

battle has not taken place, nor is it likely to. Gen. Miles's strategy contemplates a flanking movement. Part of his force is to pass Aibonito to the east and part to the west, abandoning the military road and thus avoiding the disadvantage of meeting the enemy on that road near Aibonito. Pursuant to this plan the town of Guayama, far to the east of Ponce, and about six miles inland from Arroyo, was captured on the 5th by the troops under Gen. Brooke. Four Americans were wounded in the action, but none were killed. From Guayama, Gen. Brooke was to advance to Cayey, which lies to the east of the military road not far from Aibonito, and thence north to the military road beyond the Spanish defenses at Aibonito, his objective being San Juan. Gen. Wilson, commanding the center, was to go through Coamo along the military road nearly to Aibonito and then diverging to the east to join Gen. Brooke at Cayey, and proceed with him to San Juan. On the left, Gen. Henry was to march due north from Ponce on the south coast, to Arecibo on the north coast, a point more than 30 miles west of San Juan; while Gen. Swan, marching from Ponce westward along the southern coast, and then north along the western coast, through Guayanilla, Yauco, Mayaguez and Aguadilla, was to turn eastward from the latter place and join Gen. Henry at Arecibo. This plan seems to have been conceived after the method of an Australian rabbit hunt, in which the hunters move in a wide but ever narrowing crescent until they corral their game. San Juan is in this case the corral, and the Spanish garrisons throughout the island the game.

Upon the plan outlined above, the entire American army in Puerto Rico, 14,000 men, began to move on the 7th. The advance was slow, it being Gen. Miles's purpose to avoid fighting on the way if possible. Coamo was taken early on the 9th, by the centre, under Gen. Wilson, after a fight lasting 30 minutes, in which the American loss was six wounded. The Spanish lost their commander—a major—along with two captains and nine privates, all killed, and 35 wounded. The Spanish prisoners taken numbered 180. The right column, under Gen. Brooke, encountered an ambush five miles beyond Guayama, which involved and came near destroying a reconnoitering

force; but the Spanish were driven off with a dynamite gun, and the American loss was confined to five wounded. At last reports all the American troops were in motion, in the four columns contemplated by the plan described above.

And now the Philippines have furnished a scene of battle between American and Spanish troops. News of this event did not reach the United States until the 9th, though the battle began on the 31st of July. The American troops were entrenched west of old Manila, which lies on the west bank of the Pasig river. The entrenchments extended north and south, at right angles to Manila bay, the left flank of the troops resting upon the bay, the right flank being covered by insurgent troops. Gen. Francis V. Greene, formerly of the 71st New York, was in command. On the 31st, Sunday, the insurgent left flank had withdrawn, the day being a feast day which the natives are accustomed to observe. This exposed the American right flank, and during the middle of the night, while a tropical storm was raging, wind sweeping the camp and rain falling in torrents, 3,000 Spaniards attacked the exposed American flank. They drove in the pickets easily, but were met by the 10th Pennsylvania, which checked them with three volleys. Still, in overwhelming numbers, they were almost into the American trenches, when the 1st California, part of the 3d artillery, armed with rifles, and the Utah battery came up to the support of the Pennsylvanians. The Spanish were then driven back in disorder. On the following night, August 1st, they renewed the attack, but at long range with heavy artillery, which was silenced by the Utah battery. On the 2d, just before midnight a third attack was made, again without success. The American loss was in killed 13, in seriously wounded 10, and in slightly wounded 38. The Spanish lost 350 killed and 900 wounded.

Reflections upon the good faith to the Americans of Aguinaldo, president of the Philippine republic, has drawn from him a letter in reply to the United States consul general at Hongkong, Mr. Wildman, who had brought the subject to Aguinaldo's attention. In this letter, which bears date July 30, Aguinaldo says:

I have read that I am getting the "big head" and not behaving as I prom-

ised you. In reply I ask, why should America expect me to outline my policy, present and future, and fight blindly for her interests, when America will not be frank with me? Tell me this: Am I fighting for annexation, protection or independence? It is for America to say, not me. I can take Manila, as I have defeated the Spanish everywhere, but what would be the use? If America takes Manila I can save my men and arms for what the future has in store for me. Now, good friend, believe me, I am not both fool and rogue. The interests of my people are as sacred to me as are the interests of your people to you.

