

them long life in the land He has *given* them. There is here imposed a duty, and, for its faithful performance, long life is the reward. Yes, long life on the earth which the Lord says He *gave* to the children of men. Will the Bishop of Ossory assert that this universal gift has not been unjustly and unwarrantably taken possession of by a few, or will he deny that, while he expounds the teachings of Christ, who condemns *all wrong-doing*, that he, the good and pious Bishop of Ossory, shuts his eyes to an iniquitous land system which has brought in its wake, and is still bringing in its train such misery and wretchedness. But the Commandment referred to is only one confirmation out of many which conveys the gift of the earth to the children of men. Here are the exact words which ratify God's bounty and goodness—words repeated every Sunday in the Bishop's church, in fact in all the Protestant churches: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in THE LAND WHICH THE LORD THY GOD GIVETH THEE."

The *Eagle* is doing a good work in publishing serially Rev. S. W. Thackeray's "Land and the Community, a History of Land Tenure." Dr. Thackeray's name will be familiar to many Single Taxers in this country.

#### ADDRESS BEFORE THE MAINE DEMOCRATIC CLUB,

PORTLAND, MAINE, JAN. 8, 1903.

By John DeWitt Warner.

#### THE PEOPLE'S CAUSE.

What is the People's Cause?

Democracy must be ever loyal to the People—if need be even against the government itself; but this does not involve paralysis of government, except to help monopoly. Democracy opposes government restriction—for it believes in giving the people all freedom possible. But it favors extension of public service. This to give each more freedom. To illustrate: Democracy abhors a Protective Tariff—because it interferes with men's business. But it favors our postal service—because that makes it easier for every man to do business.

No government can serve monopoly and the people; "for either it will hate the one "and love the other, or it will hold to the "one and despise the other." It cannot "serve God and Mammon."

To take our government out of bondage to Mammon; to make it better serve our people—such is, to-day, the People's Cause—such the program of Democracy.

What items does this involve?

*First:* Getting it out of the service of

Plutocracy—making it stop taxing our people for private monopoly.

Our forefathers denounced George III. "for cutting off our trade with all parts of the world." That is just what our own government is doing. What we need to-day is freedom from government obstruction to the people's business. Free Trade is what we want. Is it not high time to say so? If I remember correctly the Declaration of Independence was the glad end of a long series of loyal protests to the British crown, in which the Tories had joined. Would we not be stronger if we purged our ranks of those who are really against us?

One of the truths we must accept as axiomatic is that "Protection"—the theory that government should single out from the private industries of our country those which it thinks deserving aid, and apportion among them the aid it thinks others should give them—is usurpation—blackmail to which no man has any excuse for submitting, except that for the moment he cannot resist or escape; to which no one does submit except because he must.

I am not so sure, however, but that we may have among us those who wish to be classed as "Tariff Reformers." What does "Tariff Reform" mean? As I understand it, a mere tariff reformer is ready to acquiesce a tariff "for revenue." But, in fixing a tariff for revenue, the interests affected lie, bully, and bribe—just as in the case of a tariff for Protection. Not a man present but who knows that the statement of his most revered friend made to influence tariff rates, is as crooked as every returning honeymooner knows is the customary declaration of his wedded bride to avoid paying duty. The antics of ten monkeys to which have been thrown three oranges, are dignity and generosity compared with the performance of American manufacturers when tariff schedules are fixing.

Moreover, experience has shown how little we can hope for such adjustment of any tariff as to leave it one for revenue alone. The Wilson tariff was less oppressive in its extortions than any other we have had of late years; but there never was one less defensible on logical grounds than was this when it left the House; or one more bestuck with corruption than when it came back from the Senate to become a law.

Senators and Congressmen were not all angels then. There are men of honor and courage among them now. But no one, on reading the roll, can claim that Congress is now better worthy of trust, or that we have a right to expect future ones will be so.

Even if practicable, a tariff for revenue could not be defended. For it is a tax, not on ability to pay, but on necessity to use. From its very nature, to produce even a large or a stable return, it must be mainly

levied, not upon luxuries, but upon the necessities of life.

