with the people over whom his royal master ruled. He stepped from his carriage, advanced to the head of his horses, drew his revolver, and aiming it threateningly ordered the carters to make way. His order was promptly obeyed. The carters tumbled their teams helter skelter into the ditch on either side of the road, and Bismarck and Sheridan rode on. That incident illustrates the Bismarckian ideal of government, which was exemplified in a larger way by the arbitrary acts by which he drove millions of Germans into socialism.

Bismarck was no type of the German thought of this century. He typified not what Germany is advancing to, but what she is receding from. In him had culminated the good and the bad of the Germany that was; he was the last of his race. His personality is but a monument to the distant past—a massive monument, but nothing more nor better. To-day his personality stands out boldly as the German type, overshadowing even the royal throne; but that is because there is yet no recognized personality instinct with the life of modern Germany. Bismarck had to die before such a personality could come forward. But

when the nineteenth-century ideals of German progress do find expression in some great German, one who is great in the sense in which Bismarck was not, one whose life and thought are in tune with the life and thought of his time, then Bismarck, though he will still be remembered as a figure in the history of the German empire, will be discarded by the Germans as the type, and even as a type, of their nineteenth-century civilization.

THE CUBAN SITUATION.

With their confirmed manana habit—the habit of putting off everything until to-morrow and trusting that to-morrow will never come—the Spanish may trifle with the war problem yet a little while, but they cannot long delay a settlement. The war is already at an end. Nothing remains but for the Spanish government to acknowledge the fact, and to accept the liberal terms of peace that the American government offers.

These terms contemplate the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Spain from the West Indies, and the reference of other questions growing out of the war to the decision of a joint commission. Nothing so liberal could have been hoped for by the Spanish, after Montojo's fleet was sunk at Manila.

In view of the circumstances which led up to the war, it would be out of the question for the United States to consider the possibility, except as a defeated belligerent, of allowing Spain to retain a particle of sovereignty in this hemisphere. The flying of our flag in Cuba and Puerto Rico has nothing to do with the matter. If we had not yet succeeded in landing American troops upon either island, still peace would be impossible until Spain had either fought us to her terms or abandoned, not Cuba alone, but all her West Indian colonies. It was because of her outrages upon the democratic sentiment of this country by her rule in Cuba that we began the war; and, having begun it, it would be preposterous on our part to make peace until we either suffer irreparable defeat or remove all possibility of similar causes of war with Spain in the future. The president is right, therefore, in making

the unconditional withdrawal of Spain from Cuba, Puerto Rico and all the neighboring islands a sine qua non of peace. Whether he is right in proposing to leave the other questions to the decision of a commission we need not here discuss. It is sufficient for present purposes that no reasonable objection to that can be made by Spain. And these terms, or terms more severe, Spain will, sooner or later, have to accept.

Thus our difficulty with Spain has nearly run its course. But that difficulty will leave us another as a legacy. In consequence of the war with Spain, the sincerity of our declaration of independence will for the second time since its promulgation be put to the test. It was put to the test of fire and sword a generation ago, with chattel slavery as the issue. It will be put to another test as trying, when we come to decide the question of self-government for the colonies that Spain abandons. We shall then let the world know by our decision whether or not we of this generation really believe in the principle of the declaration of independence, that all men—rich or poor, white or black, full or hungry, daintily garbed or ragged—are entitled, by the mere fact of their birth, to equal rights before the law, and that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

In respect to Cuba, the edge of this issue will have been sharpened by circumstances immediately preceding the war. Whatever obligations our sincere devotion to the declaration of independence may impose upon us as to other surrendered colonies of Spain, those circumstances bind us to recognize the Cuban republic as the legitimate government of that island, and to establish it as such. From that there is no honorable escape, as a brief review of the facts will show.

Three years ago the Cuban republic was proclaimed, and its five-barred one-starred flag thrown to the mountain breezes of the island. From that time to this, Gomez, Garcia and their compatriots, impoverished and hungry, naked and footsore, but brave, devoted and self-sacrificing, have withstood the tyranny and terrorism of the Spanish government, with a degree of patience and endurance never before equaled on this continent ex-

cept at Valley Forge in "the times that tried men's souls." When their struggle had lasted a year, the congress of the United States formally recognized them. The senate on the 28th of February, 1896, by a vote of 64 to 6, and the house about the same time, by a vote of 213 to 17, passed the following concurrent resolution:

Resolved, by the senate and house of representatives, That a condition of public war exists between the government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba, and that the United States of America shall maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States.

