VII. The New World Order I:
Molding Public Thought And Opinion
America's Unknown Enemy: Beyond Conspiracy
Editorial Staff of the
American Institute for Economic Research
[1993]
In the Trilateral Commission's publications, Trilateral advocates
have developed a vocabulary (set of names) conducive to molding public
opinion toward acceptance of greater central (bureaucratic or
government) management of the economy -- domestic and international.
As the Glossary of Globalist Names at the end of this chapter
suggests, inaccurate and evasive naming that corresponds neither to
things, events, nor relationships -- as well as naming in contexts
that generate subtly prejudicial associations -- tends to confound
independent thought and give credence to Trilateralist objectives.
Trilateralist language docs not appeal to the hates of the past, but
to the sensibilities of members of affluent "democratic"
cultures. Globalist literature eschews names and phrases that might
elicit negative emotional responses (these 'night reveal disadvantages
and costs rather than benefits); instead, globalist literature employs
names that have favorable connotations.
Many names and phrases in the Trilateral lexicon mirror the principal
techniques of thought control by the manipulation of language that
were enunciated by George Orwell in 1984: the invention of names, the
suppression of "heretical" names, the abbreviation or
contraction of names, reliance on euphony, and the use of names to
refer to the opposite of that in common usage. Certain names appear
repeatedly in contexts that provide strong favorable connotative cues.
Three names so used -- "interdependence," "unilateral,"
and "multilateral" -- predominate in Trilateralist
literature. "Interdependence," used to describe the economic
relationships among sovereign nations, possesses both explicit and
connotative associations. The dictionary definition of "interdependence"
is mutual dependence. Although "dependence" itself is
neutral -- and may or may not connote vulnerability (which in turn
implies threat) it nearly always does so in Trilateralist literature.
Triangle Papers allude to an "intensification of
interdependence" that "becomes even more painful." Thus
interdependence describes "increased vulnerability of the
Trilateral countries to one another as the economic networks binding
their economies together multiplied." This use of "interdependence"
to describe relations between countries trying to "shield
themselves from the actions of others" thus subtly conveys the
notion that management or oversight by some bureaucracy is essential
in order to reduce vulnerability. Use of a different name or phrase to
describe the same economic relationship among countries -- such as "interactant,"
"interrelated," or "engaged in mutually beneficial
trade" - would not convey such a sense of risk that things might
go awry if not managed.
"Unilateral" also has an explicit referent but it, too,
conveys implicit associations. The dictionary definition is "one-sided"
which in turn implies "narrow-minded" and "unfair."
Used in Trilateral context -- such as in the appeal to "move
ahead in fashioning new sharing arrangements rather than continuing
the drift back to unilateralism" -- "unilateral" cues
readers to oppose things so described. The phrase "in the
national interest" used to describe the same thing would be a
different, more favorable cue. "Multilateral," on the other
hand, refers to "many-sided," and by implication to
even-handed and fair treatment. It cues readers to think favorably of
things so described. The use of the phrase, "sacrifice of the
national interest" instead of "multilateral" would
elicit a different, less favorable, emotional response.
Certain names almost never appear in globalist literature: "jail,"
"prison," "coercion," "armed force," "confiscation,"
"expropriation," "dictatorship," "armed
threat," "invasion," "military occupation."
These and many other names that describe how "international order"
might be achieved have been expunged from the Trilateral lexicon.
Instead, "management" is used to refer to the entire scope
of activities that might be undertaken in pursuit of the New
International Economic Order. The adjective "appropriate" is
often appended to names such as "measure," "policy,"
and "response," with all specifics as to why something is "appropriate"
left to the reader's or listener's inference.
Thought Control?
Moreover, by abbreviating names of highly complex things or groups of
things into a single simple name, Trilateral naming subtly narrows,
distorts, and directs thought about them. Consider, for example, the
name "South." In Trilateral language, this name is used to
refer collectively to all of the "less-developed countries (LDCs)"
of the world. Frequently it appears in discussions of the so-called "North-South
dialogue" or "North-South partnership" (the "North"
refers to the "developed countries" as a group). Although
many less developed countries are located in the southern hemisphere,
even brief reflection reveals that so used, the name "South"
is an inaccurate description. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa,
for example, are not "LDCs." Conversely, most of Africa and
all of southern and eastern Asia are located outside the southern
hemisphere.
