John MacDonnell

Charles B. Fillebrown

[Reprinted from the book, Natural Taxation, published 1917.
Part I / The Authorities / Chapter 5]

It is odd that a man whose writings have apparently escaped the notice of today's economists should be the only living writer whose work forty?two years later finds place in this symposium. The reason for this obscuration of a brilliant name appears to be that, after having at the thesis age lighted the economic firmament with two excellent and attractive volumes, this author lapsed into the law, and so was lost to the world as an economic reformer.

Several remarkable coincidences may be noted in the careers of these two English American contemporaries, John MacDonnell and Henry George. In 1871 MacDonnell at 25 was Writing a Survey of Political Economy, while George at 32 was publishing Our Land and Land Policy. McDonnell at 27 was publishing the land question in 1873; George at 39 was Publishing Progress and Poverty in 1879. So far as any records goes, they pursued entirely independent ways.

The stories of these men have also their contrasts. Of The Land Question the late Alexander MacMillan, founder of the great publishing house, said to the author: "Our reader thinks well of the book. It is original, and though there is no profit in it, I am interested in it, and will publish it, which he did, and the book met with scholarly appreciation. Progress and Poverty on the contrary, went begging for a publisher but met with phenomenal popular favor.

Antedating by six years Henry George's Progress and Poverty, one is greatly attracted by the clearness with which MacDonnell set forth many of the principles to which George gave extended treatment. His exposition of the burdenlessness of a land tax brings great strength to the cause, because it fills a wide gap in the front line left by Henry George, which was but slowly detected by many of his followers. His statistics of the urban values of his own time, as well as his effectual disposal of fertility as a source of economic rent, more than anticipated Mr. George.

Inasmuch as Mr. George wrote his Our Land and Land Policy as early as 1871, one naturally wonders if that pamphlet had given special stimulus to Mr. MacDonnell's thought. The fact is that he was not so influenced, as his book had a totally different origin. He found in the pamphlet some sentences which agreed with his own conclusions, but they were arrived at independently and in a very natural way. His own discussion goes a long way in helping to distinguish the socialization of rent from the nationalization of land. The interest evoked by the time and circumstance of his writings and their recovery, as it were, for readers of today, is the reason for giving so much importance in this collection to his notably thorough work. No student of economic problems can read these stimulating volumes without regret that the author did not resist the blandishments of English law and bestow upon the world the ripe fruits of his early promise.

Sir John MacDonnell, K. C. B., M.A., was born in 1846. He was a graduate of Aberdeen University, and has long been familiarly known to the law in almost every capacity opened to that profession. He is known as a writer upon law, especially on international law, for the chief reviews and magazines and periodical press, untiring in the cause of law reform and busy just at present with a book on Treaties for the Carnegie Endowment Trustees. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, and editor of Corporation Legislation, a journal not unknown in America.

Soon after graduation, MacDonnell became connected with the Scotsman, a newspaper which advocated the old economic doctrines in their extreme form. A former editor had been McCulloch, the great expositor of the old classical political economy. He was invited by the proprietors to write a series of articles, or a sort of manual of political economy, to correct popular heresies. To the amazement of the proprietors, his study led him to profound disagreement with the orthodox economists. He published a volume stating his conclusions which were at variance not only with the older school, but also with much of Mill's teaching. The book was welcomed as opening up some new paths, and first led many prominent economists to doubt the efficacy of the old doctrines.

At his own home in the Highlands, he had seen some cruel effects of the existing land system, and was brought by them and by continued study to examine the subject and to write this Volume, the Land Question, which was published in 1873.[1] In it all the essentials of the single tax are clearly set forth and ingenious methods of effecting an easy transition from our present systems of taxation are suggested. Several passages from his book are here reproduced to illustrate his line of thought.

He thus describes the nature and origin of economic rent:

Monopolies they, indeed, all are; but some, if not all of them, are natural, spontaneous, and inevitable. They may be used well or ill, but monopolies they will remain.... One class of them, such as land and mines, are monopolies because they, like other natural agents of production, are limited. They yield rent in the economists meaning of the term..... Economists had been at great pains to explain the nature of rent. Starting from the fact that the soil of a country is limited in extent, they have pointed out that even were it homogeneous, of uniform fertility, and equally commodious in all parts, the right to possess it would draw with it the power to extract rent as population expanded. The monopoly of the necessity of existence must create one kind of rent. Economists have also explained that even if the soil of a country be practically unlimited, differences in fertility and situation will originate another kind of rent, that kind which Ricardo has called, not very happily, perhaps, the price paid for "the original and indestructible powers of the soil."

