

toward the crucial industrial question of Great Britain, and indeed of all other countries—the question of land monopoly.



Not that all Liberals needed this pressure. All did not. But the survival of whigism within the party, like bourbonism in our own Democratic party, had been obstructive, and the loss of by-elections had weakened the radical element. With the victory, however, at North-West Norfolk, which Hemmerde achieved by pushing the land question boldly to the front, the radicals in the Liberal party were given an advantage; and Arnold's victory at Holmfirth on the same question, following closely upon Hemmerde's and supplemented by Outhwaite's at Hanley, has so strengthened radical influence within the Liberal party as to make the early adoption of the land question by the Liberals *the* issue before the country.



One feature of Arnold's victory, and also of Outhwaite's, is of collateral importance and significance. In each constituency there was a three-cornered contest, caused by the naming of a candidate by the Labor leaders. This action of Labor partisans was due to a partisan spirit strictly. The Liberals had not nominated a candidate hostile to Labor in either constituency. Mr. Outhwaite, to whose candidacy Labor leaders were especially opposed, stands for every substantial demand of the Labor interest. But as he is not a member of the Labor party, the officials of the Labor party opposed him. Their explanation is that the member of Parliament whose death had made the vacancy was a Labor member and that therefore the Liberals should have left the vacancy to the Labor Party. In fact, however, Hanley was only in name, and this through the past courtesy of the Liberal Party, a Labor Party constituency. The late Labor member who represented it, elected years ago by Liberal voters, had been continued in office by them at every election since. But for them to acquiesce in the nomination of a new man by the Labor Party would have been quite another matter. That the Labor Party had no substantial party claims to the seat is evident from the enormous plurality that Mr. Outhwaite polled over the Labor candidate. It was not at all a question of Labor Party or Liberal Party at the recent election at Hanley. It was a question, so far as concerned those parties, of Labor partisanship or the land monopoly issue.

As the general situation now appears, the Lloyd George Budget of 1909 was but an entering wedge. The land taxes it imposed are perhaps too light to accomplish much for the abolition of land monopoly; but it has given to the British democracy something the importance of which can be but barely understood by Americans. It has given them what in this country we have always had—a systematic valuation of the land. This achievement will serve as the great broad basis for the now developing campaign against land monopoly. That the Lloyd George Budget was not Lloyd George's Budget—not as Lloyd George wanted it—is an open secret, he having intended a more drastic application of land value taxes. But whiggery in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons was then influential, and he had to yield or make no headway at all. Now, however, come Hemmerde and Arnold and Outhwaite—anti-land monopolists and pro-land-value taxationists all—with their significant victories, and Lloyd George's hands are strengthened for the next campaign.



Woman Suffrage in Great Britain.

The inevitable reaction against suffragette violence in Great Britain seems to have set in, and with the result unhappily of further postponing the extension of voting rights to British women. That this postponement is due to the organized lawlessness of one great branch of the British suffrage movement is a reasonable inference from all the circumstances. Not that men who believed in woman suffrage have been driven by these outbreaks to change their minds on the subject, but that men whose inclinations were favorable to the reform were repelled by the indefensible behavior of its conspicuous advocates. Public opinion is moved in mass, not in detail. The influence upon a civic cause of organized violence as wantonly conceived and criminally executed as that of the British organization that still directs it, could not reasonably be expected to produce any other result upon the public mind than reaction against the cause thus entangled in crime.



The principal excuse made in the United States for those campaigns of wanton violence, that in Great Britain, differently from the United States, democracy can advance only through violence, is an unreasonable contention. Considered psychologically, the springs of public opinion are not so different in either country from the other. (It will be observed that through editorials and tracts and

speeches for and against woman suffrage in Great Britain there run chords of thought to which the American reader is no stranger.) Considered historically, Mrs. Mead, whose recent discussion of the subject in the Independent we reproduce this week in our department of Related Things, has left nothing of moment unsaid.



Discriminatory Panama Canal Tolls.

Americans with a sense of national honor should blush at the efforts of some of their representatives to pettifog something into a treaty which isn't written there, wasn't intended to be there, and couldn't have been put there by agreement when the treaty was signed. We refer to the move to refund canal tolls paid by American vessels.



The argument that this would be a "subsidy" in the sense in which Great Britain subsidizes ships, is too gauzy for more than passing mention. If the United States were to reimburse out of its own governmental treasury the amounts paid for Panama Canal tolls by American vessels, *that* would be a subsidy, which, merely as an international question, the American government would have a clear right to grant. But in such case the money would go out of the general treasury, whereas the proposed remission of tolls would take the money out of the canal fund.



On questions of international law, the experts must of course decide; but it seems to be conceded all around that the final experts—the Peace tribunal at The Hague—would probably decide against the United States if tolls were refunded out of canal receipts to vessels of the United States. In common sense there would seem to be no escape from that conclusion under this clause of the treaty:

The Canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation or its citizens or subjects in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable.

And did not Senator Bard of California, when the treaty was before the Senate—did he not offer an amendment reserving to the United States the right to discriminate in favor of American vessels, and was not that amendment defeated by 43 votes to 27? Inasmuch, then, as the treaty would probably stand in the way of the discriminatory

tolls Low proposed, were the question to go to The Hague, our government is urged to make the discrimination nevertheless and to defy The Hague tribunal. Right there is where the national blush should come in.



One of the reasons given for an act that would rival Roosevelt's Panama-republic performance, is the intimation that Great Britain, in protesting, has been influenced by American railroad interests. There is a worm at the core of that apple of argument. It is the theory that the American railway monopolists would be shielded from water competition if American vessels paid tolls, but would be disadvantaged by that competition if the tolls were remitted. This argument, which looks smooth on the surface, would offer no reason for the bad faith proposed in our international relations, even if it were sound to the core. But it is not a sound argument. Much more likely would railroad monopoly be to profit by the proposed discriminatory tolls, than if the tolls were the same on all vessels or there were no tolls at all. If there were no tolls, world-wide competition would tend to keep water freights close to the level of cost, leaving no margin for railway monopolies to prey upon. If tolls were equal, the same world-wide competition would tend to keep water freights close to the level of cost plus tolls, likewise leaving no margin for railway monopolies to prey upon. But if foreign shipping paid tolls while American shipping paid none, American shipping would have a margin of profit—limited on the one hand by cost of carriage and on the other by that cost plus tolls—upon which railway monopolists might prey.



MAKING WORK.

The protective spirit, as Buckle well named it, finds many manifestations, graduated all the way from a protective tariff to a franchise monopoly, and from the closed shop to the licensed lawyer or doctor; but one of the strangest yet noted is that discovered by a writer in a recent number of *Lippincott's*. The claim is made that burglary in the United States furnishes employment for 75,000 honest people; which, allowing six hundred dollars a year to each, means a salary list of \$45,000,000. And after showing in detail how conservative this claim is, the writer asks: "What would become of these men and women and all the millions of invested capital should the burglar hearken to the teachings of morality and religion, cease stealing and turn to honest pursuits?"

Here is a clean-cut proposition.