

question of parting with the Philippines, every family in the land can soon be heard from, and the answer would go far to decide the question in accord with the known sentiment of the country. We will be pleased to receive and publish the returns; and inasmuch as our paper is the recognized sugar authority of the United States and is freely consulted by the senators and representatives at Washington, the result of such a vote as proposed would go far to solve the knotty question which will immediately come up on the assembling of Congress, regarding the Philippines.

We would like to hear from our wholesale grocer friends if such a proposal as the above is practicable with them.

DIRECT LEGISLATION.

Substance of an address delivered by John Z. White, of Chicago, at a business men's banquet at Wilmington, Del., in August, 1904, as revised by Mr. White, November 16, 1906.

The referendum seems to be generally misunderstood. People apparently believe it to be something strange—a new device, whose merits and demerits are vague and uncertain. In truth it is a plan universally followed in all parliamentary bodies. Without it parliamentary law is impossible. Its absence from legislative assemblies is possible only through the substitution of that meanest and most irritating of all tyrannies, the rule of the gavel.

The referendum, together with the initiative and recall, are the means by which self-government is secured by any group of men, under any conditions whatsoever. Interference with these is just so much subtracted from the fact of self-government.

In deliberative bodies a chairman is selected to preside. His duty is to enforce the rules that may be adopted. If any decision rendered by him is thought to be in violation of these rules any member so believing may appeal from such decision to the whole body. This is the referendum. In the absence of this right of appeal, the presiding officer practically can do what he pleases.

If a member wishes action on any matter, he makes a motion to that effect, and this, on receiving the support of a second member, is placed before the body for consideration and adoption or rejection. This is the initiative. In the absence of this right to "move," members are without power to act.

If an officer refuses to perform the duties of his office, or commits acts in violation of those duties, the body may remove him from office. This is the recall. In the absence of this power, the officers may wholly defeat the will of the body, or may even carry out an opposing policy.

If the people of a city, State or the nation, are to be in truth self-governing it seems inevitably to follow that they must have at hand the means of making the government do their bidding. The people of the city of Chicago, for instance, have voted in favor of public ownership of their street car system, but their board of aldermen appear to be able to thwart the popular desire. The people of Philadelphia, and many other places, have repeatedly found themselves unable to achieve their wish. To many, self-government has come to be looked upon as an iridescent dream.

This pessimistic view arises from the fact that we are possessed of but part of the necessary machinery of self-government. We are like an engineer who has all essentials save the governor. His engine will "go," but its action is beyond orderly control.

The initiative, referendum and recall, taken together, are called direct legislation. That is, just as in any deliberative body, if the usual machinery does not produce desired results, the body may act directly. So, if our city, or other government does not act rightly, the body of the people, when possessed of the machinery of direct legislation, may act, or legislate, directly. Without this power they are not really self-governing.

It is proposed, therefore, to give to a certain percentage of the qualified voters in any political body the power to prepare and present a petition under which there shall be submitted to the whole body of voters the proposal that may be indicated by the petition. This is the exact equivalent of a motion in any club or society, save that a considerable number of "seconds" are required. That is, each signer of the petition really "seconds" the motion to adopt the matter proposed in the petition. Such action, as I have stated, is the initiative.

It is sometimes said that the people need only to elect officials favorable to such action, and that thereby all need for the device known as the initiative will vanish. The fallacy in this position comes from the fact that our officials have many duties. An officer may be highly esteemed and very

satisfactory in nearly all relations, but at the same time be quite at variance with the people on some question held by them to be important. At an election one candidate may be personally desirable, yet not in accord with the popular will on a given matter. Why shall we maintain a system by which we are either deprived of the efficient officer, or of a measure that we believe to be expedient?

In one of the elections in Chicago a man was elected by a majority of two to one, although he declared himself opposed to a policy which at the same election the same constituency favored by a vote of three to one. The opposing candidate, meanwhile, had declared in favor of this policy. The explanation is simple. Other issues were, in the opinion of the voters, sufficiently important to force this matter into the background. If possessed of the power to initiate legislation, the voters could have enjoyed the services of the officer they desired, and also secured the adoption of the policy they preferred. They were, in fact, but partly self-governing.