In the following passage, he clearly shows that economic rent belongs to the community because it is produced by the community.

I cannot conceive the distinction between land, or natural monopolies, and other kinds of property being put more clearly and forcibly than in the following passage which I take from an essay by Professor Cairnes: "A bail of cloth, a machine, a house, owes its value to the labor expended upon it, and belongs to the person who expends or employs the labor: a piece of land owes its value -- so far as its value is affected by the causes I am now considering -- not to the labor expended upon it but to that expended upon something else -- to the labor expanded in making a railroad, or in building houses in an adjacent town; and the value thus added to the land belongs, not to the persons who had made the railway or built the houses, but to someone who may not even be aware that these operations are being carried on -- nay, who perhaps has exerted all his efforts to prevent their being carried on."

Of the total proceeds of any acre of ordinary land, so much is the return on the permanent or durable capital -- drain, fences, etc., invested therein; and so much is they return on the circulating capital renewed annually, or at short intervals; and the residue is ascribable to permanent and inherent attributes of the soil, situation, proximity to markets, roads, railways, etc., and to what I may term the general state of society. That the first part should accrue to the landowner, if, as not unfrequently happens, he furnishes the capital for permanent improvements, is right; that the second should go to the usufructuary or farmer is also clear; and what seems equally indisputable is that the last, consisting of economic rent, should go to the general body of society. It having been shown that "economic rent" is paid for differences in quality and situation of land, created by no man, or that it originates in circumstances not to be credited to the landowner, it would naturally have been expected that from Ricardo's principles would have been unanimously and instantly deduced the conclusion that economical rent should not become the subject of private property, that no private individuals should be permitted to monopolize "the original and indestructible properties of the soil," and what no man has created or earned by labor of his, no man should own. It would have been only natural for all who accepted the preceding account of rent to hold that rent which proceeded from the common labors of the community should belong to it, that wages were not more fitly the reward of the laborer or profits the reward of the capitalist, than was rent, as Ricardo understood it, the appanage of the Community or State, and that, to quote the popular phrase, "the Land Was the Property of the People." For these reasons absolute property in land would appear to be theoretically unjust whenever economical rent appears. Of Course, There May Be Cited Other Reasons Why This Should Be so; and, to Name Only One, Land Is a Necessity of Existence, and Society Might Not Subsist Were Men Free to Employ It As They Please. We Would Not Tolerate a Race of Proprietors of the Stamp of the Notorious Lucas, Who Wished to Let His Fields Run to Waste. We Should Be Sacrificing the End to the Means Were We to Suffer the Landowners rights to Make the Existence of Society Impossible, Uncertain, or Difficult. But one Sufficient Reason for Denying Absolute Property in Land, Springs from the Fact That Its Proprietors Becomes, in the Natural Course of Things, the Recipient of an unearned residuum.