That this resolution referred to the Cuban republic, to the so-called insurgents, no one has ever questioned. It cannot be questioned, so plain is the language of the resolution itself. And if President Cleveland had acted upon it, receiving the Cuban representatives officially at Washington and according to Cuba the same privileges that Spain enjoyed, the effect would have been such, as prophesied by senators and representatives at the time and as may be clearly seen now, that Cuban independence would have been acknowledged speedily by other nations and by this time have been conceded by Spain herself. Our war with Spain would, of course, not have broken out.

But President Cleveland utterly ignored the resolution. Under what influence he acted in thus treating congress with contempt, we do not pretend to say. Certain it is that he was at the time notably sensitive to the influence of J. Pierpont Morgan, who, as it now transpires, is deeply interested in behalf of French holders of the Spanish bonds for which Cuban revenues are pledged; but the ex-president's conduct may have had no relation to Morgan, and have been merely characteristic. At any rate, he exhibited in this matter not only profound indifference to the action of congress, but to the opinions of the people; for the resolution in question genuinely expressed a strong public sentiment.

Of this, the fact that congress adopted the resolution so unanimously, without regard to party, is convinc-

ing proof. Congressmen are peculiarly responsive to public opinion. But if more proof be required, it is to be found in the platforms of the leading political parties framed soon after the passage of the congressional resolution. The democratic platform extended "sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence." That meant the Cuban republic, which then, as now, represented the only struggle, heroic or otherwise, of the people of Cuba for liberty and independence. The populists were quite as pronounced. They resolved to "tender the patriotic people of Cuba our deepest sympathy in their heroic struggle for political freedom and independence," and declared that "the time has come when the United States, the great republic of the world, should recognize that Cuba is, and of right ought to be, a free and independent state." But neither the democrats nor the populists were more specific than the republicans. "We watch," said the Cuban plank of the republican platform, "with deep and abiding interest, the heroic battle of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression, and our best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty." The only Cuban patriots whom that plank could possibly have meant were the patriots of the Cuban republic, the same to whom the Cuban planks in the platforms of the other parties referred.

Yet, when the republican party came into power, and the senate, by a vote of 41 to 14, adopted the same resolution that had been adopted in Cleveland's time, the power of the speaker, backed by the power of the administration, was freely used to prevent even so much as its consideration in the lower house.

This was the situation when the Maine explosion gave a new impulse to the popular feeling against Spain which sympathy for the Cuban republic had already stirred nearly to the boiling point; and, in spite of the administration, the war for the liberation of Cuba and the establishment of the Cuban republic, began.

We say "in spite of the administration," because the administration was not figuring for that kind of war. The

attorney general opposed recognition of the Cuban republic, because it did not represent the "taxpayers" and "property owners" of Cuba, meaning by those euphemisms the plutocrats who have grabbed Cuban lands, and who, because they pay over a small percentage of the taxes which they collect out of the sweat of the people, call themselves "the tax-payers." And the president himself, in his message to congress, asked authority to use the army and navy to secure in the island of Cuba the establishment, not of the Cuban republic, with which his party had professed to sympathize in its platform, but of a "stable government," the nature of which he did not specify, and as to the character of which he certainly did not propose, and apparently did not desire, any limitations in the interest of republicanism.

Congress refused the president's request. Though, under administration influences, it struck from the resolutions as they came from the senate, the specific recognition of the Cuban republic, yet it retained a clause which pledged this country to make war for the establishment of that republic and for that purpose alone. That clause was the first one of the resolutions. It reads: "The people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent." Strenuous efforts were made to strike out the words "and are," which would have eliminated all direct recognition of the then existence of the Cuban republic. But those efforts failed. Congress, therefore, declared not only that the people of Cuba ought to be free and independent, but that they already were so. This could have meant but one thing, namely, that the government of Cuba was the Republic of Cuba. In no other connection could congress have asserted that the people of Cuba were independent. They were either not independent at all, or they were independent in virtue of the existence and sovereignty of the Cuban republic. Thus the resolutions, while not a diplomatic recognition of the Cuban republic as one of the family of nations, became a solemn declaration of the purpose of this government to lift it to that dignity.

This is still more evident when we

consider all the clauses of the resolution together. It was resolved, in the first place, that the people of Cuba were even then independent; which, as already explained, was nonsense unless it meant that their government was the Republic of Cuba. Then, in the second place, it was demanded that Spain relinquish her authority in Cuba and withdraw her forces; and, in the third, that the president force her to do so if necessary. To what government could Spain have been expected to relinquish her authority, if not to the Cuban republic? To no other on the face of the earth, unless it might have been the United States. But the fourth clause of the resolutions removed the United States from that equivocal possibility by disclaiming any purpose or intention of exercising sovereignty over Cuba except for its pacification. The only inference left, then, is that the congressional resolutions passed by both houses on the eve of the war and signed by the president, intended that Spain should be compelled to surrender her sovereignty in Cuba to the Cuban republic.