In short, it is the essential of a tariff tax that it is paid in the increased price of whatever the most of our citizens find it necessary to have. It is a tax which stands by the cradle, and, as every babe enters the household, vigilantly and pitilessly increases its father's share of public burdens; but which sleeps unmoved while bond is piled upon bond in the strong box, and broad acres are added to broad acres outside. Is it fair thus to tax the necessities of the poor and leave untouched the accumulations of the rich? Is it fair thus to burden the unfortunate in proportion to his wants, and thus to let the miser go free in proportion to his stinginess? Is it fair thus to discourage the rearing of children, and thus to encourage the breeding of dollars?

But we have timorous friends, who shiver whenever there is danger that something will be done. And they ask: Would you have business disaster? Certainly—disaster to every man the continuance of whose prosperity depends on the continuation of his power to tax us for his benefit. When answered thus, they generally say that they agree, "but—that 'some tariffs are not as bad as others'; and that 'we don't want to do anything that would unsettle business.'"

Well, which are the good tariffs? Which are those the repeal of which would unsettle any business—except the business of dead-beats? Now I have asked that question scores of times, and I have never yet received an answer. But I do know something as to tariffs:

In the year 1901, we collected through the Customs House \$233,500,000.

Of that 27 per cent. was the duty on sugar.

Could not the business of this country stand free sugar?

Of the remainder, a little less than 10 per cent. was on manufactured cottons; and about the same amount on woolen and manufactures of wool.

Could not the business interests of this country survive giving our whole people better and cheaper clothes?

Next comes Flax and other fibers 5½ per cent.; Iron and Steel goods 3 per cent.; Tea 3½ per cent.; Chemicals, Medicines, etc., 2 4-10 per cent.; Pottery and China 2 3-10 per cent.; Hides and Leather goods 3 per cent.—in each of which Free Trade would help our people. The duty on tea is already repealed.

Whom would it ruin if the Sugar Trust, the Cotton Trust, the Woolen Trust, the Linen Trust, the Iron and Steel Trust, the Leather Trust and the Glass Trust were left without protection?

Of our total tariff receipts the only considerable items collected on luxuries

are: 7 per cent. thereof on tobacco; 6 per cent. on manufactured silk, and 4 per cent. on liquors.

I appreciate that Liquor and Tobacco duties are needed to counterbalance Internal Revenue taxes. Indeed, most free traders would not lie awake nights on account of the really "revenue" tariff on tea, or on account of the one we would have had on coffee—except that when the item was up the Sugar Trust happened to be "short" on the coffee market, and sent its agent to have the Senate knock it out—as he has since sworn.

From beginning to end of the tariff schedules, there is not an item the repeal of which would not help business rather than hurt it. A pauper dollar that don't earn its living without outdoor aid, is just as much a drag on business as is a human wreck whom the poormaster has to help.

In short, my fearful friends, when you plead for Tariff Reform, instead of Free Trade, in order that business may not be hurt, you are letting yourselves be used by Protection monkeys as cat's paws, to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. The only good tariffs are dead tariffs. The best way to improve a tariff is to repeal it.

So much for the Tariff. But the trust question presses for solution: Statesmen may still quibble over definitions; but we may as well understand that what people mean by a "Trust" is a private monopoly in a necessary of life or commerce.

How extensive and serious are Trust operations? As we all know, within the past two years, these monopolistic combines have been so rapidly and recklessly spawned that in that time their number, their extent and their greed have been multiplied. In the nature of things exact statistics cannot now be given.

The situation at the end of 1900,—two years before the birth of most now considered really great—was, however, as follows—stated by the most trustworthy, conservative, and influential business newspaper in America, the *"New York Journal of Commerce"*:

"First, the capitalization of the 'trusts.' At the close of 1900, their 'nominal capital consisted of \$680,000,000 in bonds, \$1,250,000,000 of preferred 'stock and \$2,796,000,000 in common 'stock, . . . probably nine-tenths of the 'common shares have nothing behind 'them beyond such transient figments 'as compensation to 'promoters,' good-'will, past profits without any guaran-'ty of their continuance, and bonuses '(over and above the true value of the 'properties amalgamated) to induce 'co-operation in the 'deals.' These 'common shares have brought no ac-'cessions of capital or property to the 'consolidations; they merely serve as 'counters in gambling stock transac-

"tions; or as shams to bolster up false confidence among the uninitiated; and by no true or proper use of language can they be designated as 'CAPITAL stock.' In nearly all cases, they are a 'worthless fiction.'"

