

be the mere clerks of this gigantic trust. Why are no proceedings taken against it? Not for want of legislation, that is certain; for the Sherman anti-trust law of 1890 not only makes the guilty parties liable to fine and imprisonment, but further provides that—

any property owned under any contract or by any combination creating or attempting to create a monopoly of any trade, and being in the course of transportation from one state to another, shall be forfeited to the United States and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided . . . for the seizure . . . of property imported into the United States contrary to law.

Why isn't that law enforced in this flagrant instance of the hard coal trust? Is it because anti-trust legislation is unenforceable, or because President Roosevelt doesn't want it enforced against his plutocratic friends?

In connection with the subject of trusts, attention should be called to a remarkable and interesting business statement which has been made by the National Biscuit Co., commonly known as the "cracker trust." This statement offers further testimony from experience in support of our contention that the objectionable trust is founded invariably upon some special privilege, landed privileges in some highly desirable form being the rock-bottom of every enduring trust structure. According to the "cracker trust" statement before us, that business combination has made sales at the rate of from \$34,000,000 to \$38,000,000 a year, with a profit somewhat below 10 per cent. It was originally "an aggregation of plants;" it is "now an organized business." Then the statement goes on:

When this company started it was lieved that we must control competition; and that to do this we must either fight competition or buy it. The first meant a ruinous war of prices and great loss of profits: the second, constantly increasing capitalization. Experience soon proved to us that, instead of bringing success, either of these courses, if persevered in, must bring disaster. This led us to reflect

whether it was necessary to control competition. We asked ourselves whether this company to succeed, must not be managed like any other large mercantile business. We soon satisfied ourselves that within the company itself we must look for success. . . . We did not aim to sell all the biscuit consumed in this country. A monopoly in any product made from such raw materials as we use in the manufacture of our goods is an impossibility. Any company which should attempt to create such a monopoly would be doomed to disastrous failure; its managers would be absolutely unfit for their trust.

We cannot vouch for the truth of that statement, but it is in full accord with common sense. This trust appears to have tried, as have other trusts, to control competition without a basic monopoly. The other large trusts of that kind have failed. This one has not. But the reason is that it stopped trying to control competition and decided to look for success "within the company itself." In that one sentence is the whole story of successful combination. Every trust must look within itself for success. If it has no basic monopoly under its control, it must succeed by rendering excellent service, as the "cracker trust" claims to have done; but if it has such a monopoly, then, like the steel trust, it may succeed by arbitrarily crushing competition. There is in the last analysis nothing else to the trust problem.

Democratic papers of the "reorganizing" variety have recently revived the story that Mr. Bryan bolted his party in 1892 by voting for the Populist instead of the Democratic electors. This is offered as an excuse for the Cleveland bolt of 1896, and also in explanation of Hill's continuing to be "still a Democrat, very still." Now, the truth about this change of party irregularity has been so often published and is so well known that nobody who keeps any run at all of political affairs is excusable for being defrauded by it. But everybody does not keep the run of politics. Consequently the lie must be exposed whenever it shows its head. Mr. Bryan supported the Populist electoral ticket

in Nebraska in 1892 because Cleveland's managers in the East wanted him to, in order to take away from Harrison a state which Cleveland could by no possibility carry. This was the policy of the party managers not only in Nebraska, but in other Republican states. The latest confirmation of that fact comes from William B. Chandler, a member of the Colorado convention that nominated Cleveland electors. He resides now in Bourbon, Ill., but was resident then in Pueblo, Col. A majority of the Democratic convention of Colorado in 1892 nominated Weaver (Populist) electors, and the minority therefore left the hall, organized a new convention, and nominated a straight Democratic ticket. They also put a Cleveland man upon the national committee. But the national committee not only refused to recognize their national committeeman; it also instructed the Cleveland state committee to take down the Cleveland electors and put Weaver electors in their place, something which the committee reluctantly did. As Mr. Chandler says, "the national Democratic committee ordered this done, hoping to carry the Rocky Mountain states, with Kansas and Nebraska, for Weaver, and throw the election of President into the House of Representatives in the event Cleveland failed of a majority of the electoral vote." He adds:

My authority for the statement that the national Democratic committee ordered the Weaver electors put on the Democratic ticket was S. H. White, chairman of the Cleveland Democratic committee of Pueblo county, Col. His authority, as stated by him to me, was the chairman of the Cleveland Democratic committee of the state of Colorado.

All this tallies exactly with the inspired gossip at Democratic national headquarters in 1892. Anyone who charges Bryan with "bolting" Cleveland's nomination, is either ignorant of the facts or guilty of intentional deceit.