It is also proposed that the people shall have power, expressed by petition, as explained in the above reference to the initiative, to promptly propose the defeat of acts of legislation deemed by them to be unwise. If a measure has been enacted by the legislature, or other legislative body, a petition may be prepared within a stated time (perhaps 60 or 90 days) and signed by the given percentage of qualified voters in the territory affected by the legislation, whereupon it shall be submitted to the people for adoption or rejection. This is exactly equivalent to "an appeal from the chair." The matter may be placed before the people at a special election or at the next regular election.

It is sometimes urged that under such a plan the people would be voting all the time and on all manner of questions. In fact, the referendum, where adopted, is seldom resorted to. Legislators are careful when they know the people can easily reverse their doings; and, very much more important, lobbyists are not inclined to use their peculiar powers of persuasion on members of legislative bodies when they know there are watchful citizens intent upon the defeat of their nefarious schemes, and with full power to defeat them if the people so will. The referendum will not only cure legislative rascality, but in even greater degree operates as a preven-

tative. Would a railroad corporation bribe a legislative body to enact injurious monopoly laws if it knew the people would in all probability rescind such act within a few weeks or months? It would not pay. They would merely lose the money spent to secure legislative privileges.

It is also proposed that, upon proper petition as above suggested, public officers may be removed from office. This is the recall. We have recently been entertained with accounts of many groups of citizens in Philadelphia visiting their representatives and urging them to take the side of the people and to oppose the influences favorable to official corruption. Do business men "urge" their representatives, or do they "order" them?

Probably nothing other than the recall can be devised that will so effectually bring about efficiency in our public service. Civil service—the so-called merit system—has been very extensively tried. It is largely a joke. The recall will "do business."

Direct legislation is merely the application to our public affairs of those methods that experience has shown best suited to attain the end desired. That end is self-government. Do we want self-government? It sometimes seems problematical. Capable men who oppose direct legislation can explain their attitude only on the ground that the people, in their judgment, are not capable of managing their own affairs. Such men are Tories. They have no proper place in the American scheme of government.

If it be held that we have in fact conducted this government for above a century without direct legislation and that we may safely continue "in the path our fathers trod," we would call attention to the fact that in nothing else are we satisfied with the ways of our fathers. They used the ox cart—we don't. Just as we have improved on our father's mechanical appliances, without violence to the principles of mechanics, so it may be possible to improve on governmental machinery without in any way altering the correct principles of government with which we were dowered.

The principle of the first locomotive is identical with that of the last. The changes have all been in the elimination of defective methods in detail, to the end that the essential principle involved might be more fully realized. Why is it not the part of wisdom to eliminate like defective details in the machinery of our government?

Again, when we remember that for the first time in history self-government on a large scale is attempted in America, is it at all surprising that the machinery first installed is defective in detail? Would it not be profoundly astonishing if that machinery were not defective?

In theory we possess popular self-government. But in fact the hindrances to its realization are so many as to cause a considerable percentage of our voters to despair. Capable men, who are earnest in their studies and in their efforts to improve existing conditions, are heard to declare that representative government has proved a failure. That these men are hasty in so declaring is no doubt true; but, on the other hand, the evidence of seemingly almost fatal defects in our governmental machinery is overwhelming.

Why was it necessary to battle so many years in the political arena in order to secure the interstate commerce commission? Why is it now necessary to delay the enlargement of that commission's powers? Is it not because the people have no means by which they can directly express themselves on that one question? The people must express themselves through representatives, and these have many duties, other than the matter of interstate commerce, to engage their attention.

The resulting situation is that the representatives are not under positive command of any one particular thing—are not even certain as to the desires of their respective constituencies. These conditions inevitably give to the different political machines a controlling power, that, among a truly self-governing people, should reside with the voters alone. We have no reason whatever to despair of popular self-government until it shall first have had full and adequate trial under the most favorable circumstances, or in conditions giving the people every opportunity, when in their judgment the need arises, to completely control governmental action.