In short two years ago 50 per cent. of our Trust stocks were water, upon which their promoters hoped, by government aid, to make the American people pay dividends.

As an example, take the most prominent late case in which we have the statement of the promoters themselves—that of the United States Steel Corporation, the largest single factor of which was the Carnegie Steel Company, limited.

Just before the steel combine was perfected, the principal owners of the Carnegie Company, Mr. Carnegie and Mr. Frick went to law as to the terms on which Carnegie might buy Frick out. Mr. Carnegie claimed the right to do so at a valuation of about \$5,000,000. Mr. Frick protested, alleging the property to be worth at least \$250,000,000. We are safe in saying that, when Mr. Carnegie tried to swear it down to \$75,000,000, and Mr. Frick tried to swear it up to \$250,000,000, the actual value was somewhere between the two.

July 15, 1902, Mr. Schwab, the President of the United States Steel Corporation, swore that these very properties—

"were purchased by the United States Steel Corporation . . . and the United States Steel Corporation thereupon issued and paid for such properties \$304,000,000 in five per cent. bonds . . . and \$188,556,000 in stock. (Or, in round numbers, \$500,000,000)."

Did Mr. Carnegie drive too sharp a bargain? Not at all. On that point we have the oath of Mr. George W. Perkins, of J. Pierpont Morgan & Co., August 22d, 1902, that—

"The (United States Steel) 'corporation was' (in May, 1902) 'doing a business of over \$400,000,000 per annum on practically a cash basis.'"

—and that of the President of the Steel Corporation, Mr. Charles M. Schwab, on July 15th, 1902, that—

"The net earnings during the first three months of the second year, viz.: 'from April 1, 1902, to July 1, 1902, 'were \$37,691,700, or at the rate of '\$150,000,000 per year."

"During the second year, the 'properties are earning at the rate of 'over 14 per cent. upon its common 'capital stock, after deducting seven 'per cent. cumulative dividend upon the 'preferred stock."

In short, so effectively did the Corporation use its monopoly, that of its gross sales of over \$400,000,000, \$150,000,000, or 37½ per cent. was net profit, and its dividend actually twice the rate (or 14 per cent. per

*annum) upon the ocean of water it had issued as common stock, than even the liberal rate (7 per cent.) which it paid upon its preferred stock.*

To what was this monopoly due? Something to railroad favoritism; but first and foremost to the fact that by "protection" its promoters were able to tax the American people at the same time that they gave cheaper goods to foreigners.

On this point nothing could be more luminous than Secretary Shaw's immortal explanation of Tariff trust relations—

"The protective tariff is not the 'mother of trusts, though it is the parent of conditions that make it profitable for capital to combine and congenial for labor to organize."

Exactly; we have heard of such things before. Corrupt government, for example, is not the mother of crime, it is simply the parent of conditions which make it profitable for bandits to combine, and congenial for honest men to band together for safety.

As to special instances? President Roosevelt says there is no tariff on anthracite coal. Secretary of the Treasury Shaw instructs collectors to facilitate the adjustment of duties on imported anthracite; Secretary of the Navy Moody says the tariff on anthracite is a fraud and an outrage—and ought to be repealed. A Democrat can scarcely add to this.

Take Standard Oil:—From the time President Roosevelt was a free-trader himself, this has been one of the interests most helped by a high tariff; which preserved its monopoly, and for long years enabled it to charge double prices here, during which it gave Europe cheap oil. And to this very day the more profitable products of the Standard Oil Co. are protected by a high tariff—generally from 25 per cent. upwards.

Of its dealings with Labor, a late instance was the Tin Plate look-out in August last, to compel the workmen in that industry to accept 20 per cent. reduction in wages, because the Standard Oil Co. had notified the Tin Plate Trust that it proposed to take advantage of the tariff rebate, and get its tin plate abroad, unless by cutting down wages, the Tin Plate Trust would let it have tin cheaper here. The locked-out workmen met and resolved that the tariff was a protection of trusts against the laboring men.

