

who, be he rich or poor, sets up wealth as the test of respectability and the insignia of industrial or political authority—that is to say, who favors government by or for the rich. Goldsmith hit off plutocracy when he wrote:

Laws grind the poor, and rich men rule the law.

What we mean, therefore, by plutocratic influences, is influences which make for the elevation of the rich to industrial or political mastership. To these influences the general press—daily, weekly, monthly—is submissive to the extent of servility. There are few exceptions outside the organs of social reform movements. Even the democratic papers, most of them, and those republican papers which still feel the democratic impulse of abolition days, are safely relied upon by our plutocracy to turn in their tracks whenever plutocratic privileges are seriously menaced.

These considerations justify the advent of a weekly paper like *The Public*, and we repeat that it makes no apology for appearing. Whatever else may be said of it, no one can assert that there is not a field for the kind of paper it aims to be. Such an assertion would imply what is evidently untrue. It would imply that a paper which prints in intelligible form the really valuable news, winnowed from the trash that goes by the name of news, and divested of partisan bias and color, a paper which, moreover, consistently and persistently, not as an organ of some reform movement but solely with reference to fundamental moral principles, is editorially hostile to plutocracy in all its phases and throughout all its ramifications,—it would imply that a paper of that character is not wanted. We believe that in fact such a paper is wanted, and that the paper which shall realize this ideal will enjoy abundant success, not merely as a business enterprise but also as a trusted teacher and leader. Conscious, however, of the difficulties of the undertaking, we make no promise for *The Public* except that it will be held as closely as we can hold it to the ideal here indicated.

The time for urging peace between the United States and Spain seems now to have passed. A stage has been reached where war, or a humiliating backdown by one or the other of the two countries, appears to be inevitable. Neither country can be expected to back down, not even with a dip-

lomatic assumption of having carried its point; and within a few weeks, probably within a few days, possibly before these words come under the reader's eye, Spain and the United States may be in deadly conflict, and the daily newspapers full of accounts of military pomp and misery. At this time, then, and in these circumstances, however strong one's inclinations for peace may be, the most important consideration is not how peace may be secured, but whether the inevitable war shall, on the part of our country, be a sincere struggle for the extension of liberty and the inalienable right of self-government, or an excuse for giving the Cubans new fetters for their old ones.

War is, indeed, terrible. Not only is this sentiment true, but we believe it to be at bottom the sentiment of the American people. But the American people regard some things as worse even than war. In that also they are right. One of these things is tyranny. Though they patiently submit to tyranny of most exasperating kinds, when it is clothed in familiar garb or touches them in subtle ways the nature of which they do not comprehend, their blood boils at tyranny in forms that they have renounced, or which for other reasons is clear to their understanding. It is this characteristic, part of our English inheritance, which has long made the common people of the United States anxious to fight Spain for the liberation of Cuba.

That the common people are in fact anxious to do that, admits of little doubt; that their reason for it is sympathy with a people subjugated as we ourselves once were, admits of less. This war, though it must be a poor man's fight as all wars are, will not be a rich man's war. We have been driven to the very verge of it not by the classes, but by the masses. The classes, except for hot-headed youths among them, who don't know what war means, and ambitious army and navy fledglings, have thrown the whole weight of their influence against a conflict. That fact has been confusing to most of us who distrust the classes and yet have a horror of war. We have found it exceedingly difficult to burnish up our peace principles under the patronage of men of whom Mark Hanna is a fit type, who don't know what principle is except when spelt with an "a," and who would be for war as sturdily as in this

case they have been for peace, if they thought it would yield them an honest dollar or two. Their partisanship for peace has probably been as effective in fanning the war flame as any other one thing except the blowing up of the Maine. And now, convinced that war is probably unavoidable, and with the president apparently in their tow, they have set about diverting the war from the only channel in which it can be justified upon democratic principles. It is this that makes imperative the necessity for insisting that the war, since war there must be, shall be no war of conquest, no war for revenge even, no war for the establishment of a Yankee protectorate, but a war for securing to the people of Cuba—not to a class, but to all of them—the right to govern themselves. If we are to have a war with Spain about Cuba, let it be a war for Jeffersonian liberty.

But liberty for the Cubans as a whole can be secured only by recognizing the independence of the Cuban republic. That would throw the burden of making war upon Spain, and at the same time put the Cuban republic in position to expel the Spanish troops. We should thereby aid a new republic which, in the field and in its civil administration, has earned a right to our warmest sympathy and bloodiest support, if we are to expose ourselves to the horrors of war at all.

To the classes, however, our recognition of the Cuban republic is objectionable. The reason has been expressed by Attorney General Griggs, of New Jersey, the young man who advised the president that if we were to recognize Cuba, and hereafter discontented Californians, aided by filibustering Mexicans, were to resist the United States and lead her armies a chase through the mountains, Mexico might recognize them as an independent nation upon the authority of our own precedent. Attorney General Griggs objected to recognizing the independence of the Cuban republic because it does not represent the "taxpayers," and "property owners," of Cuba; and that is one, at least, of the reasons why Mark Hanna objects. That this in turn is one of the president's reasons for objecting, may be fairly inferred from the way in which Hanna has flitted in and out of the war consultations at the white house. In a word, this objection to recognizing Cuban independence is a class objection. It is an objection to government by all

the people of Cuba, and the forerunner of a plan to govern Cuba through the so-called "property-owning" and "tax-paying" classes. It makes no difference that the tax-paying classes collect their taxes back again from the underpaid labor of propertyless Cubans; nor that the property-owning classes of Cuba are in great degree mere parasites upon the property-producing classes there. Notwithstanding this, these classes must govern. Therefore, whatever else is done, the Cuban Republic must not be recognized. That is the attitude of the plutocratic elements in our country; and at the moment when this is written the indications are that it is to be the attitude of the administration.