It was upon this theory that the war proceeded until Shafter—Secretary Alger's own particular friend and protegee, a subordinate officer with whom the administration had virtually superseded the general in command, Gen. Miles, much as with Capt. Sampson it had actually superseded Com. Schley—made good his landing in Santiago province. Lieut. Col. Rowan had crossed the province carrying dispatches to Gen. Garcia, of the Cuban republic, and bringing back replies; and he had found the Cuban forces to be a worthy band of patriots. The naval squadrons had frequently utilized the insurgents as scouts to the satisfaction of both sides, and later the military forces had done the same thing. The flag of the Cuban republic had floated side by side with our own, not only throughout the United States, from the homes of the common people, but also from the Santiago hills, where it was far in advance of the American battle line. When the American forces landed upon Cuban soil, they did so under the protection of Cuban scouts and Cuban pickets, without whose aid the landing would certainly

ly have been a bloody one, and might, as recent developments indicate, have been a total failure. Up to this time no word was breathed in public against the Cubans. It was still understood that we were prosecuting the war for the pacification of Cuba under the Cuban republic, and they were yet our very good friends.

But as soon as our landing was secure, and especially after Spain's fate in Cuba had been sealed by the destruction of Cervera's fleet, a plutocratic and imperialistic campaign against the Cuban republic began. For every peccadillo of an ignorant or criminal or thoughtless or worried Cuban, the Cuban republic was held accountable. The Cuban troops and their officers were treated insolently by Shafter. When they held back from charging long range and swathing artillery with machetes, these men who had for three years held their lives in constant risk were published as cowards. Cowards! As if men could at the same time be cowards and rebels! Though they had devoted themselves to a cause as men never do except from the loftiest motives, they were libeled as brigands. Even their ragged condition, a condition which has made the American heroes at Valley Forge illustrious for a century, was described to their discredit by descendants of the Valley Forge martyrs. Private complaints of soldiers who had not found all the Cubans white-robed angels were spread broadcast through the Associated press with evident concert and ignoble purpose, as were the sneers of captured Spanish officers who were enjoying American hospitality. The Cubans were denied official representation at the surrender of Santiago, though the city could not have been invested but for them. They were even forbidden entrance into the city as individuals; and this upon the insulting pretense that if they were admitted they might possibly steal something from Spaniards. The Spanish officials, their enemies and the enemies to the death of their republic, were retained in office at Santiago; and when one of them, the civil governor, more magnanimous than his class, afterwards replaced some of his Spanish subordinates with civilian Cubans, Shafter gave him a wiggling.

The Cuban newspaper formerly published at New York, but which removed its plant to Santiago after the surrender, was denied permission to publish there, because it was expected to advocate recognition of the Cuban republic. And the Cuban flag, which still floats side by side with the star spangled banner from scores of thousands of American homes, is not allowed to float at all under American jurisdiction in Cuba. To sum up the whole matter, the American public is persistently cautioned, by the way in which the Cubans are officially condemned, and also by specific admonition, that "the Cubans are incapable of self-government."

In that caution lies the whole secret of our new attitude toward the Cuban republic. We went to war to establish its sovereignty in Cuba; but subtle forces of tremendous power are at work to induce us to stultify ourselves by ignoring the republic and seizing the island as our own. The shibboleth of this infamous crusade is the parrot cry that "the Cubans are unfit for self-government." If you go to the root of the matter, however, you will find that they are unfit because they might dispense the milk and honey, with which this Canaan of the Caribbean flows, to the wrong rings and combines. Yet there is an honest though contemptible sentiment to which that cry appeals. Many Americans imagine that only they and their equals and betters are fit for self-government. All whom they regard as below themselves are canaille, sans culottes, niggers, mean whites, the great unwashed, the mob, the vulgar classes, who cannot be trusted with self-government until by some mysterious process they shall without experience have learned to govern. If the upstarts who entertain these opinions can be impressed with the idea that Cubans are mostly of the "lower classes," they will readily accept the plutocratic dictum that Cubans are incapable of self-government. To them, therefore, the appeals of the plutocrats and imperialists are addressed.