Mr. Wildman has answered Aguinaldo as follows:

Trust to the honor and justice of the United States and let nothing interfere with the first task of throwing off the Spanish yoke. I believe in you. Do not disappoint me.

In Cuba the war has, indeed, practically ceased, with the Americans holding all they have conquered. This is exceedingly fortunate, for the health of the American troops is such that it has become necessary to hurry them home. Though it had been known that our troops were suffering from sickness, the seriousness of the danger was not appreciated until the 5th. Then the country was shocked by the publication of a letter from Col. Roosevelt to Gen. Shafter, and of another to him from all the general officers at Santiago. The letters were given to the Associated press for publication, by Gen. Shafter himself. They showed the army to be in immediate danger of destruction by disease.

Col. Roosevelt's letter represented that while yellow fever cases were as yet few, the whole command was so weakened and shattered by malarial fever as "to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep" when the yellow fever epidemic should come. He added that if the army were kept there it was the estimate of the surgeons that over half would die. The other letter, which was signed by Gens. Kent, Bates, Chaffee, Summer, Ludlow, Ames and Wood, and by Col. Roosevelt, declared it to be the unanimous opinion of the signers that the army should be at once taken out of the Island of Cuba and sent to a northern sea coast; and represented that owing to malarial fever the efficiency of the army was already destroyed, and that the army was in a condition "to be practically destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever," which was "sure to come in the near future." The letter

protested against the attempt proposed by the war department to move the army into the interior of Cuba, both for lack of transportation facilities, and because with the equipment it had it "could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever." In conclusion the letter asserted that "the army must be moved or perish; and gave warning that any person preventing its removal north would be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives." The opinions of the officers signing this letter were based, as they said, on the unanimous opinion of the medical officers with the army.

The foregoing letters to Shafter having been forwarded to Washington, produced an instantaneous effect. On the 4th an order from Washington was received at Santiago commanding Gen. Shafter to prepare the troops for immediate embarkation. The place selected for their retirement was Montauk Point, at the eastern extremity of Long Island. The first troops to embark sailed on the 7th. More left on the 8th and still more on the 9th and 10th. Some of the invalid soldiers already in the north have been taken to Montauk Point, and they complain bitterly of lack of food and water there.

The returning troops are to have their places in Santiago supplied by regiments of yellow fever immunes. Among these are the 8th Illinois volunteers, a regiment of colored men. The immune troops are now on their way to Cuba.

The publication of the letters to Shafter regarding the danger to the army of allowing it to remain at Santiago, was regarded by the war department as a reflection upon its efficiency. To remove that impression, the secretary of war posted an official bulletin on the 5th in which the action of the department was explained. According to this bulletin it had been supposed at the department that yellow fever was epidemic at Santiago. For that reason the troops had been detained there. But Gen. Shafter was notified on the 28th of July that as soon as the fever subsided his men were to be brought north; and that Montauk Point had been already selected for the purpose. When, however, it was learned that

yellow fever was not yet epidemic, transports were sent to Cuba, and Gen. Shafter was ordered to move his command north as rapidly as possible. All this was done, so the bulletin asserted, before the communication signed by the generals was received and before Col. Roosevelt's letter was published. From that bulletin and the publication by the secretary of war of a private letter from Col. Roosevelt, with a reply rebuking him, it is evident that a good deal of ill-feeling is involved in the circumstances attending the removal of the troops.

