

hood, his country and its government—for with every serious thought concerning the blessings which he enjoys all these are intimately associated. With such an attachment to the objects which claim his protection, and, the high spirit of independence, inwrought from the beginning into his character, it is scarcely possible that he should not act the soldier, when he perceives any danger threatening his enjoyments or his country.

What a deadly parallel might be drawn between the prosperity which could suggest those observations and the prosperity of which we hear so much a hundred years later, when the happiness of all is supposed to be served not by modest and equitable conditions, but by the fabulous and sordid gains of a privileged few.

President Roosevelt has entertained as a private guest at dinner at the White House, the Negro scholar and gentleman, Booker T. Washington. As this was a private dinner, the event is nobody's business, and President Roosevelt is quite right in refusing for that reason to discuss it. But some bourbon papers of the South, some sensational papers of the North, and some Democratic politicians who don't know what democracy is when they see it without the label, have raised a newspaper tempest over the incident, which demands a word or two of democratic comment. It is good democracy, to begin with, to allow every man the freedom of his own inclinations with reference to personal associates. But if this White House dinner were a public instead of a private matter, still it would be good democracy not to criticise it upon race grounds. Democracy, true democracy, knows no race distinctions. This does not imply that a democrat must associate socially with members of a race that is repugnant to him. He has the same right to regulate his personal associations by race standards as by individual manners. But if he objects to the presence in any public place of a person, who, for race or other reasons, is repugnant to him, he raises the question of that person's right to be there. It is not a matter of congeniality. It is a matter of rights.

Now Booker T. Washington has the same right to be at the White House, and the same right to be at the White House table, whether on private or state occasions, if invited, as the whitest faced man in the country. That is democracy.

White persons' objections to associating with Negroes, are, let us observe and not for the first time, not based upon personal repugnance. They are based upon class distinction. That the Negro is not personally repugnant is proved by the fact that to the very class that objects he is most acceptable in the closest personal relationships, but only as a servant. The real objection to association with the Negro is not that he is personally offensive, but that his color is an indelible badge of servitude. Let him appear in white company in the role of a servant, and he is welcome; but let him appear as a man, and he is repugnant. This reason for objecting to Negroes is un-democratic, and no one who is truly a democrat will be governed by it in his convictions, no matter how his timidity or his tastes may prompt him to act. Whatever course he may himself decide to pursue with reference to associating with persons of that race, he will not, if he is a democrat, object to association by others with gentlemanly members of it, nor deny to anyone of the race, for race reasons, his equal rights as a man and citizen.

After attributing to Bryan's campaign the stubborn resistance of the Filipinos to American invasion and aggression, and assuring the people of this country nearly a year ago that Bryan's defeat had been followed by substantial pacification of the "new possessions," the war department now proposes augmenting the American military force in the island. This is what might reasonably be called an anti-climax.

Important action on the subject of taxation was taken by the

State Commerce convention of New York in session at Buffalo on the 17th. This convention unanimously re-adopted a desolution declaring—

That the best way to reform the system of local taxation is to grant local option in taxation to the cities and counties of the state.

This is a distinct and emphatic approval of the method of taxation that is to be voted upon in Colorado next fall, and which will come prominently before the legislatures of New York and Ohio this winter. The State Commerce convention of New York is an influential trades body. Among its delegates are representatives of the hardware jobbers' association, the wholesale grocers' association, the Albany chamber of commerce, the Buffalo merchants' exchange, the New York produce exchange, and the Utica chamber of commerce, besides numerous other civic, industrial and fiscal bodies, and the mayors of several cities.

Explanations from Virginia regarding the striking out of the guarantee of freedom of speech from the state constitution are to the effect (we quote one of them, a letter in a school publication, *The Little Chronicle*) that—

The words "freedom of speech" were not originally in the bill of rights as drafted by Madison, Monroe, Marshall and Lee in 1829, nor were they inserted by the conventions of '51 and '76, but were put in by the Underwood convention. In the convention now sitting the words were struck out as superfluous, because section 14, article 5, of the state constitution provides, in positive terms, that "the general assembly shall not pass any law abridging freedom of speech or of the press." The daily press, north and south, assumed that, because of the assassination of President McKinley, Virginia proposed to throttle free speech, in spite of the first amendment to the constitution of the United States. Freedom of speech is one of the corner stones of our government and no state could, constitutionally, deprive its citizens of this right. It is inconceivable that one of them would desire to do so.