Why, then, the name "South"? The use of the name "South"
to refer to any nonindustrialized place permits globalists to
circumvent the "messy" task of convincing taxpayer-citizens
that the globalists' program in its specifics is in the public
interest. Obscurantism disarms potential public opposition much more
readily. That the elitist Trilateral bureaucrats may be wrong about
what they think is in the public interest apparently is of no
significant consequence to them.
Although Trilateralist language is not nonsensical "'gabble,"
it reflects a bias for names that obscure rather than clarify and lull
rather than awaken. There is so much "sharing," "fairness,"
"equitable consideration," "harmonious integration,"
and "positive adjustment" in Trilateralist work that the
less than fully alert reader easily might be lulled into believing
that this is a planet of saints and the leaders of the New
International Economic Order a band of angels. This is far from the
actual, for these soothing names are the tools of the language of
power.
Trialateral Commission Proposals
Each of the Trilateral Commission's numerous "Task Force Reports"
utilizes language in this way to persuade readers to the Trilateral
viewpoint on some important issue affecting the world economy.
Triangle Papers are co-authored by one representative from
each of the Trilateral regions -- North America, Western Europe, and
Japan -- an arrangement that the Commission asserts makes it "possible
to achieve a broad consensus among members on subjects such as those
dealt with in these reports." In this way, the leaders of the
Trilateral Commission effectively conscript all its members into an
implied support for the reports as "constructive policies that
offer long-term solutions to world problems."
The Task Force Reports focus on perceived problems in the following
areas: the international monetary system, political developments,
developing countries, trade, energy, and East-West relations. These
problems all require, according to the Commission, a coordinated
effort by which the "Trilateral process" can "manage
international economic interdependencies" that have been created
since World War II. In the accompanying summary "Selected
Triangle Papers," some of the major recommendations made in the
Triangle Papers are outlined.
The apologia for these Trilateral recommendations seems to be rooted
not in Adam Weishaupt or Marxist-Leninist ideologies but in Walt. W.
Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
Ever since the publication in 1961 of this "manifesto,"
would-be global managers have clung to the notion that carefully
orchestrated economic development would promote both world peace and
prosperity. Central to this view was Rostow's assertion that when any
society reaches the "age of high-mass consumption" the "aggressive
habits of the immature society are discarded." Accordingly,
Soviet-style Communism, said Rostow, was but "a disease of the
transition" to the final stage of economic growth, and its demise
would be hastened by any economic intercourse that might accelerate
internal development in the Soviet Union. Likewise, he argued, the
threat of Communism in underdeveloped countries could best be thwarted
by encouraging rapid economic growth in those countries.
The international economic policy implications from this analysis
were two-fold: (1) economic trade -- including the transfer of
technology -- with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations ought
to be expanded; and (2) massive and sustained "external aid would
be required to lift all of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America into regular growth." The Trilateralists Henry Kissinger
and Zbigniew Brzezinski, heirs to Rostow's throne as mentor of
aspiring global managers, persistently advocated both such policies.
Trilateral Proposals Ignore History
Plainly, however, this view of the relationship between economics and
a society's propensity (or lack thereof) to pursue a course of
peaceful intercourse with other nations is totally at odds with
observed events. While it is accurate to assert, for example, that
Communist Third World nations are "poof" nations in relation
to advanced Western countries, it does not follow that prosperity will
reduce their professed ambition to export their rule to their more
prosperous neighbors. Even the most extravagant overconsumption failed
to brake Roman ambitions, no degree of early "success"
restrained Hitler's Germany from pursuing world hegemony; and the high
standard of living in pre-Castro Cuba (the second highest in Latin
America) failed to keep it from becoming the first country in the
Western hemisphere to succumb to a Communist takeover.
Even brief reflection on the post-WWII behavior of the Western powers
(and recent events in Central and Eastern Europe) suggests that the
Rostovian view may be too narrow. In the Western industrialized
nations, it has become commonplace for socialist initiatives to gain
ground during periods of relative prosperity. The burgeoning of the
welfare mechanism in the United States precisely during a period of
rapid growth in the 4 decades following World War II is a case in
point.
