

Call it five dollars for good measure, and then think of the monumental effrontery of men like Mark Hanna, who burn up more than twice as much in cigars—think of their talking about the comforts of the American workingman with his full dinner pail! Nor is this condition peculiar to Pennsylvania. There, if anywhere, the dinner pail ought to be fullest, for it is there that republican protection is supposed to do its most perfect work. But whether or not its work be more perfect there than elsewhere, the “full” dinner pails which have been there uncovered are no more empty than the dinner pails that are still covered.

The solemn and sorrowful truth about the matter is that it is bitter mockery to describe the American workingman’s dinner pail anywhere as full. How many workingmen have an average income of more than \$250 a year? Some do get \$300. Not so many get \$400. Fewer still get \$500. He who gets \$1,000 is a veritable nabob. Yet \$1,000 a year is less than \$20 a week. It is probable that labor incomes are more accurately represented by half that amount—\$10 a week. And with what comfort can a man bring up a family upon \$10 a week? In the imagination of people whose money comes easy, he could doubtless do wonders with that income. But what can he do in reality? As Kipling somewhere says—there are men who, when their own front door’s closed, will swear that the whole world’s warm.

But you can’t close your own front door any more than you can sport a “full dinner pail” on \$10 a week.

Of the merits of the miners’ strike no room is left for debate. Their pay is wretchedly small. Yet they are forced to buy blasting powder of their employers at an exorbitant price. Yet they are compelled to take pay in orders upon company stores, where goods are sold to them at swindlers’ rates. Yet they are required to mine hundreds of pounds more than a ton for every ton of coal they get credit

for. Yet they are assessed for mine physicians, and their employers thrust upon them favorites of their own. In a word, they are as truly enslaved as if they were chattels upon an auction block. They must accept these extortionate terms or starve. For their employers are invested by law with a monopoly of the highways over which coal must go to market, and of the natural beds from which the coal must be mined. They are absolutely at the mercy of the power which these monopolists are thereby able to wield. Here are reasons enough for a strike. But before striking the miners sought by every possible means to make the matter a question of amicable concession or of arbitration. They at first wanted the operators to meet them in a friendly joint conference, pledging themselves to withdraw every demand that could be shown to be unreasonable. The operators arrogantly ignored the invitation. Then the miners proposed arbitration. But the operators had “nothing to arbitrate.” Controlling the highways and controlling nature’s coal deposits, why should they arbitrate? That was their attitude. And now that these uncrowned kings have forced the strike—either because they wished to influence the coal market so as to rob consumers, or to crush the strikers so as to rob miners, or both—let the responsibility rest upon them, where it belongs. Moreover, let the word go forth that highways and coal deposits ought not, shall not, and do not of right belong to any man or set of men; but that of right they are and of necessity must be made common property. Thus shall coal miners be freed from helpless servitude, coal consumers be protected from conspiracies against them, and the whole public be saved from periodical wars between starving coal miners and overfed coal monopolists.

Mr. Bryan’s formal letter of acceptance, while a necessary and valuable contribution from him to the campaign literature of his party,

is so completely overshadowed by his masterly acceptance speech at Indianapolis that but little need be said of it beyond advising its careful perusal. For our own part there is much in it to commend, along with some things to which we cannot assent. On the question of trusts, for instance, as we have noted heretofore, Mr. Bryan seems to make the mistake of regarding trusts as producing monopolies instead of seeing that monopolies produce trusts. His anti-trust policy, therefore, aims to suppress trusts by hostile legislation directly against them, rather than to undermine them by repealing the legal monopolies out of which they grow and upon which they flourish. Nevertheless, we are obliged to notice even upon this point that he recognizes in the Dingley law a “trust breeding measure,” which is suggestive at least of his growing perception of the true nature of the trust evil. But matters of agreement or disagreement on this or other points covered by Mr. Bryan’s letter of acceptance are not up for discussion at the present juncture. We are now in a campaign involving almost the right of discussion itself, a campaign in which the institutions that make possible a just settlement of any and all domestic questions are at stake. In such an emergency secondary questions must wait. It is enough that Mr. Bryan explains with characteristic candor his position upon every matter of public policy mentioned in his platform, and that he concludes by reiterating the assurances of his Indianapolis speech, that none of the subjects treated in his letter, however important each may seem in itself, presses “so imperatively for solution as the question which the platform declares to be the paramount issue in this campaign.”