We shall, perhaps, be told that there is a great objection in principle to the conclusion here arrived at: it would bring the state into a region and from which it should be excluded. Now, laissez-faire is a good rule when the meddler is antagonistic to the meddled with; but he seems to violate laissez-faire most deeply who lets value which the community, or assuredly no single individual, has created be taken from it by private persons. And if it be possible for the state, or for municipalities, to manage any or all of these monopolies, there seems little standing in the way of the assertion that they are the primary resources of government. Since there are many things from which their owners may, with ordinary exertion, or no exertion at all, draw rent, or something above the usual profits on capital, if too much has not been expended in the purchase, and since the state, every needy, is compelled at present to draw its revenue from taxes which are a hardship to all, and a grievous burden to the poor, it is no paradox to affirm that the maintenance of the state should be provided, as far as may be, out of those funds which nature herself seems to have appropriated to public purposes, or arising as they do out of common warm public exertions. The onus of providing the expediency of letting even one of those funds fall into the private domain rests on those who propose it. In one point of view, it matters little perhaps whether the public or private persons hold the sites of cities. But if one mode of tenure brings vast wealth or competence to a few, and releases so many from the wholesome bondage of labor, and if the other relieves the whole community from burdensome taxes or rates, and eases all a little without giving idleness to any, need we hesitate or doubt as to which is preferable. Such being the alternatives, do we not squander or pawn the natural and primary resources of the state when we suffer private hands to monopolize them? That which presses on no man, yet benefits all, is on the face of it a better mode of obtaining a revenue than that which mulcts all, it may be, unequally, and perhaps to the grievous injury of some. That which, taking from no man is just earnings, yet provides for the just common wants, is conspicuously superior to a system of which the true principle, according to Mr. Lowe, is that you must pinch every class until it cries out. And offer is made of a mode of raising revenue, which takes from none what they have rightly earned, which need rob no man of what he has rightly bought, and which will replenish the treasury, no man being mulcted, no man wronged; and are we to reject this offer, and forever allow so many private interests to gather round this public domain that it shall be useless and perverted. To a like question the answer once made was decidedly negative. For a time the revenue of this, as of every other state of Europe, came from rent. But the answer was revoked: the feudal duties incident to property fell into desuetude, and ultimately they were abolished; much of the Crown land was squandered; and for centuries the nation has been reaping the harvest of its errors, each sheaf whereof has been some tax, often vexatious and cruel. Ministers cannot govern the contrary for less than 70 million pounds. We vex the poor with indirect taxes, we squeeze the rich, we ransack heaven and earth to find some new impost palatable or tolerable, and all the time, these hardships going on, neglected or misapplied, there have lain at our feet a multitude of resources ample enough for all just common wants, growing as they grow, and so marked out that one may say they form nature's budget. Such seems the rationale of the subject of which the land question forms a part. And so we may say that, if property in land be ever placed on a theoretically perfect basis, no private individual will be the recipient of economic rent. Bastiat, it may be mentioned, saw that logic and justice demanded no less; and, anxious to escape from such a conclusion and to buttress the fabric of society as he found it, he sought to undermine the Ricardo's theory, and to prove, in the face of familiar facts, that all rent was the return on the landowner's capital. Less logical economists in this country have at once expounded Ricardo's theory and defended the position of the English landowner. How few have seen and own the simple truth which follows from his doctrine is somewhat amazing, and equally strange is the small number of those who, having seen the truth, were courageous enough to utter it.

Here he indorses Henry George in looking forward to the rent tax as the single tax and in pointing out the natural law by which its volume is apportioned to the growing needs of the community:

But, granting the above to be the ideal both of obtaining revenue, it would follow that just as we should seek to replace loans by taxes, so should we seek to substitute for the latter rent drawn from natural monopolies; and it would seem not unreasonable to hope that as loans have ceased to be the regular resources of all solvent governments, so may taxes. Thus only shall we have the benefits of government without the burden.....

And, granting the above theory to be true, does their not arise a conception of a beautiful, simple, and useful law, providing for the expenditure of the state, without the aid of statesmen's ingenuity, and with all the certainty of a physical law? We recognize the possibility of the normal revenue constantly keeping pace with the normal expenditure. Note the simultaneous movements in both the social wants and the social resources and means. A country, let us suppose, is barbarous and sparsely peopled; we contemplate Persia, or the India of pre-Anglican times. In that low state of civilization the acknowledged common interests are few, and a land revenue, or the rent of the soil, will suffice to cover the common expenses. Then comes to denser state of population: we contemplate modern European countries; the general expenses of society have grown. But, simultaneously with their growth, grows also the needed nutriment, and wherever the common expenses are, of necessity, heaviest, that is, in great towns and cities, there do these monopolies of which we have spoken multiply and wax in remunerativeness. There flourish pauperism and crime, costliest scourges, and there also does the value of land rise highest, and there, too, appear docks, telegraphs, etc.., and other natural monopolies, in the most lucrative form. The wants come, and their causes bring also the wherewithal to satisfy them. Sheer pedantry it would be to limit the expenditure of any state in all circumstances, and however trying the emergencies, to the resources provided by these funds. So long as there exist pauperism and a permanent criminal population, so long as there are wars to be waged, and indemnities to be paid, so long certainly must we resort to taxes or loans. In times of transition, too, such as 1859, for instance, was to India, there may be experienced difficulty in making the expenditure and revenues of all sorts balance. But the ideal to which we should strive to attain, and which may be opened to others states less compromised than England by a long history, seems to be that which I have described. Though that harmony cannot be practically illustrated here, it may be so where there is no call to meet emergencies.