This growing and menacing issue in American politics must be met promptly and with fearless honesty and patriotism. It must be met upon the basis of the declaration of inde-

pendence. According to that charter of our liberties, governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. If this doctrine be true, our duty is to establish and recognize the Cuban republic, leaving the Cubans to work out the details of their own freedom in their own way, as we are working out ours. Should we turn from that duty, then let us be well assured that our sin will come back and rest upon ourselves. Already the very classes who oppose the Cuban republic because its adherents are "unfit for self-government," are proposing the disfranchisement of American workmen for the same reason. The issue of unfitness for self-government is not a Cuban issue merely. Every extension of self-government from class to class has been against the opposition of the classes above. This opposition is one of the forms in which the devilish doctrine of the divine right of the few to govern the many has ever found expression. The Cuban question, therefore, is also an American question in a deeper sense than as a phase of American foreign policy. It is at bottom the question of the inalienable right of self-government and equal rights before the law. And in our disposition of it, we are about to confirm or repudiate the fundamental principles of the declaration of independence. But we cannot repudiate those principles permanently as to other peoples, and retain them as to ourselves. Either we must stand firmly and broadly upon the principles of self-government and equal rights for everybody, or be prepared to abandon them altogether. Moral law cannot be trifled with.

NEWS

The peace which was in sight last week is now almost here. Then the Spanish, through the French ambassador at Washington, had formally presented peace proposals to the United States; this week the United States has in reply submitted peace terms to Spain which the latter cannot reject and which it is unofficially reported her ministry have about decided to accept.

The terms of peace proposed by the

United States, as officially announced at Washington on the 2d, are simple and positive. They require—

1. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to the island of Cuba, and its immediate evacuation.

2. The cession by Spain to the United States of the island of Puerto Rico, and its immediate evacuation.

3. The cession by Spain to the United States of all other islands in the West Indies now under Spanish sovereignty, and their immediate evacuation.

4. A concession by Spain to the United States of an island in the Ladrone group of the Pacific.

5. The United States to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines; such treaty to be concluded by commissioners to be appointed by the two powers upon the acceptance by Spain of the foregoing terms in their entirety.

The Spanish ministry, immediately upon receiving notice of the terms of peace exacted by the United States, took the subject into consideration, and after a long session on the 2d reached the conclusion, as reported unofficially from Madrid on that day, that nothing was left them but to accept the principal conditions, though they raised questions as to the details of putting the conditions in force. No official notification, however, has yet been received of any action on the part of the Spanish ministry which may be regarded as final.

When Spain shall have accepted the proposed terms of peace mentioned above, hostilities will be suspended. Meantime, however, the military campaign goes on. This is now in progress under Gen. Miles in the island of Puerto Rico. In last week's issue we were able to tell of the landing effected by Gen. Miles's troops at Guanica, on the south coast of Puerto Rico, about 20 miles from the western end of the island and 75 miles southwest from San Juan, the city on the north coast which Sampson bombarded in May. A little to the east of Guanica, at a place called Yauco, a railroad runs eastward to Ponce, a city of 50,000 inhabitants; and from Ponce there is a good military road across the island to San Juan. Having landed at Guanica on the 25th, Gen. Miles pushed his troops forward

in the direction of Ponce. On the 26th he had reached Yauco, the railroad town, and proceeding partly along the railroad and partly by water to Port Ponce, was in possession of Ponce on the 27th. This gave him control of the entire southern coast.

Ponce was captured without a battle. The Spanish soldiers retired into the interior, and the surrender was made by the civil authorities. The Puerto Ricans welcomed the American troops enthusiastically. Their volunteers, which had been serving under Spain, surrendered with arms and ammunitions, and thousands of civilians offered to enlist. Supplies were brought in abundantly. Gen. Miles issued a proclamation assuring the inhabitants that the Americans had come not to make war upon them, but to bring protection and to give them the largest measure of liberty consistent with a military occupation. Capt. Allison, a nephew of Senator Allison, was then appointed provost marshal of Ponce.

From Ponce the American troops advanced along the military road toward San Juan, receiving a continuous ovation, and meeting from the mayors of the towns through which they passed proclamations declaring that the people were no longer Spanish but Americans. No opposition was encountered, the Spanish troops retiring rapidly before the American advance, and on the 1st the Americans were within six miles of Cuamo, several miles inland, with the Spanish rear guard retreating before them. They were then expecting a battle farther on, in the mountain passes near Aibonito, which is some 30 miles from Ponce.

Santiago is no longer a news center. The only reports now coming from there relate to the pestilence that is raging among the troops. According to official reports from Gen. Shafter, the total number of sick had increased from 4,122 on the 25th to 4,255 on the 31st, while the total of fever cases had diminished from 3,193 on the 25th to 3,164 on the 31st. The new cases of fever on the 25th were 822 and on the 31st 653. Of the fever cases 542 were reported on the 25th and 722 on the 31st, as returned to duty. On the 2d the total sick had increased to 4,290, while the total of fevers had fallen to 3,038. The new cases of fever on the 2d were 594, and on that day 705 fever patients returned