Government planners whose policies actually may have thwarted
economic growth often have taken credit for prosperity due to policies
they opposed,
i.e., tax reform. (The "Massachusetts miracle," for
which Michael Dukakis claimed credit and which led to his 1988
presidential candidacy, is an extreme case in point. As of this
writing, that state's economy is reeling under the effects of decades
of social legislation that has crippled businesses, led to the
disintegration of the state's infrastructure, and promises to
overwhelm individual taxpayers.)
In our view, rather than promoting democratic capitalism,
internationalist "cooperation," economic or otherwise, that
enhances the stature of established socialist governments (no matter
what they call themselves nowadays) is just as likely to entrench in
power those most wedded to the old policies. In short, what is to
prevent the "old guard" from taking credit for related "improvements"
in domestic conditions, just as our own politicians claim credit for
economic successes that the American people are able to achieve in
spite of their interference?
Rather, events in the Soviet Union and the Eastern-bloc countries
would seem to suggest that the economic failure of socialist economies
there has been directly linked to popular demands for democratic --
and to some extent capitalistic -- reforms. Why, then, pursue a
foreign policy that is calculated to perpetuate those in power?
The International "Debt Crisis"
Trilateral plans to promote economic development in the Third World
likewise ignore the relevant lessons of history. For example, central
planners have doggedly pursued financial policies that have
historically been shown to be unsound. Bypassing the market mechanism
for allocating credit is a case in point. Since its inception, the
Trilateral Commission has urged that increasing amounts of credit be
channeled to less-developed countries via government to government
grants, government guarantees of private credit, and credit from
international lending agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank.
Trilateral papers have consistently proposed the adoption of larger
and larger credit "quotas" for member nations in the IMF and
greater and greater commitments to the General Agreement to Borrow.
Today, IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which were initially gold
units, are simply an index of currencies -- and SDR allocations have
been extended above those initially proposed.
Consequently, many borrower-nations received sums of funds vastly
greater than private investors or creditors alone were willing to
commit, and the "international debt crisis" indicates these
sums are vastly greater than the debtor countries have been able to
repay. To date, outright defaults by debtor nations have been avoided
by emergency credit from various government, central bank, and
international lending organizations and by reschedulings, which are
rewriting of debt terms. But as we see the situation, there is little
chance that most of the debt ever will be paid in real-resource terms;
therefore, almost surely some resources will have passed uncompensated
from the "North" to the "South," as Trilateral
reports have recommended. It will not be the bankers' wealth, however,
that will be transferred if government intervenes. Rather, it will be
the unsuspecting public's wealth transferred through tax-supported
agency loans to replace the bankers' credits or through reducing the
real value of past dollar-denominated debts via more inflating.[1]
This illustrates how unsound economic policies promoted by the
economic managers generate new "problems" that elitists
always see as requiring more management. Typical of bureaucracy,
failure breeds more power, not less.
Trilateral Commission reports cite the debt crisis as evidence of the
need for more intervention by international agencies in the economic
affairs of sovereign nations. One
Triangle Paper, for example, argues that the GATT ought to be
provided with "new international rules to cover sectors which are
currently outside or virtually outside the GATT framework." These
would embrace services, investments, and intra-firm trading.
Unilateral and bilateral agreements now outside GATT would be brought
"under international rules and discipline." Moreover; the
GATI' would assume the power to grant subsidies when needed. ("The
applicant for relief should be required to provide GATT with the
details of his adjustment or rehabilitation policy for the domestic
industry in question.") GATI' would assume permanent control of
all domestic agricultural subsidies. Accordingly, "clandestine
unilateral or bilateral arrangements for protection should be
dismantled and subjected to improved safeguard conditions."
Boiled down, this Trilateral Commission proposal asserts that because
the interests of different countries industrialized as well as "developing"
-- have diverged from those set out in previous Trilateral plans for
cooperation, sovereign governments must be stripped of the powers to
rule their own affairs and forced into cooperation" by
supranational government -- "for their own good," of course.