De Tocqueville has told us -- and it scarcely needed a de Tocqueville to tell us -- that a danger ahead in democratic times is the danger lest the power of the government should be employed by "our masters" in bleeding the rich, and adsorbing the earnings of all those whose means tower above their neighbors. Communism, or some of its evils, may invade under the guise of improved taxation or a democratic budget. Graduated income taxes may be gradients to it. And truly, when no principle governs the selection of taxes, or the amount to be taken by means of them, it is hard to convince the interested that they are pushing taxation to extremity. Let those, therefore, who regard the advent of democracy as inevitable, and who do not desire to see government's ruling by largess is extorted from the wealthy by the proletariat, welcome a revenue system which seems to set natural limits and barriers to the demands of potent and rapacious poverty. Let them recollect that there is a peril lest future revenue come from the income tax: that the majority of the electors are not subject to it; that they may encourage resort to it; and that, indeed, this danger almost approaches a certainty, unless we manage to dispense with an income tax. Let them embrace with gladness a system which enlists justice on their side, or rather, what is different, a consciousness on the part of the rapacious that justice is against them. It may prove well hereafter if the share of the state is defined almost as sharply as the portion of the capitalist or the laborer.

We see, then, the possibility of government, local and imperial, without taxation. To no transcendental motives does the project appeal. It demands no miraculous drought of administrative talents or public virtues. It is simple and intelligible. It is nothing but giving the body politic the blood to which it has secreted. And even those who say that the principle is a barren theory, or that we invoke it too late to apply it, will own that it is in unison with much that goes on around us -- with the growing disbelief in laissez-faire as sterility taught of old, the taking over so many branches of industry by the state, the perplexity, strikingly revealed in the report of more than one committee, of how to regulate railways without owning them, the growth of companies of almost state dimensions, and the necessity of investing than with state privileges.

He admits practical difficulties but denies that we should be deterred thereby from moving toward a natural system of taxation, especially when we consider the social benefits which will follow its adoption:

Those, too, will admit that revenue reform would become clear, that all scrappy suggestions would be welded into one principle which a child might understand, and that the march of the financier would be certain, if not easy, were there truth and value in this principle, the departure for which has perhaps not the least of unrecorded errors. I know how far out of the path we and others have strayed, how hard it is to hark back, and how easy it is to speak in three words that which generations of strong minds will not accomplish. We have been putting hills and seas between us and this principle. Not in our time, perhaps never, will they be wholly cast down and utterly dried up. But I still presume to think that it is good to contemplate a splendid possibility, some dim similitude of which may one day be realized, to the unspeakable benefit of society.

I have written the above in deference to the observation of Turgot: "It is always the best with which one ought to be occupied in theory. To neglect this search under the pretext that this best is not practicable in the actual circumstances, and is to wish to solve two questions at once; it is to renounce the advantage of placing the questions in that simplicity which can alone render them susceptible of demonstration; it is to plunge without a clue into a inextricable labyrinth and to wish to investigate all routes at once, or rather it is voluntarily to shut one's eyes to the light by putting oneself in the impossibility of finding it." It will be well, as he advises, to separate the two questions, "What should be done?" and "What can be done?" Now, if theorists have been prone to exaggerate the ease with which principles of the above character could be carried into effect, there has been another error of an opposite kind.

He makes several ingenious suggestions for overcoming the difficulties of the transitional period. If the state is to purchase the land, the purchase may be affected by paint to present landowners that difference between a permanent and a temporary annuity for, say, fifty years, or by making present payments are the reversionary value of the land. But that all the benefits of land nationalization without the complexities and difficulties involved in government ownership may be obtained by the expedients of taxation is clearly hinted in the following remarkable passage:

I presume to think that the acquisition of the soil by the state seems easier or in the light of the simple truths. Time the rather than the huge votes of money, judicious and temperate taxation rather than purchase, may help very much to nationalize the land.