On the Meat Trust I can quote a good deal better authority than President Roosevelt—Mr. Armour, its head. When he landed in New York on his return from Europe in the latter part of August, a *World* reporter met him and asked him about the prospects of the meat combine, with which we have since become familiar:

"Will the combination, if affected, 'control the meat industry of this country?"

"I think it would."

"Will it control Europe?"

"No. It is impossible for any combination in the United States to control the meat trade of Europe, because of the large shipments of cattle from Argentine and other South American countries."

\* \* \* \* \*

"We intend, however," he said, "to build a million dollar plant at Fort Worth, to handle Texas cattle for the export trade."

In other words, as Mr. Armour candidly explains, with a two cent per pound tariff on meat the combination enjoys a monopoly here. It cannot extend this to Europe because Europe is free, as America is not. to buy meat from Australia and South America. But so far are our high prices from being necessary for the meat business here, that the Meat Trust proposes to build enormous slaughter houses in Texas to send Europe cheap meat, and thus compete there with the Australian and South American farmers, who would be glad to furnish us cheap meat, if our tariff didn't leave us at the mercy of our Meat Trust.

Take the Steel Trust itself: Mr. Roosevelt don't think the tariff helps it. I must again be excused from quoting what I think better authority. Mr. Lewis Nixon is the head of the Great Shipbuilding combine, owning, as it now does, its own steel works and with shipyards from Maine to California. Promised ship subsidy he was willing to take it; but, being a Democrat, wouldn't lie about it; so that the subsidy people had no use for him after his first statements in January, 1900, from which I quote:

"Mr. Nixon (shipbuilder), speaking on behalf of the bill, testified (Hearings, 1900, p. 26), as follows:

"Mr. Fitzgerald: Where can you buy steel for \$35 a ton?

"Mr. Nixon: In England.

"Mr. Fitzgerald: How do you account for the fact, then, that American steel is sold abroad?

"Mr. Nixon: We sell it over there.

"Mr. Fitzgerald: And you have to pay \$60 for it here?

"Mr. Nixon: We have been doing it.

"Mr. Fitzgerald: Do I understand you to make the statement that you can buy steel for \$35 a ton in England?

"Mr. Nixon: Thirty-six dollars, I think, was the last quotation.

"Mr. Fitzgerald: And how much here?

"Mr. Nixon: Two and six-tenths cents a pound the other day."

The Republican program is to subsidize our shipbuilders so heavily that they can afford to pay Steel Trust extortion. The Democratic plan is to make the Steel Trust

give everybody cheap steel, so that no subsidy will be needed.

I have been asked not to forget the Ship Subsidy. I am rather surprised. For I had supposed this steel already doomed—at least until Hanna should be President, Knox, Chief Justice, and each Trust given an additional Senator for every \$100,000, 000 of its capital over half a million—all of which may be close at hand, but not here yet.

The original subsidy bill, under the pretense of helping our exports, gave most of the \$9,000,000 permitted without reference to exports, and to ships that could not carry them.

Sundry crumbs were widely scattered. But it was a case of "us four and no more"—with the International Navigation Company (a Pa. R. R.—and Standard Oil concern) at the head of the table, the Atlantic Transport Co. (another Pa. R. R. concern), at its right hand; at its left the Pacific Mail still odorous from its bribery, in the last ship subsidy scandal; and opposite the N. Y. and Cuba Mail.

For example: Of some \$5,700,000 subsidy that had this late grab succeeded would have been paid out during the first year, the International was to have gotten \$2,331,000, or over 50 per cent.; the Atlantic Transport Co., \$845,000, or nearly 15 per cent.; the Pacific Mail nearly \$600,000, or over 10 per cent.; and the N. Y. & Cuba Mail \$625,000, or 11 per cent.

Senators Hanna and Frye would have put it through Congress, however, except that from our wage-earners and farmers, in 1901, came such a storm of protest as to drive them from their loot.

Only in appearance, however—for they concocted a new bill—in fact, the same old steal for the same old sinners—which, last Spring, they put through the Senate, and tried to get through the House—before the Shipbuilding Combine and the Shipping Trust were launched.