We share the view that government impediments to the international
flow of goods, services, and funds -- that is, trade and capital
restrictions -- are economically harmful. Thus, the GATT objective of
reducing tariffs and other obstacles to international transactions
merits support. But the method recommended by the Trilateralists is
dishonest and flawed. Sovereign power need not and should not be
relinquished to some supposedly objective supranational bureaucracy.
If there are sound reasons for the elimination or reduction of trade
and capital barriers, negotiators for sovereign governments should be
just as capable of recognizing that their self-interests are served
thereby as would supranational bureaucrats. Educating sovereign
negotiators to these benefits may take some time, yet the longer
process may better ensure that various interests are indeed served. We
do not subscribe to the notion that an "objective" third
party could better serve U.S. interests than could U.S. negotiators;
the United States is simply not the same as other countries.
Recent Trilateralist Directions
Recent Trilateralist publications have been somewhat subdued. During
the latter years of their publication, the
Triangle Papers, which ceased in 1985, rejected "detente"
with the Soviet Union, paid some lip service to the desirability of
free-market economies, and acknowledged that the hopes expressed
earlier for "multinational cooperation" tended to be
exaggerated and naive. Nevertheless, the Trilateralists persist in
promoting a "New World Order" to be run by some sort of
supranational authority. A representative statement from Triangle
Paper 28 "Democracy Must Work: A Trilateral Agenda for the
Decade" (1984) suggests the extent to which the Trilateralists'
professed commitments to democracy and national defense are overcome
by their urge for world power: "We see the essential freedom of
democracy to be broadly incompatible with a state controlled economy
and we are not afraid to openly reject communism [the implication
being that some Trilateralists are afraid to do so! -- Ed.] and to
attempt to devise a global system where the communist philosophy
withers and has no new converts." A careful reading of recent
Trilateralist literature suggests that the contemplated "global
system" would be nothing short of global totalitarianism.
Of course, a number of the potential disasters predicted by the
Trilateralists during the 1970's and early 1980's -- such as the "energy
crises" and "meteorological crises" -- have passed from
public view and are no longer readily exploitable for Trilateralist
purposes. Other Trilateralist plans for international "cooperation"
simply found no takers. But virtually any trumped-up "crisis"
or dissatisfaction with existing arrangements can be made to serve as
grist for the Trilateralist mill.
For example in the mid-1980's, widespread dissatisfaction with the
floating exchange rate system was the occasion for a spate of
Trilateralist proposals to create a new "international monetary
authority." In this respect, a new Trilateralist-oriented
organization, the Institute for International Economics, has been the
principal "research" agency. Headed by Trilateralist C. Fred
Bergsten, who was Under Secretary of the Treasury under President
Jimmy Carter, that Institute was founded in 1981 "through a
generous commitment of funds from the German Marshall Fund of the
United States." Already it has published many studies professing
the need for more international "management" of world
monetary arrangements. President Reagan included in his 1986 State of
the Union message a reference to the need for -- and commissioned a
study to inquire into the possibility of establishing -- a new
international monetary system to be "managed" by a then
vaguely described agency. (The "Group of Five" [now the "Group
of Seven"], which erroneously has been credited with promoting
international monetary stability, was the subsequent brainchild of
this attempt at international monetary management.)
The Market Alternative to Elitist "Management"
The fatal flaw in Trilateral thinking is the belief that "competition"
and "cooperation" are antithetical and that therefore
so-called global problems require a comprehensive blueprint formulated
by a few "enlightened" individuals from the Trilateral
regions. Voluntary cooperation is fostered by competition in the
marketplace. It does not require governmental "direction";
it requires merely a set of rules that prohibits such acts as fraud
and theft. The marketplace adjusts the actions of consumers and
producers so that economic activity is geared to satisfy market
participants to the greatest extent without infringing upon anyone's
rights.
Some people may object that market decisions are "inequitable"
and that it would take lesser-developed countries longer to develop --
and so prolong human misery -- if "aid" were not available.
This notion that progress attends equitable results rather than
equitable treatment under the law seems to have an eternal popular
appeal in spite of abundant evidence to the contrary. Centrally
planned programs are notorious for producing surpluses in production
in some areas and shortages in others, but they also wrongly suggest
to the people that politicians and bureaucrats (national or
international) can ensure that their economic needs are taken care of.