The intent of our governmental structure is right. Its theory is sound. Its defects are wholly in the details of administration. These are not of uncertain or indefinite character, but easily perceived, and as easily understood. So long as city or State legislative bodies may grant a privilege in highways—commonly known as a right-of-way—and the courts continue to call such grant a contract, thus

placing it beyond the reach of sovereign states, the people are helpless, without we secure possession of the machinery for direct legislation.

Why should any man who believes in popular self-government hesitate to claim the right to review legislative action? Does he not know what he desires the legislature or the city council to do? If he does not, why does he vote?

Let us then recognize the very evident fact that the machinery originally installed for the realization of popular self-government is in some respects insufficient for the intended purpose. Let us observe that this insufficiency has been fully overcome by the commonly known and plainly correct methods of customary parliamentary law.

Having arrived at a clear knowledge of the paralyzing difficulty and its simple remedy, let us demand that it be applied—and at once. We demand the initiative, that we may carry our will into effect when legislative bodies fail or refuse to act. We demand the referendum, that we may resist legislative action when contrary to the popular will. We demand the recall, that we may remove public servants who violate the trust reposed in them by those whom they represent—or, more correctly, misrepresent.

In other words, we demand the continuance of representative government with optional direct legislation. We want representative government as a mere matter of convenience—but demand direct legislation as our natural and inalienable right.

Again, such a step is but in accord with the previous action. The electoral college was originally designed as a representative body, whose duty was the naming of a chief executive from among certain selected citizens. This body was soon reduced to a merely clerical position, with the result that, in the matter of selecting their chief executive, the people now possess the initiative. If the citizens of the United States desire a particular man to act as president, no one may say them nay. Would any considerable number of our people favor curtailing popular power in this direction? On the contrary, is there not an ever-increasing demand for the election of United States senators by popular vote?

Tories everywhere oppose the rule of the plain people. The claim is set up that they are incompetent. So said Charles I., so said Louis XVI. So say all Tories to-day. And yet the world's

history bluntly tells the story of meanness, misery and fraud wherever power has been placed with the few, while peace, good will and joy have ever attended those peoples whose governments were equally participated in by all.

L'ENVOI OF THE AUTHORS.

When Earth's last book has been printed
and the types are twisted and pled,
When the Smallest Maynard has perished
and the Littlest Brown has died,
We shall rest, and, faith, we shall need
it for the Century, at best,
Till the Houghtons cease from Mifflin and
the Scribners are at rest.
And those that were good shall be Har-
pers; they shall sit with the Putnam
chaps,
And write on Doubleday Pages, or an L. C.
Page, perhaps;
They shall have real Britons to draw from
—Macmillan and Kegan Paul,
They shall wait an age for their state-
ments, and never get tired at all!
And only McClure shall praise us, and only
McClurg shall bless;
And no one shall write for an Agent, and
none for a Private Press.
But each for the joy of the writing, and
each in his separate star
Shall write the book as he sees it, for the
Dodd of Medds as they are!
—Carolyn Wells, in Bookman.

Little Clarence—Pa, what is an optimist?

Mr. Callipers—An optimist, my son, is a person who doesn't care what happens, if it doesn't happen to him.—Puck.

According to the Manchester Guardian, one of Gen. Booth's stories runs as follows: A parson complained to a Hallelujah lass that he did not like the "horrid drum." The Salvationist retorted that she did not like the church bell. "What, not like the beautiful note of the church bell which says: 'Come, come, come to the house of prayer?'" "No, it interferes with our prayer in the market place, and besides, our drum beats the bell hollow. The drum says: 'Fetch 'em, fetch 'em.'"

BOOKS

AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS.

Introduction to the Study of Economics. By Charles Jesse Bullock, Ph. D., assistant professor of political economy in Harvard University. New edition, revised and enlarged. New York, Boston and Chicago: Silver, Burdett and Company.