This feeling may not be altogether foreign to a difficulty between Gen. Shafter and Surgeon General Sternberg, relative to the medical service at Santiago. In the course of an investigation which the administration is carrying on, Gen. Shafter was asked to explain why sick transports were sent away from Santiago overcrowded with sick and wounded soldiers and without an adequate supply of medicines, doctors and nurses. Gen. Shafter denied responsibility, placing it upon the medical department. He admitted not detailing nurses to the sick transports, but said he had ordered that the stronger convalescents be used as nurses. For the lack of water on the sick transports, he held the medical department accountable, saying that as water had not been asked for, he supposed the ships were supplied. Gen. Shafter added that if the army had been properly provided with medical supplies it would have been possible to check the spread of disease. To this, Surgeon General Sternberg replies that he provided nurses, doctors and medicines sufficient for an army of 50,000 men, and declares that the lack of supplies can be traced directly to Gen. Shafter's negligence in allowing not only medicines but food and other necessities to remain on board transports. Transports which returned to New York and Tampa, were found, he says, to have never been unloaded of either food or medical supplies. Surgeon General Sternberg's charges of neglect on Gen. Shafter's part are corroborated by the official report of Assistant Surgeon Munson, who gives details tending to show that the lack of medical supplies was due to their having been left on the transports, and to Gen. Shafter's indifference to the efforts of the medical corps to secure facilities for landing them.

The total sick at Santiago had decreased from 4,290 on the 2d, to 2,830 on the 9th; and the total of fevers had decreased from 3,038 on the 2d to 2,043 on the 9th. The number of deaths among the troops was 15 on the 4th; 2 on the 5th; 7 on the 6th; 11 on the 7th; 12 on the 8th, and 14 on the 9th—a total since our last issue, of 61.

Coincidentally with the departure from Santiago of the American troops, the deportation of the Spanish prisoners has begun. The first of these to go aboard ship were the sick and wounded from the military hospital. They were carried on the 9th, by steam lighter, to the Spanish hospital ship, Alicante, the only transport for the Spanish that had yet arrived, and on the same day, to the number of 1,000, they began their voyage home. The work was done under the actual supervision of Spanish officers, though American officers directed it nominally.

Since our last report the president has created a military district in Cuba to be known as the Department of Santiago, and to consist of "all that part of the island of Cuba and the islands and keys adjacent and belonging thereto as have or may hereafter come under the control of the United States." The headquarters of the department is established at the city of Santiago, and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton has been assigned to the command.

Though the war between Spain and the United States is practically at an end, that which the Cubans began three years and more ago they are still prosecuting. Most of the news of their operations, however, is indefinite and all of it is unauthoritative; yet such as it is, it indicates that they are making successful fights. Among other things it is reported that after a hard fight Garcia has gained a victory over the Spanish at Mayari, and previous reports of his capture of Gibara are confirmed. It is also reported that he has invested Holguin, and that the Spaniards are negotiating for the surrender of that stronghold to him. Along with this news from Garcia in the east, comes a report from Gomez in the west, that he has won the largest and most important battle ever fought in the western part of the island. He attempted with 3,000 men to force the

trocha between Las Villas and Camaguey, and to establish himself in the latter city. The trocha at this point had never been broken, and was then guarded by 4,000 Spaniards. Gen. Gomez led the attack in person, and after a battle in which he lost 130 killed and the Spanish 300, he marched without further opposition to Camaguey.

The president of the Cuban republic, Bartelome Masso, has forwarded to President McKinley an important communication bearing on the relations of the Cubans to the United States. It was delivered to President McKinley on the 5th, and is as follows:

I am anxious only to bring about peace and a feeling of satisfaction which will be gratifying both to the Cubans and to the United States. To further that end, if deemed best, I would gladly resign my position as president of the provisional government at any moment. I have lived, labored and fought for my country all my life, and my greatest desire is to see her in a condition of peace, security and prosperity before I die.

The expulsion of the Spanish with the assistance of the army and navy of the United States is now practically an established fact, for which we can perhaps never repay our benefactors.

We fully realize and are delighted in the fact that we are in the hands of the people of the United States, for in them and their government we have the most implicit confidence. The slightest friction or misunderstanding at Washington would give us unbounded pain.

I know that the question is seriously asked whether the Cubans are capable of governing themselves; can they be trusted to govern? I can only answer by saying that we have a population entirely different from that of other Latin-American countries, and that no spot on earth can be found where peace and freedom from strife of all kinds is more desired than in the island of Cuba. Once the Spanish people leave this soil, it will be a most serious occasion indeed that could bring about an armed resistance.