The history of such welfare programs on both the domestic and
inter-national levels (as in the case of multibillion dollar
governmental aid programs to the development of the Third World)
demonstrates that recipients do not advance economically from them but
rather become increasingly dependent on them and beholden to the "donors."
Consider the wide difference between the promises made by the central
planners and the realized performance of their development programs to
date. How much better off politically and economically is the vast
majority of the population in the undeveloped countries as a result of
aid programs?
Plainly, aid directed through the governments in many of these
countries has enhanced the ability of those already politically
powerful to further their aims. But whether these aims coincide with
the preferences of consumers and producers or with the interests of
the majority of people is another matter. Development "aid"
has been used in some places to promote programs that local political
leaders genuinely believed to be in the best economic interests of the
populace. However, these well-intentioned programs often created many
new problems that their sponsors did not anticipate. For example,
development programs of the 1960's involving subsidies to promote
industrialization are widely criticized by today's "development"
economists for misdirecting developing-country resource allocations
away from agricultural pursuits and thereby causing widespread hunger
and starvation. In other places, international economic aid has been
used to enhance the power of existing tyrannical governments by "rewarding"
the faithful and expanding the government bureaucracy with virtually
no economic benefit to the general public.
But in virtually no country can it be shown that such aid contributed
efficiently to the sustained improvement in the lives of the general
population. Rather, many "beneficiaries" of international
aid appear to be verging on the brink of massive social, economic, and
political disruption. In such a climate, the outlook for the future
lives of many inhabitants of the Third World is grim indeed.
It need not have been so -- as the historical record attests. During
the 18th and 19th centuries, less developed countries -- the United
States was a prime one -- entered the developed stage rapidly by
providing a legal and political structure attractive to private
foreign capital. There were no aid projects or international aid
agencies then, yet the world advanced rapidly in economic terms and in
terms of individual sovereignty. To be sure, there were abuses of
power and special privilege, but the alternatives available to the
great majority of the people -- economically and politically -- were
far more at the end of the century than at the beginning. Progress was
made, and it was substantial.
No convincing evidence has been presented suggesting that the
successful approach of the last century would not be applicable this
century. Accordingly, there is reason to think that if the legal and
political structure in the developing countries were inviting to
private capital, then there would have been "voluntary"
private investment in the developing countries -- allocating
decentrally, outside the incumbent political power structure, and
consistent with evolutionary potential for usefully "absorbing"
capital.
When investment mistakes occur in the private sector -- as of course
they do -- the "damage is minimized. (Many would likely be
surprised at the list of "failures" that accompanied rapid
economic growth in the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries --
failures that nevertheless did not thwart continued economic
progress.) Unlike contemporary government's penchant for big,
all-or-nothing projects (and almost pathological political fear that
they might fail), private investment historically has been more
prudently inclined to limit the scope of "experimental"
projects. And unlike government-directed funding that seems to know no
limits, private investment tends to abandon failed projects much
Sooner. Consequently, any dislocations resulting from unsuccessful
private ventures are less harsh than is the case with government
projects, and the drain on resources less severe.
In short, private investment promotes economic flexibility; central
planning promotes inflexibility. In this regard, the relationship
between national and international economic activity is indeed "inter-dependent."
For central planning on a national scale (which expropriates potential
private investment capital) begets central planning on an
international scale (given that political leaders have concluded that
international "development" is desirable and since less
private investment capital is avail-able.) Conversely, as "management"
of the international debt crisis indicates, global planning in turn
fosters even more central planning within sovereign nations -- as well
as outright abrogation of sovereignty. What happens in the "Third
World" is indeed relevant to what will happen in the United
States and other developed countries -- but not for the reasons cited
by the Trilateralists (e.g., that global catastrophe will ensue if
undeveloped nations are not quickly given their "fair share").
Rather, it is "global management" itself that is the
greatest threat to both national and international prosperity.
NOTES
- See "Lessons of the Debt 'Crisis,"' Research
Reports, April 2, 1984.
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