In the following passage he anticipates one of the most modern modes (and undoubtedly the most simple and equitable mode) of ultimately securing to the state the whole or major part of all economic rent. He points out that an old land tax is a burdenless tax, and that therefore equity not only permits but also demands that the rate should be increased at regular intervals. Otherwise landowners as such, escape taxation altogether:

There is another mode which, only give time, would facilitate the same work. It may be shown that if a special tax be imposed upon land, and if it be suffered to subsist, it will, in course of time, cease to be felt as a tax. Land will be bought and sold subject to it; offers will be made, and prices will be settled, with a reference to it; and each purchaser who buys for the purpose of earning the average rate of profit will reduce the purchase money, owing to the existence of the tax. If he does not, it will be because he prefers something to profits. Hence the land tax imposed in 1693, so far as it is not redeemed, has probably ceased to be felt as a tax. "It is no more of a burden on the landlord than the share of one landlord is a burden on the other. The landowners are entitled to no compensation for it, nor have they any claim to its being allowed for, as part of their taxes."[2] Hence, too, it follows that if it was originally fair to impose a tax of 4s, it is now fair to add a tax of the same amount; or, in other words, if the landowner of the reign of Victoria may be justly called upon to bear as heavy a burden as that borne by his forefather, the land tax must be raised to 8s, of which 4s will be a rent charge or the share of a joint tenant, and only the remainder will be of the nature of a tax. Ceteris Paribus, the landowner's profits will be as high under the eight shillings land tax as were those of his predecessor under the 4s. No doubt it may be said that the landlord's return on his capital is constantly diminishing.[3] But this decline is simultaneous with a general law lowering of the rate of profits derivable from all branches of industry; and, admitting the facts to be as alleged, it still would be true that the relative subtraction from the landowners incomes owing to the 4s and the 8s taxes would be the same. In course of time the same causes which effaced the first four shillings would remove the weight of the 8s: whenever land is sold, it will be so with an eye to the existence of the latter tax. The process will not stop here; assuming that rents do not fall, that land is freely sold, that the equivalent taxes levied upon personalty, and that the increments of taxation are imposed at very distant intervals, in the lapse of time each addition to the land tax will be shifted from the landowners. Thus it would seem that there is no taxing them always unless the land tax be repeatedly raised, and that, if such an impost is just at all, the state must in fairness to keep whittling at the portion of the landowner until, at some distant period, it is absorbed by taxation.[4]

Ricardo and the earlier writers on the subject confined their attention almost exclusively to agricultural rent. A merit of McDonnell's treatment is the emphasis which he places upon urban rent. It is here where the abuses of privilege are most rampant. The following passage is noteworthy in this connection:

So far the principles which ought to govern property in land. Let us proceed to apply them with an eye to the special circumstances of the various kinds. There are many reasons why we should begin with urban land. With respect to it there is ample scope and most pressing urgency for the application of the principles which we have stated. In the ground rents of cities are to be seen perfect samples of "economical rent," due to monopoly, produced by no man's labor, assuredly not always by the labor of the owner of the soil. The rents of houses, so far as ground rent is an element therein, are solely the prices paid for situation, or "the original and indestructible properties of the soil." Thus the Duke of Bedford and the Marquis of Westminster exacts some of hundreds of thousands of pounds annually from those who enrich their property. They are remunerated because certain land is situated in Middlesex -- a circumstance in which one may be pardoned for failing to recognize the beneficent hand of the owner. Of the annual ratable value of London, for instance, computed and £23,000,000, an increasingly large portion is the value of ground rents. When a square foot of land in Victoria Street lets for one pound sterling, we may judge of the immense revenue flowing from this source into private purses. Those increments scarcely ever proceed solely from the diligent exertions of the proprietors. Were they imbeciles instead of good men of business, they must earn more than thousands of boiling artisans; were they Solons or Solomons, it would not make much difference. Their position of affluence is independent of virtue or vice, prudence or folly. They exist; that is their service. It was the sole service of most of their ancestors. In the prices paid for sites in cities, we see the most surprising instances of rises in value of that character which Mr. Mill terms of the "unearned increment." A few examples occur to me. Somewhat marvelous of so they may seem, they cannot be scouted as exceptional. A piece of land in Holborn, purchased in 1552 for £160, now yields £5,000 a year; a wharf in Castle Baynard, bought for 2,000 pounds in 1670, lately realized 110,000 pounds; and an acre of land at South Kensington, which sold for £3,200 in 1852, fetched £23,250 in 1860. We are told that the price of an acre of the most valuable uncovered land in the city of London after the great fire of 1660 was £30,000, or about one-third of the value of the land when built upon. At the present time the highest rate for unbuilt land may be taken at £1,000,000 an acre and such value constitutes fully three-fourths of the value of the property after it has buildings on it.