I prefer to kick live steals rather than dead ones, and shall, therefore, waste little time on this—though it is still stirring. It is a mail subsidy grab for the same parties. For example, the International—since chief factor in the shipping trust—is now hired to carry our mails between this country and Great Britain—though it has not a single fast ship, or a single new one that is not far slower than its ten year old ones. In the year ending July 1st, 1902, on the theory that it carried our mails between New York and Great Britain, we paid the International \$667,000 for carrying 131,000,000 gr. of letters. We had to hire the greater part of our letters carried by faster British and German ships. For example, we paid the Cunard Line \$221,000 for carrying 141,000,000 gr. of letters. That is, we paid the Cunard for carrying more mail at greater speed, one-third the rate the International got for the work it could not do.

The pending bill provides that the Post Office Department contract with the International to carry these same mails for twenty years to come, at 30 per cent. higher rates of pay—this without a single provision for other or faster ships than it now supplies. In short, to establish an "Old Ladies' Home" where we shall pay its old hulks, no longer fit to carry mails, a bigger pension for doing nothing, than we must pay in addition to fast modern ships for actually carrying our mails.

This is a sample apple from the ship subsidy basket. The rest are smaller, but just as rotten.

There is beauty in many another tariff trust, but I don't know of a rose in the garden more sweet than the sugar blooms, or a more rich "Cuban Reciprocity." I don't believe President Roosevelt knew the measure he was procured to recommend was one the Sugar Trust had concocted. But he knows it now. For with the rest of us he has learned that the Cuban manifestoes were subsidized and public expression here manufactured by Mr. Thurber, with Mr. Havemeyer's money—a combination that certifies the interest in which was pushed a Reciprocity that left Cuba's product, one which we need, still shut out by a duty scarcely less prohibitory than the one which now disgraces our statutes—the reduction, however, being as much as the Sugar Trust dared grab on its raw materials, without risking reduction of the much worse tariff on its refined product.

It was a fine example of lofty principle our President gave us—an appeal for generosity to Cuba—on the ground that it wouldn't cost us anything, and not even hurt the beet sugar dead-beats—a statement, doubtless, inspired by the Sugar Trust, and naturally not a true one. For Mr. Oxnard knows more about beet sugar than the President will ever learn, and he and his have poured out their money like water, and filled the air with their squalling, to beat the Sugar Trust program.

The Democratic program, as I understand it, is to strike down at one blow the Sugar Trust and Beet Sugar Trust, and help our own people by giving them free sugar—thus giving the Cubans about a hundred-fold what they are likely to get from any Havemeyer-Roosevelt plan.

As to the philanthropy of the Sugar Trust: Among those interested in the sugar business before the Sugar Trust was formed was John C. Havemeyer, of Yonkers, reputed a high-minded, straightforward gentleman. During the past ten years I have often wondered how he could join in the infamy by which that Trust had prospered. The answer came in this telegram, which I quote from the *New York Times* of December 14th:

"John C. Havemeyer delivered an address in Westminster Presbyterian

"Church to-night, and referred to the reason which led him to abandon the sugar industry for the profession of preacher. In the course of his remarks he said:

"When the sugar manufacturers combined together to form a trust, I could not see that my way was clear to live a Christian life and at the same time to rob the poor by raising the price of their coffee sweetening."

—I shall not try to add to that picture.

One more specimen: From the *Press* despatches of December 11th—less than a month since—I quote:

"Isidor and Nathan Strauss, composing the firm of R. H. Macy & Co., applied to Justice Leventritt yesterday for an injunction restraining the American Publishers' Association and the American Booksellers' Association from acting under a certain agreement whereby they wished to stop selling books to Macy's."

"... Col. Stephen H. Olin appeared for the book dealers. Col. Olin admitted that the book publishers and sellers had entered into agreements to maintain the prices of books. The trouble arose from the fact that Macy's would not consent to keep up the prices of the books."

Plaintiffs quoted from the annual report of the Secretary of the Booksellers' Association the following, as to village or school librarians who might try to save public moneys:

"If your local librarian is disposed to ask for a greater discount, it is your duty to call upon him and explain to him explicitly the reason why the public library is entitled to no discounts."

"If he still insists on cutting off a share of your rightful profit, it is your further duty to go before the Town or City Council and have the annual salary of your local librarian reduced. This you may rightfully ask as a taxpayer."

