.


SCI LIBRARY

The Confessions Of A Reformer

Frederic C. Howe



[Part 5 of 11]


CHAPTER 15 / MARK HANNA


...Mark Hanna had a feudal idea of society. "Some mean must rule; the great mass of men must be ruled. Some men must own; the great mass of men must work for those who own." The men to do the ruling were the men who owned. The men to do the serving were those who worked. ...[p.147]

...Senator Hanna along with Foraker, of Cincinnati, ...ruled the State.[p.148]

With the nomination of Mr. Bryan in 1896, Mark Hanna became a national figure. His management of the McKinley campaign put the politics of America on a money basis and shocked ever so slightly the conscience of the nation. He made McKinley President and had himself appointed to the United States Senate, ...[pp.148-149]

Mark Hanna wanted power. Money was the symbol of power in his world. It had no other symbol. Money controlled banks; it controlled public opinion; it controlled the State. So he sought money. Unerring instinct told him, as it told John D. Rockefeller and Tom Johnson, that the easy way to make huge sums of money was not through mills and factories, which were subject to competition, but through the seizure and protection by law of natural resources, railways, and public-utility corporations. Law-made wealth, he saw, was easy and sure.[pp.150-151]

The ethics of these men was clan ethics. They cared for the opinions of their particular herd. They craved the approval of members of the Union Club of the Chamber of Commerce, and the board of directors of the bank. If the quickest way to do business was by bribery, then, since business demands results, that was the "natural," the businesslike, way to proceed. That street-corner orators denounced them as corrupt meant nothing to them unless that plain and ugly word got to their families, where it had to be explained. With the press under their control, district attorneys members of their clubs, and judges men of their selection, they had little fear of criminal proceedings. Difficult to initiate and easily suppressed, such proceedings were frowned down by public opinion, which counted them harmful to business and to the good name of the community.[p.154]

The code of business in relation to labor ran something like this.

By the superior intelligence of the employer a certain amount of wealth is produced, of which capital gets less if labor gets more. Without the employer labor would starve. Organized labor is the enemy of capital. Strike-leaders must be gotten out of the way, by bribery or otherwise.[p.154]

Free immigration provides a labor surplus. Immigrants can be worked twelve hours a day; by mixing nationalities they can be hindered from organizing; when they are maimed or worn out, others take their places. They need not be supported during hard times; when injured they can be sent to public hospitals for repair. Handled intelligently, ignorant men are cheaper than machines. And out of a labor surplus come strike-breakers.[pp.154-155]

CHAPTER 16 / MAKING LAWS AT COLUMBUS


The struggle for A City on the Hill failed because the city was not free. It had only the shadow of self-government. It could not own or operate things, or control private property; it could not levy taxes as it willed. It could only borrow a limited amount of money and for limited uses; it could not control its own employees. The city was little more than a big policeman. Its people were bound like Gulliver by endless thongs written into the constitution and laws of the State. They were helpless before the bosses and business interests that controlled the government. Laws which crippled democracy were written by corporation lawyers. Privileged business defeated demands for home rule; it would not permit the city to own anything or to do anything that interfered with private property. The city could perform only perfunctory things and perform them only as the laws defined. It could give away things easily enough but could not own anything that was valuable, could not control property in the interest of all the people.[p.157]

With three other men from Cleveland I was elected to the State Senate on the reform wave. The Democratic platform was clear-cut. It gave home rule to cities, gave them power to own and operate public-utility corporations, and do practically anything else that the people desired. It taxed railroads and public-utility corporations the same as other property. It committed us to a simple direct primary law, to the initiative and referendum, and the recall.[p.160]

I believed fervently in this platform. We would have great cities -- the city was always my passion -- in America if the people were given power. They had shown in Cleveland their willingness to follow a leader. But we had been thwarted by bad laws, an inflexible constitution, by out-of-date charters. We had failed because we were manacled by laws. Our first task was to get freed from the legislature. And I fully expected that we should succeed. We had a progressive governor, a progressive majority in the Senate, and the best Lower House that had been elected for years. We had the support of the Scripps-McRae papers. Apparently ours was a complete mandate from the people. There was no reason why our legislation should not go through in every detail. I confided my expectations to Ed Doty, who had long been the clerk of the House of Representatives. He laughed cynically. "You'll be lucky," he said, "if you get one bill through."[p.161]

All of our measures were immediately introduced and referred to committees. Public hearings were called. I prepared what seemed to me conclusive briefs on railroad taxation and the initiative and referendum, expecting that early action would be taken on them. But the bills were not reported. They could not be gotten out of committees. We could not get a quorum. ...[pp.162-163]

I came away from the legislature with scant respect for the laws of the land. I had seen how they were made. Some were frankly bought and paid for. Many were passed the last day. Only occasionally were bills in the public interest forced through by the pressure of public opinion. And these were so crippled with amendments that they were of little value. A great part of the laws was so much rubbish.[p.166]