What contribution do those proprietors make to local taxation? It may be asserted that some of their property contributes absolutely nothing to the newly imposed rates, and inadequately to the older rates. The assertion may be proved. At the time when many of the now running leases of ninety-nine years were entered into, there would have been no anticipation of the outlay caused by, and the rates imposed in consequence of, the Thames Embankment and the Main Drainages Scheme. These items could not have formed a factor in old bargains; and such rates imposed, let us bear in mind, for purposes of permanent improvement, must have fallen wholly on those possessing temporary interests -- the owners of houses and the occupier's. It is no doubt true that at certain periods in the first half of this century, the poor -- and country -- rates were high in Middlesex. Thus, in 1803 the poor- and country-rates, with the portion of the church-rate, amounted to 3s 5 1/4d, and in 1868 rates of all kinds to 3s 11 3/4d. But the general tendency has been toward a steady increase of the rates. Nor did these exemptions begin with the imposing of the Metropolitan Consolidated Rate to meet the wants of the Metropolitan Board of Works. One who examines the local or private measures, passed for the most part in the reins of George III and George IV, in order to "pave cleanse, light, water, and embellish" the various squares of London, will find them studded with acts of favoritism to landlords. Looking, for instance, and into George IV, c. 58, relating to Grosvenor Place and other lanes and streets adjoining, I find its 140 clauses one giving powers to commissioners to compel owners and builders of houses where there ought to be streets to pave, level, or gravel them. But the act as specially exempted Robert, Earl of Grosvenor, from paying for the improvement of his own property. It also empowered him to put whenever fences or gates he was pleased to erect on streets which others maintained. A similar provision appears in many of the Act's passed in the last century for the purpose of paving or embellished in the various estates on which much of the west of London is built. Some of the Acts -- for instance, that relating to the Calthorpe estate -- practically absolves the owner of the freehold from all charges. The ratepayers, in short, were mulcted in order to improve and "embellish" the landowners' estates. Thus, the Duke of Bedford went to some expense to with respect to Oakley Square. But I find that the Vestry of St. Pancras repaid him. The facts remain as they are here stated, somewhat shabby and incredible though they may seem.....

We have stirred late, and we cannot now move with ease, but something may yet be done in the right direction; and when London possesses a local government superior to that which that formed by the Local Management Acts, and similar to that which Mr. Mill has proposed, we may take the first great step. Here, if anywhere, there is a sphere and an occasion for the application of Mr. Mill's theory of the unearned increment. Here in the most flagrant form, is that divorce between industry and earnings which breeds communism; and those who hesitate to urge the acquisition of the entire soil by the state may fearlessly put into operation their principles with respect to London and other great cities. For we are not quite too late. Justice may be done, and even generosity accorded, to all concerned, and yet we may be drawing near, at no mean speed, to that ideal time in which the soil shall belong to the community.

To sum up: it is but justice to Sir John MacDonnell to assert that no more recent writer has set forth with greater force and clearness than he, the true nature of economic rent and its peculiar fitness as a source of national and municipal revenue. He recognizes it as a social product and hence as the legitimate property of the state. He emphasizes the importance of urban rent. Finally, his statements are always sane and temperate. He recognizes the difficulties of correcting long-standing abuses, however glaring, and he proposes solutions to the difficult problems which for ingenuity and breadth of vision have not been excelled.


  1. Macdonnell, Sir John, The Land Question, MacMillan & Co., London, 1873.
  2. Mill, J.S., The Principles of Political Economy.
  3. Thiers, L.A., De la Propriete, p.153.
  4. For a detailed statement of this method worked by Mr. C.B. Fillebrown for the city of Boston, see Catechism, No. 65 (chap. xv infra, p.234.

PREFACE Ch. 1 - Adam Smith
Ch. 2 - John Stuart Mill Ch. 3 - Patrick Edward Dove
Ch. 4 - Edwin Burgess Ch. 5 - John MacDonnell
Ch. 6 - Henry George Ch. 7 - Edward McGlynn
Ch. 8 - Thomas G. Shearman, Pt 1 Ch. 8 - Thomas G. Shearman, Pt 2
Ch. 9 - A Burdenless Tax to the Threefold to Support Upon Which the Single Tax Rests Ch. 10 - Land -- the Rent Concept -- the Property Concept
Ch. 11 - Taxation and Housing Ch. 12 - Thirty Years of Henry George
Ch. 13 - Henry George and the Economists Ch. 14 - The Professors and the Single Tax
Ch. 15 - A Catechism of Natural Taxation ...