We trust that this statement of fact is more trustworthy than the exposition of constitutional law that accompanies it. The first amendment to the

federal constitution does not prohibit throttling of free speech by the states, but only by congress. We could wish, moreover, that the Virginia explanation were more circumstantial. It is easy to understand that the press reports may have misrepresented the convention in the manner indicated; but it is hardly probable that they invented the speech of one of the delegates, purporting to have been made upon the floor, which definitely mentioned and enlarged upon McKinley's assassination as a sufficient reason for striking out the free speech clause. Whatever may have been the fact, however, the Virginia convention has now put itself right by inserting in the bill of rights a strong free speech clause by an overwhelming majority.

If immigrants who come here in ships must take an oath of belief in our form of government before being allowed to land, shall we apply the same rule to immigrants who are brought here by storks? Anarchists are quite as likely to get in by the one route as by the other.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CZOLGOSZ CRIME.

The execution of Czolgosz revives momentarily in the public mind its waning memory of President McKinley's assassination. But there is less of the spirit of the wild beast in the expression of public thought now than when the crime was fresh.

Sensational preachers could hardly win rounds of applause from ten thousand people at a "religious" camp meeting, as Talmage did less than two months ago, by violently expressing from the pulpit regret that the officers of the law who arrested Czolgosz had not committed murder by lawlessly killing him on the spot. Neither would reverend apostles of satanic joy, like the now forgotten clergyman who leaped into passing notoriety, expect to win popular favor by publicly proposing, as he did, that the privilege of assisting at the execution of Czolgosz, by touching buttons simultaneously at different telegraph offices of the country, the buttons to

be electrically connected with the chair of death at Auburn, be sold to Christian patriots at a dollar a touch, for the purpose at once of affording an opportunity for the joyful expression of popular hate and of raising a McKinley monument fund. Savage sentiments like these, typical of the mere commonplace utterances of pulpit and newspaper only six weeks ago, appear now in something like their true character.

So nearly, indeed, has the public mind returned to its normal state that one may doubt if any of the propositions for the avowed suppression of free press and free speech, which were so popular immediately after the assassination, would find responsible advocates now. Even the reactionary Virginians, who, in distinct terms, made the assassination their reason for striking a free speech clause out of the state constitution, are now explaining and reconsidering. Though the work of suppressing press and speech will probably proceed insidiously as heretofore, through postal department rulings and federal injunctions, it is evident that the panicky public feeling, which promised for a time to support open measures against these landmarks of liberty, is subsiding.

With this returning sanity, it may be possible to get a candid hearing upon a possible cause of Czolgosz's crime, to which the public ear was closed while the spasm of hysteria lasted. We refer to the gospel of the strenuous life, which had been inculcated by practice and precept, not by men of the Most type in the name of anarchy, but by leaders of thought and action in the name of manhood, morals, religion, and destiny.

The one thought about Czolgosz and his crime, regarding which there is and can be no reasonable dispute, is that he acted irresponsibly.

We do not mean, of course, that he was irresponsible in a legal sense. The criminal law cannot draw nice distinctions with reference to mental impulses and operations. Given a case in which one man kills another lawlessly, doing so with a set purpose, and being at the time in possession of his faculties, the criminal law must

classify him as a murderer. And such appears to be the case of Czolgosz.

But when sociological phenomena are under consideration, not in the forum of criminal law, but in the speculative domain of psychology, we may go farther. We may then say that Czolgosz was irresponsible, in the sense that his murderous act derived its impulse not from his own malice, but from an outside source; in other words, that he was merely an instrument—a willing instrument, it may be conceded—of external influences to which the weakness of his character made him susceptible.

Not only may this be said, but it is said. Those who attribute the crime of Czolgosz to the teachings of anarchist agitators adopt that theory. They assume, and they often assert, that Czolgosz, a weakling, became the irresponsible instrument of a murderous philosophy. And though others attribute the act to other causes, all agree that he was influenced by an external impulse. From this generally conceded fact, then, that Czolgosz was moved by psychological influences external to himself, the inquiry into the question of responsibility for his crime may fairly proceed.

What we have to seek, consequently, is the influence most likely to have injected into his weak mind the murderous impulse in obedience to which he acted.

His own explanation that he was inspired by a speech delivered by Emma Goldman at Cleveland must be dismissed as utterly untenable, except upon the theory that he is not only psychologically but legally irresponsible. None but an insane man could have been inspired by that speech to commit murder.

The substance of the speech, embodying the worst parts of it as we may be sure, has been published by the Chicago Tribune. Instead of advocating assassination, either directly or by suggestion, Miss Goldman appears to have opposed it. And she opposed it in a way which leaves no room for fair suspicion that she did so only in letter while favoring it in spirit. The very significant fact should be noted also, that a squad of police attended her lecture with instructions to