If the newspaper interviews with Bryan while on his tour in the East are correctly reported, his judgment

and political liberality, as expressed by himself, are of a much better order than what are expressed for him by Republican and "reorganizing" Democratic editors. For instance, when asked whether he favored Edward M. Shepard for Democratic presidential candidate, he having spoken pleasantly of Mr. Shepard at the Nantasket dinner, he said:

I never discuss candidates for the presidential nomination. In referring to Mr. Shepard, I simply meant that I was always ready to sit with such Democrats, either at the banquet table or council board, receive advice from them, and give it respectful consideration.

Being further plied with leading questions, he replied:

I object to advice by such men as Cleveland, who never indicated his purpose to vote for the Democratic ticket in the last two campaigns. I do not expect that the Cleveland men will control the next Democratic convention. If they do we shall meet the issue at the time. Hill is a candidate for the nomination, but he is not to be trusted. All these appear to be justifiable and judicious discriminations.

It is a conscience-probing letter, that which the committee headed by Charles Francis Adams has addressed to President Roosevelt; and Mr. Roosevelt cannot dodge it, try he never so strenuously. He must either ignore it contemptuously or respond to its demand in good faith. Unless he does one or the other he will irrevocably implicate himself in the official conspiracy to hush up the Philippine atrocities. He may, anyhow.

By way of relieving the President of the necessity of meeting this letter upon its merits, the administration press are challenging the Adams committee to produce their evidence if they want their charges investigated. But that won't do. The committee explains too pointedly why it doesn't embody the evidence in its letter, and offers too definitely to produce it when an official investigation shall have been set on foot. These men distinctly assert that such an investigation—

would demonstrate the following criminal acts, contrary to all recog-

nized rules and usages of war, on the part of officers and soldiers of the United States: (1) Kidnaping and murder under circumstances of aggravated brutality; (2) robbery; (3) torture, both of men and of women, rape of the latter; (4) the infliction of death on other parties on the strength of evidence elicited through torture.

Charges of that character cannot with impunity be contemptuously ignored when they come from men like Adams and Schurz, of high national reputation, and others like Moorefield Storey and Burritt Smith and Herbert Welsh, who, though not so widely known, are men of the highest standing.

Especially can these charges not be ignored with impunity when the men who make them declare that every door of investigation has been officially slammed in their faces, and that there is no process possible, without the aid of the President, by means of which they can elicit the incriminating testimony and bring the culprits to justice. Still more especially can the charges not be ignored with impunity when it is a notorious fact that similar charges have been proved against high military officers, and they have been convicted only to be punished lightly as for a trivial offense. That an atrocious system of outrage and terrorism has prevailed in the Philippines with the consent if not the orders of the American military authorities has long been no secret. Returned soldiers have told about it boastfully. Returned officers have told about and defended it. The Senate investigating committee was put upon track of the evidence, but refused to follow it up. The war department was well advised of it officially months ago, but concealed its information until some of it leaked out, much to the chagrin of the secretary of war, who thereupon took proceedings, but only in those cases. It has been no secret to anybody but Mr. Roosevelt. It is no longer a secret to him.

Census statistics are always to be considered with much caution. But taking for what they are worth those

just published on agricultural values in the United States there is nothing very encouraging in them, not for working farmers. The total farm values are given as \$16,674,694,297. But of this amount only \$3,560,198,191, or 21 per cent., represents the value of buildings. The value of other improvements is bundled in with the value of the farm sites; but as the value of buildings comprises in most farming regions nearly all the value there is to improvements, it would not be far out of the way to estimate the whole \$13,114,492,056, or 78 per cent., as land value. In that case the land-owning, or monopoly, interest among farmers would be more than three times as much as their improvement-owning, or labor-produce, interests. So the figures would go to show that the prosperous fellow in agricultural regions is not the man who does the work, but the man who owns the site—not the farmers who farm farms but the farmers who farm farmers.

But who believes that the sites of the farms of the United States are really worth three times as much as the improvements? If the figures are true, there must be a great number of bonanza farms, to bring up the average, because on small farms the land is usually worth considerably less than the improvements. This bonanza farm explanation is not available, however, for the same collection of census figures is arranged to show that the number of farmers is increasing while the average size of farms is diminishing. It looks a little as if these census figures had been got up by a lineal descendant of the department clerk of whom it is told that when he was ordered to prepare official statistics on a certain question, he innocently asked, "On which side?"

The probability is that the enormous land values of these farms has been arrived at by including suburban lands highly affected with city values. It is well known that in the neighborhood of all cities there are