The final suggestion I have just quoted typifies trust methods. The Publishers' Association doubtless assumes itself an honorable body. But there is not a man of its directorate who does not know that the instructions thus given its agents could not be—and were not intended to be—carried out except by lying and bullying; or who will claim that the tools to whom this order was issued were expected, when they lobbied, to punish local librarians, to state the real reason why they did so. If there be dirtier business than this, I have yet been spared from getting it. If there be men who deserve both the pump and the

horsewhip, it is "gentlemen" who order or connive at such business.

Well; What do we propose to do with Trusts? The President parrots the worn answer, "Publicity." Publicity—What for? Does anyone imagine the people of this country are in any doubt as to the fact—or the nature—or the consequences of these Trusts—or as to who is responsible for them? I perfectly well appreciate that publicity might protect small investors in Trust stocks; but when did fair division of plunder, rather than suppression of banditti, become the first duty of government? Our President reminds one of the boy who, when shown by his mamma the picture of Daniel in the Lion's den, burst into tears in sympathy with the little lion "who was crowded so far into the back that he wasn't going to get any Daniel." The mighty hunter in the White House may sympathize with the little Bulls and Bears. But what a plundered people demand is Protection from the beasts, little as well as big.

Our Tariff is the blood sucker through which Trusts most drain our life and commerce. What do we propose to do about that? It will not do simply to answer that we propose to reduce Protection, to bad Trusts. We may not know yet whether the Meat Combine, or the Coal Combine, or the Sugar Trust, or the Steel Trust, or many another Trust is a bad one or not. But the people do; and it is time for us to answer whether or not we are determined to have free meat, free coal, free sugar, free steel—in short, every other thing free, just as fast as we can force the issues.

Again: Some of us may assume it wisdom to wait until a trust grows from a mere nuisance to a national menace, before we cut off the protection on which it is growing fat. Our voters, however, indulge in no such nonsense. They every day more sharply urge Free Trade, not merely against big trusts, that have grown dangerous, but against little ones—before they get big.

So far can Congress undo the wrong it has done. But that is not enough. Interstate Commerce and Postal Service are in the power of Congress. No formidable trust could exist except suffered by Congress to do interstate business. Next to the tariff Interstate railroads have most bled others to fatten Trusts. Free Trade would strip Trusts of "Protection"—their shield. Why should not Congress use the powers expressly given it to provide for Interstate transport as well as postal service—and thus take from the trusts their sword as well?

Do you want instances of how Trusts have used railroad crime to destroy legitimate business?

I note a little Standard Oil history, lately collated by Miss Tarbell:

"In 1871 John D. Rockefeller and his "associates entered into a conspiracy with

"the railroads serving the oil regions. "Under the terms of this conspiracy a "monopoly was to be created by freezing out of business all oil refiners who "were not members of the band. . . .

"Their contracts . . . which the "railroad managers secretly signed, "fixed rates of freight from all the leading shipping points within the oil "regions to all the great refining centers—New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburg, and Cleveland. . . . "For example, the open rate on crude "oil to New York was put at \$2.56 a "barrel. On this price the South Improvement company (the Rockefeller "interest) was allowed a rebate of \$1.06. "But it got not only this rebate, it was "given in cash a like amount on each "barrel of crude oil shipped by parties "outside the combination."

That is, while others were charged \$2.56, the Standard Oil paid only from \$1.50 down—only 44 cents per barrel net, for example, in case outsiders shipped as much as did it.

This paved the way for the benevolent assimilation of its rivals on the Standard's own terms.

In this connection I am glad to note that that Attorney-General Knox has seen more than he has done. In October he said:

"In the early part of this year it came "to the knowledge of the President that "great railway systems in the middle "West, upon which every section of the "country is dependent for the movement of breadstuffs, had entered into "unlawful agreements to transport the "shipments of a few favored grain "buyers at rates much below the tariff "charges imposed upon small dealers "and the general public. This injustice prevailed to such an extent and "for so long a time that most of the "smaller shippers had been driven from "the field. . . . In a word, there was "practically only one buyer on each railway system, and the illegal advantages "he secured from the carrier gave him "a monopoly of the grain trade on the "line with which his secret compact "was made. It was an odious condition.