That is, indeed, the sole issue upon which every voter will declare himself next November, whether he thinks so or not. To vote for McKinley is to indorse his policy of imperialism. To vote for Bryan is to condemn it. And a vote for a hope-

less minority party, or a refusal to vote at all, is to indorse or to condemn accordingly as the voter would have supported Bryan or McKinley had he chosen between them. No voter can escape the alternative. And what the effect of an indorsement would be no prophet can tell. Who would have supposed four years ago that McKinley would take advantage of a war for that independence for Cuba which both parties demanded, to seize territory in the orient and establish a crown colony there? Yet he has done it, regardless of popular approval or disapproval, and in utter defiance of national traditions and ideals. What might he not do if this experimental policy were indorsed by popular vote, as indorsed it would be by his reelection? Foreign alliances, foreign complications, foreign wars, slices of China as it is carved up, a bullying navy on the seas, a conscripted army in foreign lands, crown colonies scattered over the earth, and a menacing military system at home—these national calamities are within the early probabilities should Mr. McKinley's venturesome policy in their direction be indorsed by his triumph in November. And then, indeed, would it be too late to turn back. Not because we ought not even then, but because we could not. The power to do so would be gone. The American republic would have passed; the American empire would have come.

Excellent work on the Philippine question is being done by the New Voice, the prohibition organ, published at Chicago, which sent a special correspondent to Manila months ago, and is now publishing his letters. The correspondent is W. E. Johnson. He remained in the archipelago for weeks, traveling from place to place quietly investigating before making any disclosures. Although his mission had to do primarily with the "canteen" abuse, his observations were general. His reports are equally so. And they expose a condition of affairs which should put the Amer-

ican people to shame. Besides his discoveries regarding the "canteen" he marshals a host of other military and administrative scandals, including assassinations of native men, infamous assaults upon native women, official gambling, customhouse swindling, and so on through the well-known catalogue of colonial wickedness. All this is what might be expected from the civilizing processes of subjugation and militarism; and Mr. Johnson's reports in the New Voice verify the expectation.

Mr. Roosevelt's letter accepting the Hanna nomination for vice president recalls the fact that in his life of Benton he described in advance President McKinley's destiny which determines duty. He wrote that "a practical way of looking at a neighbor's land is at the root of the doctrine of manifest destiny." The rebuke was to an earlier species of imperialist, but it applies as well to the species to which Roosevelt himself now belongs.

This letter of Mr. Roosevelt's further confirms a growing impression that Roosevelt cares very little about the truth of any of his statements that promise to be "good enough Morgans until after election." For example, he says that the Louisiana country—  
was acquired by treaty and purchase under Jefferson exactly and precisely as the Philippines have been acquired by treaty and purchase under President McKinley.

"Exactly and precisely!" Is it so? Let the treaties answer. The Jefferson treaty provided in the third article that—

the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.

But the McKinley treaty provides in the ninth article that—

the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United

States shall be determined by the congress.

Nowhere does the latter stipulate for admission into the union. In the Jefferson treaty, then, it was obligatory upon congress to admit the inhabitants of the Louisiana purchase as soon as possible, and to invest them with all the rights of citizens of the United States; whereas, in the McKinley treaty no such obligation is imposed upon congress with reference to the inhabitants of the Philippines. Yet Mr. Roosevelt says that Louisiana was acquired by Jefferson "exactly and precisely" as the Philippines have been acquired by Mr. McKinley.

Mr. McKinley begins his campaign for reelection in a good old fashioned imperial way. Napoleon the Little, when as president of France he prepared the coup d'etat that made him emperor, could not have adopted more appropriate methods than our own President McKinley's. We refer especially to Mr. McKinley's plan of suppressing state papers until the time is ripe to use them as campaign documents, and then giving them out to the press.

His first experiment in this line was made in connection with his letter of acceptance, in which, as a presidential candidate, he quoted from the instructions to the Paris peace commissioners, which he had given as president. The senate asked for those instructions, but asked in vain. It would have been "incompatible with public interests" to disclose them at that time. But it is not incompatible with public interests, though the circumstances are unchanged, to embody them at the present time in a campaign document. Or, rather, to embody them in part. For in his letter Mr. McKinley gives to the public only so much of his instructions to the peace commissioners as he thinks may serve his ends as a candidate for reelection.

By a slip of the pen we were made to refer last week, on page 356, to ex-