CHAPTER 17 / I THROW AWAY BALLAST


I decided to take stock of my political philosophy. ...My early beliefs in the business man had been shattered by experience in the city council. The Constitution was the Ark of the Covenant in my eyes. Must that too be questioned?[p.168]

I sat down with reluctance to examine my conception of the political state. It meant going back to the men whom I revered most, whose authority on the Constitution and on politics was infallible. It meant sitting in judgment on James Bryce and Woodrow Wilson and on their disciple -- myself. When I left Johns Hopkins I accepted without question the oft-quoted statement of Mr. Gladstone's, that the American Constitution was "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." It was sacrosanct, near to being divinely inspired; it would remain unchanged for all time. To question its perfection or the disinterested motives of the men who framed it was sacrilege. And its chief distinction was that it distributed powers into three categories: the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary -- this and the detachment of officials from popular clamor. These provisions were said to insure calm and dispassionate consideration. Passion was checked, judgment suspended, and intelligent action insured. Under this distribution there was discussion in the committees and then on the floor of the two houses. Before a measure passed beyond control it had to win the approval of the government. Then it had to be tested out in the courts. The co-operation of many minds was expected to bring forth the best possible results. This was "government by discussion," as described in the text-books. It was government by representatives of the people. It was assumed that men in public office wanted only to ascertain the public good and to act upon it; they were detached from private interests and sought by contemplative study to ascertain only the truth on public questions.[p.169]

I cherished this belief in popular government, in the value of discussion, in the marvelous prevision of the makers of the Constitution. But I had been for three years a member of a legislative body in which no one listened to discussions. ...[p.169]

Business men and bosses showed no respect for the Constitution that I had been taught to revere. It had no sanctity in their eyes. The laws they wanted could be driven through it with a coach and four. It was only referred to when some labor measure was to be defeated. Liberal laws for the protection of women and children in industry were always discovered to be unconstitutional, while fifty-year grants to street-railways were upheld. Attempts to regulate tenements or to require safety devices in mines were held to violate sacred property rights, while monopoly powers assumed by private corporations were sustained as in line with progress. The courts constituted themselves judges of what was constitutional and what was not. Their decisions were in the interest of one class and against another. ...The State and the city could give things away without restraint, but when they attempted to own something that made money, or to do something for the welfare of the people, the hand of the court was raised against them.[p.170]

Obviously the Constitution was not what I had believed it to be. It was an instrument that worked easily and well for one class and interest only. Government was something outside it.[p.170]

Continuing my inquiry into the Constitution, I went back to a study of the debates that preceded its adoption. I read the opinions of Alexander Hamilton and his associates and the proposals they made. They did not conceal their desire for an aristocratic form of government. They distrusted democracy and they did everything possible to make the government as undemocratic as possible. They made it complicated and difficult to understand; they introduced divided responsibility, checks and balances -- confusion all along the line. That was their purpose. At the university I had thought of Hamilton as a great statesman -- as the man who had saved the early government from bankruptcy, dissolution, and anarchy. I remembered now that he was a corporation lawyer. His ideas about property and the state were much the same as those of Mark Hanna. Alexander Hamilton feared democracy. He wanted to give the people an appearance of power, no more. To this end officials were made as irresponsible as possible. They were elected for different periods. An electoral college selected the President and Vice President, while State legislatures elected members of the United States Senate. The system was so complex that people could not follow it. They could not register their will. Some one had to give all his time to Politics just to make the machinery work. Hamilton urged these complications. He sought to create an even more aristocratic system. ...[p.174]

At the university we had studied the writings of Aristotle and Plato, of Grotius, of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, of Alexander Hamilton and Jefferson. We knew the theories of the state from Greece to Washington, yet the actual political state under which we lived and in the shadow of which we had studied ... was referred to only by muck-rakers, whom we held in contempt, and in the yellow newspapers, which were not permitted in the university library.[p.175]

CHAPTER 18 / RECASTING MY BELIEFS


My text-book government had to be discarded; my worship of the Constitution scrapped. The state that I had believed in with religious fervor was gone. Like the anthropomorphic God of my childhood it had never existed. But crashing beliefs cleared the air. I saw that democracy had not failed; it had never been tried. We had created confusion and had called it democracy. ...[p.176]

I set down for myself principles that would constitute democracy. I applied biological processes to it. From some source or other I had come to believe that Nature was very wise, and that her rules, by which billions upon billions of creatures were able to live, must be a reasonably good guide for the organized state. I took the pnvate corporation as a guide. Business had succeeded in America and it worked with very simple machinery. It was not bothered by a constitution; it was not balked by checks and balances; it was not compelled to wait for years to achieve what it wanted. Its acts were not supervised by a distant supreme court. The freedom of a private corporation was close to license; what its officials wanted done was done. ...[p.176]