"Nor does this describe the full measure of wrongdoing. It reached the "centers of trade, and affected related "industries with more or less disaster. "In Kansas City, for example, it was "asserted that local dealers had been "excluded from participation in the "grain trades; that their elevators for "the storage and transshipment of grain, "built at great expense for the demands "of an important market, had been deprived of business; and that large "numbers of laborers had lost employment and remained in idleness, solely

"because of the diversion of business  
"from its natural channels, as the re-  
"sult of this forbidden monopoly in the  
"purchase and transportation of grain."

In short, our railroads have misused the privileges given them until our government postal service, as well as both our interstate and foreign commerce, is obstructed and blackmailed, while trust monopoly is openly favored by law breakers, such as those whom, as they have themselves reminded us, God in his inscrutable providence, has permitted to monopolize an-  
thracity.

If more evidence were needed we have the Interstate Commerce Commission's late report on the Railroad pools' combine with the Meat Trust:

"The facts developed upon that in-  
"vestigation (of the Chicago packing  
"houses) and upon a previous investi-  
"gation into the movement of grain and  
"grain products, are of such a character  
"that no thoughtful person can con-  
"template them with indifference. That  
"the leading traffic officials of many of  
"the principal railway lines, men occu-  
"pying high positions and charged with  
"the most important duties, should de-  
"liberately violate the statute law of the  
"land, and agree with each other to  
"do so; that it should be thought by  
"them necessary to *destroy vouchers*  
"and to so *manipulate bookkeeping* as  
"to obliterate evidence of transactions;  
"that hundreds of thousands of dollars  
"should be paid in unlawful rebates to  
"a few great packing-houses; . . .  
"must be surprising and offensive to  
"all right-minded persons. Equally  
"startling, at least, is the fact that the  
"owners of these packing houses, men  
"whose names are known throughout  
"the commercial world, should seem-  
"ingly be eager to augment their gains  
"with the enormous amount of these  
"rebates, which they receive in plain  
"defiance of a Federal statute."

In view of such conditions, who can dispute Chairman Knapp's conclusion:

"If we could unearth the secrets of  
"these modern trusts, whose quick got-  
"ten wealth dwarfs the riches of Solo-  
"mon, and whose impudent exactions  
"put tyranny to shame, we should find  
"the explanation of their menacing  
"growth in the systematic and heartless  
"methods by which they have evaded  
"the common burdens of transporta-  
"tion. . . .

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"As I view the matter the state has  
"as much right to farm out its business  
"of collecting its revenues or preserv-  
"ing the peace, and then allow the par-

"ties entrusted with those duties to fix  
"the rate of taxation according to their  
"interests, or to sell personal protection  
"to the highest bidder, as it has to per-  
"mit the great function of public car-  
"riage to be the subject of special bar-  
"gain or secret dicker, to be made un-  
"equal by favoritism or oppressive by  
"extortion. . . ."

We have lately heard many appeals to the alleged principles of Democracy, from gentlemen not hitherto suspected of knowing or caring for them. Our Trust and Railroad magnates eagerly warn us against extension of federal powers. In our cities, street railway and gas magnates are bitter against what they call the "State Socialism" of municipal street cars and gas works. In Congress Republican Senators have fits at any proposed extension of mail facilities that would hurt express monopoly.

The people appreciate the great risks in government control of railroads; but they also appreciate the greater ones in railroad control of government. They know that they must choose between them—and they have made their choice. Have we? If so, the quicker we announce it the better. If not, we had better let somebody lead who does know the direction in which he is going.

But again rise our timid friends and ask: Where are the thousands of millions of dollars to buy the railroads? It would not cost a dollar to enact laws that would give the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to make railroads choose between fair service to all, or penitentiary for their officials, and fines that would kill dividends. And why should not government also proceed to construct roads for its postal service and interstate commerce on routes where such would pay from the start—for example, from Boston to New York, or from New York to Washington? Does any one doubt that such roads would pay? Or but that, this once done, other great lines would try so to serve our people as not to invite government to build roads?

Indeed, the railroad problem is an easy one compared with others that are close at hand. As our supply of meat, of bread, of coal, of steel, of sugar,—of one after another necessary of life or commerce becomes a private monopoly—Is our government as now constituted, helpless to break it? And, if so: As between State and Federal Constitutions, and the Constitution of our citizens themselves. If one must go, which is fated to be broken first?