In his school book introduction to economics, Prof. Bullock, of Harvard,

devotes a chapter to Henry George's single tax, which he identifies with land nationalization. It may be worth while to remind Prof. Bullock that between centralized national ownership of all the lands of a country, and local taxation (even up to full annual value) of the land of localities held in private ownership, there are political differences so wide that he who holds one of these policies to be equivalent to the other must be a very superficial student of public policy. But as Prof. Bullock professes to be only an economist, it may be assumed that his identification of the two policies relates not to their political elements, but to the fact that with either policy economic rent would be taken for public instead of being left to private use. If this is what he means, then his identification of the single tax with land nationalization is to that extent correct. Not so, however, with the criticisms which he thereupon offers.

He specifies two fallacies in George's argument for the proposition that, as he expresses it, "progress will always cause poverty, as long as land remains in the hands of private owners." This statement of George's contention indicates that Prof. Bullock has failed to grasp both George's argument and his conclusion. For George's contention is not that progress will cause poverty as long as land remains in the hands of private owners, but that it will cause poverty in the midst of wealth, where and when and to the degree that the institution of land ownership obtains. This misapprehension of George, however, is of small importance in comparison with the two points Prof. Bullock especially urges.

"First," he says, "all social progress"—with the "all" italicized—"does not increase the demands upon land." But George never argued that all social progress—with the "all" italicized—does increase the demands upon land. He argued that this is its tendency.

Yet if George's argument had been as Prof. Bullock understands it, Prof. Bullock's reply would be transparently absurd. Here it is in full: "The improvements in manufactures of the last century have increased enormously the product secured from each acre. Improvements in agriculture constantly enable the supply to be produced from better grades of lands, throw poorer grades out of use, and decrease rents. Improved means of transportation enable the best grades of lands in all parts of the world to be utilized, and they have reduced rents on older lands. The progress of the last century has notably increased rents only in the case of land especially desirable for use in commerce and transportation, and this mainly in large cities."

Is it possible that Prof. Bullock, who makes so much of history in his economic studies, does not realize that even if rents have fallen in some places, they have risen in others—agricultural and mineral, as well as urban—and that the aggregate increase is enormously greater than the aggregate decrease? Let him compare the aggregate rents of a century ago with the aggregate of to-day, the agricultural rents alone, if he chooses, and then say whether he stands by what he has written. Almost the entire American continent, now yielding fabulous incomes in yearly rent, and representing many times their yearly rent in salable value, commanded neither rent nor price a century ago. How much of any land of all the world is worth less to-day than it was then? These values were caused and are maintained by the condition to which George ascribes them, and which Prof. Bullock slurs over,—progress and expectation of progress.

Prof. Bullock's second point he states in these words: "The second fallacy is that of supposing that, in any case, the demand for land can increase indefinitely, and can throw most of the product into the hands of landlords."

Before considering the argument in support of this point, we must remind Prof. Bullock that the burden of George's argument is not that most of the product would be thrown into the hands of landlords (by that name), but that most of it would be thrown out of the hands of its producers.

In support of his second point Prof. Bullock argues that "the growth of population, which is the principal cause of an increased demand for land, is limited by the desire of men to maintain their standard of living or even to raise it." But is growth of population in fact the principal cause of increased demand for land? Doesn't the kind of population count? Won't 100 millionaires cause a much larger demand for land than 100 hod-carriers, simply for their own consumption—residences, clothing, food, luxuries, etc., etc.? Won't any progressive community make vastly larger demands upon land for the supply of their wants than an inert community of equal population? Then isn't it true, as George so forcibly argues, that improvement in the arts and in social conditions, as well as increase of population, is a great factor in creating demand for land? And doesn't it follow that the desire of men to raise their standard of living tends, not to limit but to increase the demand for land?

Proceeding from his two principal points of contention, Prof. Bullock states several others. For one thing, he accuses George of falsely assuming that investors in land never lose, but always gain. George did not assume this as to individual investors; nor even