The vast majority of the population of Cuba are agriculturists, and possess neither ambition nor the desire to hold office. To be left alone to the cultivation of the soil and the enjoyment of their home life is all they ask.

These people comprise seven-eighths of our population. Of the remainder, our leaders, political and military, many were educated in the United States.

There they have imbibed the spirit of liberty, and learned the meaning of a true republican form of government. In their knowledge, ability and integ-

ity we place our trust, and under the guidance and protection of the United States I can see for Cuba a future of brightness.

It is true that the temper of our people is peculiarly sensitive, with a tendency to distrust toward all who attempt to rule or govern. This is but the natural result of our long period of subjection and oppression at the hands of Spain. But it is equally true that our people are responsive and eager to grasp the hand of friendship. This has been extended to us by the United States in a most generous and self-sacrificing manner, and no true Cuban will ever forget it.

If the right men are chosen to govern the task will be easy; the people will govern themselves. If through misinformation the wrong men are secured for office the problem of reconstruction may be incumbered with more than one difficulty.

Our first step, with the approval of the United States government, will be to call a new assembly, which will represent as far as possible every section of territory and condition of people. This assembly will elect a new provisional government that will possess more powers than the present one, which is of necessity a government of revolution.

But the result of the new assembly will be to form a government which will still be limited in power and whose most important work will be the establishment of a permanent and complete government, founded on the lines of that of the United States, and one which we hope and have every reason to believe will be satisfactory to the United States and Cuba.

The strained relations which have existed for three years or more between England and Russia, regarding their conflicting interests in China, are bringing on a crisis. War was regarded last week as imminent, and nothing has since occurred to alter the situation. On the contrary, the tension has if anything been increased. The fundamental issue is the conflicting policies of "open door" or "closed door." It is the English policy to open all ports she controls, to the commerce and general intercourse of the world. This is the policy of the open door. Russia on the other hand aspires to shut out the rest of the world from the territory she acquires, with a view to exploiting it, commercially and politically, for her own purposes. In China, Russia has now acquired such a foothold as to enable her soon to appropriate to herself, excluding the trade of all other nations, the whole northern part of the empire. This the English resent.

The immediate surface issue, however, which now strains Anglo-Russian relations, is over a railroad concession. The Chinese diplomacy of Russia indicates her intention upon the completion of the trans-Siberian railway which she is building, to continue the line into the very heart of China, by means of a long spur extending from New Chwang—at the base of the peninsula on which Port Arthur lies—around the northwest shore of the Gulf of Leao-ton to Tien-tsin, and thence to Hankow, on the Yangtse-Kiang river. A glance at the map of eastern China will make it clear that this railroad system, sweeping through Russia, Siberia and northern China, from St. Petersburg to the Yellow sea, and then reaching from the Yellow sea down into the Yangtse valley, all under Russian control, would make Russia with her "closed door" policy, the political and commercial master of eastern Asia. Railroads which are expected to become part of this system are now in process of construction from Tien-tsin southward to the Yangtse-Kiang, and northward toward New Chwang. But English capitalists have disturbed Russian calculations by offering to provide the capital necessary for the erection of a line from Tien-tsin, by way of Chin-Kiang, on the west coast of Leao-ton, to New Chwang. This railroad would be a link in the system to the control of which Russia looks forward, and would seriously interfere with Russian influence and power in China if under British control. For that reason, so it is explained, Russian diplomacy has been brought to bear upon the Chinese authorities to induce them to reject the British loan. Presumably, Russia would provide the capital if the British loan were rejected. Latest accounts from London were to the effect that the British government was firm; from which it is to be inferred that Russia must stop interfering, or England will fight. The British admiralty has made preparations for quickly mobilizing the fleet, and the whole naval force has been notified to be in readiness for service at an hour's notice. That the notice will soon be given is probable if a report of the 10th from Peking turns out to be true. That report is to the effect that the Chinese government has assented to all the conditions imposed by the czar relative to the New Chwang railway. One of these conditions is that the line