

the House of Commons to make woman suffrage part of the Ministerial suffrage bill. A divided Ministry have compromised upon an agreement that their electoral bill shall go into the Commons without extending suffrage to women; but that if a majority there vote to amend it by inserting that provision, the bill so amended shall thereupon be accepted by the Ministry as their own bill, and be forced through the House of Lords as such with all the power of the Liberal party. Acting upon that agreement, and with a large majority of the Ministry encouraging him, Lloyd George, the most popular British Minister for many a day, has undertaken to secure a majority in the Commons for the woman suffrage amendment. If the Tory suffragists in the Commons would vote for that amendment—and this they could do without violating their party obligations in the slightest—the woman suffrage cause in Great Britain would be won along with the abolition of plural voting; but even with unanimous Tory opposition there is excellent reason for expecting a majority of Liberals large enough to secure that result. And such is the view of all the women suffrage factions except that which is identified with Mrs. Pankhurst's leadership.



But just at a critical moment, when Liberal members of Parliament as yet unconverted are in doubt, and a trifle may move them one way or the other, Mrs. Pankhurst's faction throw stones through the windows of the Prime Minister's residence and through the windows of stores, and make other demonstrations which, if not criminal with reference to the law and in bad faith with reference to their cause, must be insane. What is likely to be the effect of such demonstrations upon Liberal members who hesitate between following Mr. Asquith or Mr. George on this question? Certainly not to weaken any tendency they may have to follow Mr. Asquith. Upon the opinion of thorough-going suffragists the inexcusable conduct of that faction will of course have no effect. Thorough-going suffragists will follow Mr. George's example and vote for the amendment in spite of the criminal folly of some women. But is that likely to be so with new recruits or prospective ones? The violent faction might serve their cause better by urging their Tory supporters in the Commons to vote for the woman suffrage amendment, thereby making it part of the Ministerial bill, than by getting up riots at a time and under circumstances which can serve no purpose of the rioters unless it be their purpose to prevent the embodiment in the Ministerial

electoral bill of a clause extending the suffrage to women.



Experts in Government

One of the justly distinguished men of the East, a wise man who, unlike those wise men of a farther East, sees a star only to wonder at it and blunder about it, makes the remarkable statement that democracy, in order to succeed, must learn to depend upon "experts." The dangerous feature of this bit of wisdom, for wisdom there is in it, is its undiscrimination. Very likely the thought in the speaker's mind was that specialized work should be done by specialists. But he may or may not have realized that all is not specialism. If he did not realize this, then his remark is one of those half truths which is ever the worst of falsities; if he did realize it, then he made a slipshod statement, or has been unintelligently reported. For democracy to assign its *expert work* to experts and trust them, is the soundest kind of civic good sense; but for democracy to assign its *non-expert work* to experts and trust them, is civic insanity.



Where can the line be drawn between expert and non-expert work in government? There may be difficulty in determining this where one merges into the other; but there need be no insuperable difficulty even there, and seldom would the issue be important. In general terms expert work may be briefly and roughly described as that which in detail executes a general purpose, and non-expert work as that which decides upon the general purpose to be executed. The latter has to do with the *What*, the former with the *How*. As to warfare, for illustration, democracy must confide in military experts to wage war; but it would be suicidal for democracy to leave it to military experts to make war at their own will. So, also, it is for architects and engineers to design and erect public improvements; but the people must decide whether they want the improvements or not. And although experts may be called in to help the democracy to a conclusion in the domain of public desire, their function there is only advisory. It is all as when one consults his lawyer. The lawyer may advise litigation, and if litigation is decided on, a lawyer must be trusted to manage it in its technical details; but whether litigation shall be entered upon is for the client and not for the lawyer to decide. At the point democracy trusts *public policy* as well as plan and execution to experts, democracy ends and absolutism begins.

The indiscriminate outcry in some quarters for government by experts, might more appropriately come from the uneducated and the foolish than from wise men. Government by experts is no new thing. It is as old as history, and in all times and everywhere it has been—so far as the interests of democracy are concerned—a wretched experiment and a disastrous failure. Russia is governed by experts to-day, and what democrat would exchange even our halting experiment in democracy for Russia's expert system of government? France had government by experts under Napoleon, earlier also under the French kings, and how did it benefit democracy? The monarchical system of government by experts confided in by the democracy—is a confidence game singularly like that of the lamb in the stomach of the lion. For the good of all, the only true principle of government, so far as history thus far enlightens or reason guides, is that experts shall advise and execute, but that the democracy shall determine the point for them to advise upon and the purpose for them to execute. For democracy the What, for experts the How.



DIRECT LEGISLATION AND THE RECALL.

The Initiative, Referendum and Recall have passed the stage when these measures can be called "merely academic." Nearly one fourth of the States have the Initiative and Referendum, and the Recall is an active political issue. The States which may be called progressive in regard to these measures are, South Dakota, Utah, Oregon, Nevada, Montana, Oklahoma, Maine, Missouri, Michigan, Arkansas, Colorado, California, Washington, Nebraska, Idaho, Wyoming, Wisconsin, Arizona, New Mexico, North Dakota, Illinois, Texas and Ohio.



Considering the people of the several States as an organized political body in meeting assembled, the Initiative corresponds to moving the question. It is a scheme whereby a small number of voters may propose a law and compel a vote to adopt or reject it.

The Referendum corresponds to action on the report of a committee. It is a plan whereby a small number may compel a vote of the electorate on an act of representatives to approve or reject it.

The Recall is a plan to compel an election before the stated time. It is a measure whereby a

small number may compel a vote of the people to say whether or not they approve of a public servant and desire him to continue to act as their representative or not.



It is a well established constitutional principle that the "sovereignty in every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may change their form of government at their own pleasure" so long as its form is "republican."

A form of government in which the supreme power resides with the people is republican in form. The forms of republican government in the various States have from the beginning been undergoing transformation, and have been and are being constantly reorganized according to the progress of popular government.

It can not be truthfully said that autocracy in Russia, aristocracy in England, or democracy anywhere, have been free from corruption, but in the United States, we are, not only by our written constitutions, but also by our fundamental political character, committed to democracy.

We have been extending and are likely to extend further the elective franchise.

We have been changing the State constitutions to conform with the decline of State legislatures in public esteem.

There has been a gradual recognition of the fact that there is no real difference in principle between a statute and a constitution. A public service corporation law is written in the State constitution of Oklahoma, a civil service law in the constitution of New York, while in other States these measures are merely statutory.

And so there is no principle of discrimination between acts upon which the people of the several States may vote directly by way of enactment. If they can adopt or reject the most important of all legislation by popular-vote constitutions, they can certainly vote to adopt or reject a less important measure passed by their representatives in the State legislature. If the people, through their representatives, can propose legislation for enactment, the people can propose legislation directly. There is no heaven-given right residing in a legislature alone to employ legal talent competent to draft a bill with technical formality.

If the people can elect public officers they can also remove a public officer by election.



The general rule is, that the will of the people is expressed by a majority vote.

If this is not the best method of ascertaining