Rent
Benjamin R. Tucker
[Excerpted from the book Individual Liberty:
Selections From the Writings of Benjamin R. Tucker, Vanguard
Press, New York, 1926. Kraus Reprint Co., Millwood, NY, 1973]
"Edgeworth," a frequent contributor
to Liberty, had read a couple of Proudhon's books,
treating of the rent question, which Mr. Tucker had recommended
to him, and he seemed to be muddled about the "fiction of
the productivity of capital," and some other things. And so
the editor enlightened him:
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The two works which I recommended to Edgeworth are among
Proudhon's best; but they are very far from all that he has written,
and it is very natural for the reader of a very small portion of his
writings to draw inferences which he will find unwarranted when he
reads more. This is due principally to Proudhon's habit of using
words in different senses at different times, which I regard as
unfortunate. Now, in the article which gave rise to this discussion,
Edgeworth inferred (or seemed to infer), from the fact that some of
Proudhon's transitional proposals allowed, a share to capital for a
time, that he contemplated as a permanent arrangement a division of
labor's earnings between labor and capital as two distinct things.
Lest this might mislead, I took the liberty to correct it, and to
state that Proudhon thought labor the only legitimate title to
wealth.
Now comes Edgeworth, and says that he meant by capital only the
result of preparatory labor, which is as much entitled to reward as
any other. Very good, say I; no one denies that. But this is not
what is ordinarily meant by the "productivity of capital";
and Edgeworth, by his own rule, is bound to use words in their usual
sense. The usual sense of this phrase, and the sense in which the
economists use it, is that capital has such an independent share in
all production that the owner of it may rightfully farm out the
privilege of using it, receive a steady income from it, have it
restored to him intact at the expiration of the lease, farm
it out again to somebody else, and go on in this way, he and his
heirs forever, living in a permanent state of idleness and luxury
simply from having performed a certain amount of "preparatory
labor." That is what Proudhon denounced as "the fiction of
the productivity of capital"; and Edgeworth, in interpreting
the phrase otherwise, gives it a very unusual sense, in violation of
his own rule.
Moreover, what Edgeworth goes on to say about the proportional
profits of landlord and tenant indicates that he has very loose
ideas about the proper reward of labor, whether present or
preparatory. The scientific reward (and under absolutely free
competition the actual reward is, in the long run, almost identical
with it) of labor is the product of an equal amount of equally
arduous labor. The product of an hour of Edgeworth's labor in
preparing a field for cotton culture, and the product of an hour of
his tenant's labor in sowing and harvesting the crop, ought each to
exchange for the product of an hour's labor of their neighbor the
shoemaker, or their neighbor the tailor, or their neighbor the
grower, or their neighbor the doctor, provided the labor of all
these parties is equally exhausting and implies equal amounts of
acquired, skill and equal outlays for tools and facilities. Now,
supposing the cases of Edgeworth and his tenant to be representative
and not isolated; and supposing them to produce, not for their own
consumption, but for the purpose of sale, which is the purpose of
practically all production, it then makes no difference to either of
them whether their hour's labor yields five pounds of cotton or
fifteen. In the one case they can get no more shoes or clothes or
groceries or medical services for the fifteen pounds than they can
in the other for the five. The great body of landlords and tenants,
like the great body of producers in any other industry, does not
profit by an increased productivity in its special field of work,
except to the extent that it consumes or repurchases its own
product. The profit of this increase goes to the people at large,
the consumers. So it is not true (assuming always a regime
of free competition) that Edgeworth's tenant "profits three
times as much" as Edgeworth because of the latter's preparatory
labors. Neither of them profit thereby, but each gets an hour of
some other man's labor for an hour of his own.
So much for the reward of labor in general. Now to get back to the
question of rent.
If Edgeworth performs preparatory labor on a cotton field, the
result of which would remain intact if the field lay idle, and that
result is damaged by a tenant, the tenant ought to pay him for it on
the basis of reward above defined. This does not bring a right of
ownership to the tenant, to be sure, for the property has been
destroyed and cannot be purchased. But the transaction,
nevertheless, is in the nature of a sale. and not a payment for a
loan. Every sale is an exchange of labor, and the tenant simply pays
money representing his own labor for the result of Edgeworth's labor
which he (the tenant) has destroyed in appropriating it to his own
use. If the tenant does not damage the result of Edgeworth's
preparatory labor, then, as Edgeworth admits, whatever money the
tenant pays justly entitles him to that amount of ownership in the
cotton field. Now, this money, paid over and above all damage, if it
does not bring equivalent ownership, is payment for use, usury, and,
in my terminology, rent. If Edgeworth prefers to use the word rent
to signify all money paid to landlords as such by tenants as such
for whatever reason, I shall think his use of the word inaccurate;
but I shall not quarrel with him, and shall only protest when he
interprets other men's thought by his own definitions, as he seemed
to me to have done in Proudhon's case. If he will be similarly
peaceful towards me in my use of the word, there will be no
logomachy.
The difference between us is just this. Edgeworth says that from
tenant to landlord there is payment for damage, and this is just
rent; and there is payment for use, and that is unjust rent. I say
there is payment for damage, and this is indemnification or sale,
and is just; and there is payment for use, and that is rent, and is
unjust. My use of the word is in accordance with the dictionary, and
is more definite and discriminating than the other; moreover, I find
it more effective in argument. Many a time has some small
proprietor, troubled with qualms of conscience and anxious to
justify the source of his income, exclaimed, on learning that I
believe in payment for wear and tear: "Oh! well, you believe in
rent, after all; it's only a question of how much rent;" after
which he would settle back, satisfied. I have always found that the
only way to give such a man's conscience a chance to get a hold upon
his thought and conduct was to insist on the narrower use of the
word rent. It calls the attention much more vividly to the
distinction between justice and injustice.
More from "Edgeworth" about "unearned
increment," "judgment and skill," "employer the
appraiser of work," etc. Then a few more remarks from Mr.
Tucker:
This smacks of Henry George. If the municipality is an
organization to which every person residing within a given territory
must belong and pay tribute, it is not a bit more defensible than
the State itself, - in fact, is nothing but a small State; and to
vest in it a title to any part of the value of real estate is simply
land nationalization on a small scale, which no Anarchist can look
upon with favor. If the municipality is a voluntary organization, it
can have no titles except what it gets from the individuals
composing it. If they choose to transfer their "unearned
increments" to the municipality, well and good; but any
individual not choosing to do so ought to be able to hold his "unearned
increment" against the world. If, it is unearned, certainly his
neighbors did not earn it. The advent of Liberty will reduce all
unearned increments to a harmless minimum.
I have never maintained that judgment and skill are less important
than labor; I have only maintained that neither judgment nor skill
can be charged for in equity except so far as they have been
acquired. Even then the payment is not for the judgment or skill,
but for the labor of acquiring; and, in estimating the price, one
hour of labor in acquiring judgement is to be considered equal, -
not, as now, to one day, or week, or perhaps year of manual toil, -
but to one hour of manual toil. The claim for judgment and skill is
usually a mere pretext made to deceive the people into paying
exorbitant prices, and will not bear analysis for a moment.
On the contrary, the employee, the one who does the work, is
naturally and ethically the appraiser of work, and all that the
employer has to say is whether he will pay the price or not. Into
his answer enters the estimate of the value of the result. Under the
present system he offers less than cost, and the employee is forced
to accept. But Liberty and competition will create such an enormous
market for labor that no workman will be forced by his incompetency
to work for less than cost, as he will always be in a position to
resort to some simpler work for which he is competent and can obtain
adequate pay.