...We had freed the individual but imprisoned the community. We had given power to the corporation but not to the state. The text-books talked of political sovereignty, but what we really had was business sovereignty. And because the business corporation had power while the political corporation had not, the business corporation had become the state.[p.177]

Nor had we followed what nature had to teach. We violated the instincts of man. Politics offered no returns to the man of talent, who wanted to see the fruit of his efforts. If business had been organized like the state, it would have been palsied. Business would have gone bankrupt under the confusion, the complexity, the endless delays which were demanded by the political state.[p.177]

Taking the private corporation as a model, I evolved three basic principles; they were: Government should be easily understood and easily worked; it should respond immediately to the decision of the majority; the people should always rule.[p.177]

Elaborated into a Programme of constitutional change, these principles involved:

(1) The easy nomination of all candidates by petition. There should be no conventions. Direct primaries are the fountainhead of democracy.

(2) Candidates should print their platforms in a few lines on the election ballots. Voters would then know what a man stood for.

(3) The short ballot.

(4) The recall of all elective officials, including judges.[p.177]

(5) The initiative and referendum on the Constitution, on laws, and on city ordinances.

(6) Complete home rule for cities. The city should be a state by itself, with power to do anything of a local nature that the people wanted done. A free city would be like the cities of ancient Greece, like the mediaeval Italian republics, like the cities of Germany to-day. It would inspire patriotism. Able men would be attracted to the task of administering it.

(7) The State Assembly should consist of but one body of not more than fifty members. It should be in continuous session for a four-year term, the governor sitting with it and responsible to it for the exercise of wide powers.

(8) The courts should have merely civil and criminal jurisdiction. They should have no power to interfere with legislation. Congress and the State legislatures should be the sole judges of the constitutionality of their acts. The British Parliament and the legislative bodies of other countries are supreme. America alone has created a third assembly-chamber that has an absolute veto of the popular will.

Such a government would be simple and easily understood. There would be no confusion, no delays. In such a state the people would be free. And they would be sovereign. Under the existing system they were neither sovereign nor free. We had stripped the state of sovereignty; the first thing to do was to restore it. Under such a system we could have a boss if we wanted one. Certainly we should have leaders. But we could hold the leader to responsibility. Things would be done in the open. We should not be living the lie of the existing system, which was not democracy but economic oligarchy.[p.178]

...Public opinion in Cleveland could be aroused over the appointment of an unknown person to the park board. The people were jealous of their parks; they took pride in the public library and the schools, in the grouping of public buildings. But they took no pride in the city council or any of its works. They showed no concern over the election of a corrupt man to the city council or even to the mayoralty.

Why this anomaly?

It seemed that the only men who cared about politics were those who got something out of it. Some of them were at the top -- they got privileges; others were at the bottom -- they got jobs. There was no enthusiasm for the State or the city on the part of the great majority of voters.[p.179]

I had studied municipal administration in England and Germany and had found there a new type of men in city politics and a burning interest in the city on the part of voters. Men of distinction, of irreproachable honesty served as mayors and councilmen. The cities owned and operated street-railways, gas, water, and electric-lighting services; they owned markets and other business agencies. The big municipal industries were owned by the city and operated on a high scale of efficiency. The city was the most important corporation in the community.[pp.179-180]

Here, possibly, was the clew that explained everything -- concern and indifference, honesty and corruption, political dignity and debasement. In England and Germany voters were alert, because the city was a big thing, every one had to give attention to it. Because it was a big enterprise, men of ability wanted to run it, as they want to run banks, factories, business undertakings. They were able to do so because there were no more big profits to be gotten out of grants and franchises. Their purse was no longer at war with their patriotism. Tom Johnson was always saying that a street-railway franchise would corrupt the Twelve Apostles if they were councilmen. England had formerly invited corruption, as had we, by giving away colossal prizes in the form of franchises to men through the control of politics. Acting like an expert in hygiene, she went to the source of the disease: she took the profit herself. The same men who had previously profited by the gifts of the city were now anxious to serve it. They liked to do big things; they hungered for public places without other emolument than the distinction of important work well done.[pp.180-181]

Our business men were no whit different from Englishmen. The trouble was not with the American people, as Mr. Bryce had said, it was with American institutions. We had made the state so unimportant that the people were indifferent. They left it to bosses and to business because it did not serve them. Our failures were not traceable to too much democracy, but to too little. We had built our political system on distrust. ...Business men have bent the political state, cumbersome, unwieldy, unresponsive to its professed uses, to their private gain. But let the state be restored to sovereignty, let it become an important thing, and they would enter its service.[p.181]

My philosophy was recast. Beginning with the sanctity of a document conceived in the past, it ended with a belief in democracy yet to be born.[p.181]

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