It ought not to be the attitude of the American people. They profess to believe in government by all the people, and not by a class. Shall they, then, in authorizing a war which has thrust itself upon them, center their sympathetic attention upon a few parasitic Cuban planters, and pour out the young blood of the country to enable these planters to govern the people of the island, because, forsooth, the planters are "tax-payers" and "property-owners"? Or will they insist that the war, if it needs must come, shall be waged for the freedom and the right to self-government of all the people of Cuba, tax producers and property creators, as well as tax-payers and property owners? No true American should be at an instant's loss for a reply.

Close as are the Australasian colonies to the United States, in all that goes to make unity of sentiment—closer in most respects even than Canada—they are yet so far away in point of location and facilities for intercourse that we in this country know less about them than we do of the Russians in China. If we knew more it would be better for us. Occasionally there is an opportunity to learn something. One was afforded some four years ago by the publication, unusually extensive for a public document, of the report of Consul Connelly on the subject of taxation in New Zealand, which showed that a considerable measure of the Henry George system had been applied in that colony with unexpectedly good results. Another came to some of the residents of Chicago one evening last week, when George Fowlds, an Auckland merchant now on his way around the world, talked to the Chicago Sin-

gle Tax Club about economic conditions in New Zealand and her sister colonies. This opportunity was better even than the other, for Mr. Fowlds was present in his own proper person to answer questions, which were put to him in profusion. It would be impossible here to go over the ground that he covered in his speech and his answers. But a few facts may to advantage be repeated. New Zealand, he said, has abolished, for colonial purposes, all taxes upon industries except a restricted tariff tax of the revenue sort, all her internal taxes being now upon land values alone irrespective of improvements. For purposes of local taxation, every municipality—whether urban or rural—is permitted, upon voting to do so, to raise its revenues in the same way, and several municipalities have already voted to do this. As to public service monopolies, New Zealand owns and operates her own railroads, street cars, telegraphs and telephones, a policy from which the very best results are obtained. On the railroads, for example, passengers ride second-class—about the same as first-class on our second-rate railroads—from one end of the island to the other, for two cents a mile. And over in New South Wales, on the Australian continent, where tariff taxes have been largely abolished and the consequent deficit made up by a tax on land values irrespective of improvements, the prosperous condition of the people in comparison with those of the adjoining colony of Victoria, where tariff taxation and the general property tax are still in the ascendant, is marked. Here, too, the government railroad system is in striking and favorable contrast with our systems under private corporations. Evidently, Australia and New Zealand are countries with whose economic policies it would well repay the American citizen to make himself familiar.

Under the Dingley law the customs receipts for March, 1898, were only \$15,450,431.94. Under the Wilson-Gorman law, those receipts for the corresponding month of 1897 were \$22,833,856.46, or over \$7,000,000 more than under the Dingley law. Taking the whole period from July 1, 1897—23 days before the Dingley law went into effect—to March 31, 1898, and we find that the customs receipts were nearly \$6,000,000 less than under the Wilson tariff of the same period in the preceding fiscal year. These figures are from the last

treasury report. The success of the Dingley tariff as a customs revenue raiser remains yet to be demonstrated.

The governing principle regarding state interference with medical practice was succinctly stated by Prof. James, of Harvard, in the argument before a committee of the Massachusetts legislature, which he made last month against a bill to prohibit professional practice by others than regular physicians. The commonwealth of Massachusetts, he said, "is not a medical body and has no right to a medical opinion." In the light of that principle, the whole subject of state regulation of occupations needs revision. No state, for instance, is in the drug business; yet some states undertake to manage drug businesses in which their citizens engage. Neither is any state a plumbing body; yet in some states supervising boards of plumbers have been established whose license is a necessary prerequisite to doing business as a plumber. So, in one state at least, there is a board of examiners without whose authority it is unlawful to follow the occupation of barber; and movements are on foot even if they have not been somewhere successful, to establish state boards of examiners for horse shoers. It is plain enough, of course, that such laws as to plumbers, barbers and horse shoers are in reality for the purpose of legalizing trade unions. They are protective, that is to say, having for their object the lessening of competition among craftsmen. And they are recognized as such and condemned by the very people who advocate laws for making legal doctors and legal druggists. But they belong in the same class with doctors' and druggists' laws. All these laws are the same in principle. They are also the same in purpose. For, though doctors and druggists pretend that their aims are to protect the public from incompetents—the same claim, by the way, that is made by plumbers, barbers and horse shoers—their real aim is to legalize, in the medical profession and among druggists, something in the nature of a trade union—something that will give the trade legal power over the people. The state has no right to make such laws. And one of the reasons is that which Prof. James expressed. It is not a medical, nor a plumbing, nor a tonsorial, nor a horse-shoeing body, and has no right, as a state, to an opinion on medicine, or plumbing, or tonsorial skill, or horse-shoeing. It is every man's right as