To set up a bogie of Socialism is no answer. Our people know the real thing too well. And as between the Socialism of Plutocracy that abuses law to make the people serve it, and that of Democracy that exacts ever more service from government to give its people more freedom, they will not hesitate to choose.

Again: Another problem is ever with us—that of taxation. Tariff taxation is unfair taxation. Then in the name of Justice let us have Free Trade. Agreed; but on what shall we levy taxes? If we don't know, we had better find out. The people expect us to answer. What have we to propose? Is there a fairer tax than the Income Tax? Is there a less oppressive tax than a Succession Tax? Is there a tax that takes less of what a man has earned, and more of what is due the public already, than a tax on Land Values?

If so, a waiting people listens to hear us suggest these better taxes. If not, the same people expects us to propose and adjust Income taxes, Succession taxes, Land taxes—one or all. Or, if any one thinks excise, or direct taxes upon the states in proportion to population, or any other method should be further or newly exploited, it is high time to consider it. If we need constitutional amendment to open the way for what should be done, we should demand and work for it—and meanwhile use all the power Congress has.

These problems are urgent. If we don't meet them they will meet us. Democracy cannot be ready too soon.

I do not forget that many still urge that Democracy is not a proper theory of government. Indeed, if we are to judge from the world's history, the opinion of mankind has been so largely otherwise that one might argue that monarchy, or Aristocracy is better than popular government. And I respect the logic—though I do not agree with it—of Mr. Carnegie—who stands among those most responsible for what now faces us, and far first among those attempting to meet their responsibility—when thirteen years ago he voiced the theory upon which he and worse men have since been working—that it was on the whole good to let our people become stratified into upper and lower classes, one representing Wealth and the other Labor—on the theory that—

“The millionaire will be a trustee for the poor, entrusted with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself.”

What I do know, however, is that this is Plutocracy, not Democracy. What I urge is that, while it may be honorable to leave the field in case we find Democracy a failure, it is dishonorable, so long as we flaunt its banner, to make any other fight than that of the People's Cause, against Protection, Privilege and Plutocracy.

As to tactics, we might well learn from our foes. From their standpoint they rightly refuse to disturb any tariff item, on the ground that the protective system would be thereby endangered; and that only by defending each in what he now has, can a

solid front be maintained. To demand Free Trade on some lines while winking at Protection in others, is to betray the People's Cause in order to keep with us those who belong with the enemy. If we are willing to join the church of Esau, ought we not at least to be more sure of our potage?

The fact is, sir, as I believe, that for every Protectionist or doubter held with us by trimming, we lose two who might have been converted did we stand for Free Trade.

Of course, success is important; and if the protectionists we took with us when we got power in '92 had proved helpful to public weal and Democratic honor, I could now understand the position of a trimmer, however little I might agree with him. The fact, however, is that, with all we then accomplished—and we did much—our betrayal by those among us who were half-hearted on principle, turned Democracy into a hissing and by-word, and gave Protection a new lease of life.

There are two ways in which we may come again into power: One, by drifting in to fill the vacuum, when our voters kick out the Republicans—just as the Republicans themselves came in in '94—not because anybody wanted them, but from popular indignation wreaked upon Democrats: Another, by organizing and leading our voters to intelligent assault upon monopoly—so that our success shall be a proof of their confidence.

If we depend upon the former the less we do the better; but if on the latter, the quicker we hang our banners on the outer wall the more promptly can we expect fighting recruits.

I appreciate that argument may be made in favor of a still-hunt to get into office, for the sake of the opportunity thus given a patriot. And as to any particular patriot who proposes this, I shall try to believe his use of office might be more creditable than the way he got it. But my observation has not been that way. And I don't think our people can be made to believe that a party, or a man, who wants to get into office with a dark lantern, is one you can trust when he is in.

So, sir, as the most direct means towards success—certainly in serving our country—probably in getting its offices—I am sure we might well adopt Cato's counsel, as the policy of the Democratic party to the end of time:

“'Tis not in mortals to command success,  
But we'll do more, Sempronius, we'll deserve it.”

**IF any one of our friends has a Memorial Set of Henry George's works which he would be willing to dispose of, will he write to the REVIEW, stating terms?**